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Domain Name System Operations A. Dulaunoy
Internet-Draft CIRCL
Intended status: Informational A. Kaplan
Expires: 29 October 2024
Expires: 28 February 2025
P. Vixie
H. Stern
Farsight Security, Inc.
W. Kumari
Google
27 April 2024
27 August 2024
Passive DNS - Common Output Format
draft-dulaunoy-dnsop-passive-dns-cof-11
draft-dulaunoy-dnsop-passive-dns-cof-12
Abstract
This document describes a common output format of Passive DNS Servers
This document describes a common output format of Passive DNS servers
that clients can query. The output format description also includes
a common semantic for each Passive DNS system. By having multiple
Passive DNS Systems adhere to the same output format for queries,
@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Status of This Memo
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 29 October 2024.
This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 February 2025.
Copyright Notice
@ -53,9 +53,9 @@ Copyright Notice
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Common Output Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. ABNF grammar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. Mandatory Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3.1. rrname . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3.2. rrtype . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3.1. rrname . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3.2. rrtype . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3.3. rdata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3.4. time_first . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3.5. time_last . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Optional Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4.1. count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3.5. time_last . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4. Optional Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4.1. count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4.2. bailiwick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5. Additional Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5.1. sensor_id . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5.2. zone_time_first . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5.3. zone_time_last . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5.4. origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5.5. time_first_ms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5.3. zone_time_last . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.5.4. origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.5.5. time_first_ms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.5.6. time_last_ms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.6. Additional Fields Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.7. Additional notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.8. Suggested MIME Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.3. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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1. Introduction
Passive DNS is a technique described by Florian Weimer in 2005 in
Passive DNS replication, F Weimer - 17th Annual FIRST Conference on
Computer Security [WEIMERPDNS]. Since then, multiple Passive DNS
implementations were created and have evolved over time. Users of
these Passive DNS servers may query a server (often via WHOIS
[RFC3912] or HTTP REST [REST]), parse the results, and process them
in other applications.
Computer Security [WEIMERPDNS]. It is a mechanism for logging DNS
answers in a manner intended to minimize the privacy implications to
users, and is widely by security researchers to investigate malware
(for example to discover command and control servers), and other
security threats. By capturing only the "cache fill" DNS responses
(responses from authoritative servers in response to queries
performed by a recursive resolver when iteratively resolving a name),
Passive DNS does not have access to the client (users) source IP,
source port, destination IP, or destination port.
There are multiple implementations of Passive DNS software. Users of
Passive DNS query each implementation and aggregate the results for
their search. This document describes the output format of four
Passive DNS Systems ([DNSDB], [DNSDBQ] , [PDNSCERTAT], [PDNSCIRCL]
and [PDNSCOF]) that are in use today and that already share a nearly
identical output format. As the format and the meaning of output
fields from each Passive DNS need to be consistent, this document
proposes a solution to commonly name each field along with its
corresponding interpretation. The format follows a simple key-value
structure in JSON [RFC4627] format. The benefit of having a
consistent Passive DNS output format is that multiple client
implementations can query different servers without having to have a
separate parser for each individual server. passivedns-client
[PDNSCLIENT] currently implements multiple parsers due to a lack of
standardization. The document does not describe the protocol (e.g.
WHOIS [RFC3912], HTTP REST [REST]) nor the query format used to query
the Passive DNS. Neither does this document describe "pre-recursor"
Passive DNS Systems. Each of these are separate topics and deserve
their own RFC documents. This document describes the current best
practices implemented in various Passive DNS server implementations.
As these answers are served in response to queries originally
initiated by user devices, the Passive DNS data can be used to detect
if devices using the resolver are connecting to known malicious
domains, without identifying the individual users / devices. In
addition, as answers are responses to queries made by the recursive
server itself, Passive DNS records the answers which are ultimately
served to users. This is important as authoritative servers may
serve different answers to different query addresses, for example to
increase performance (e.g Client Subnet in DNS Queries [RFC7871]) or
to hide malicious behavior when queried from addresses known to be
associated with security researchers.
Passive DNS is usually implemented either by capturing DNS response
packets themselves (i.e packets with a destination address of the
recursive resolver, a source port of 53, and the QR bit set to 1) or
by having the DNS software itself log these responses. The latter
method is likely to become more common as recursive to authoritative
DNS communication becomes encrypted.
Multiple Passive DNS implementations and services exist. Users of
these Passive DNS services may query a server (often via WHOIS
[RFC3912] or HTTP REST [REST]), parse the results, and process them
in other applications. Users of Passive DNS query each
implementation and aggregate the results for their search. This
document describes the output format of four Passive DNS Systems
([DNSDB], [DNSDBQ] , [PDNSCERTAT], [PDNSCIRCL] and [PDNSCOF]) that
are in use today and that already share a nearly identical output
format. As the format and the meaning of output fields from each
Passive DNS need to be consistent, this document proposes a solution
to commonly name each field along with its corresponding
interpretation. The format follows a simple key-value structure in
JSON [RFC4627] format. The benefit of having a consistent Passive
DNS output format is that multiple client implementations can query
different servers without having to have a separate parser for each
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individual server. passivedns-client [PDNSCLIENT] currently
implements multiple parsers due to a lack of standardization. The
document does not describe the protocol (e.g. WHOIS [RFC3912], HTTP
REST [REST]) nor the query format used to query the Passive DNS.
Neither does this document describe "pre-recursor" Passive DNS
Systems. Each of these are separate topics and deserve their own RFC
documents. This document describes the current best practices
implemented in various Passive DNS server implementations.
1.1. Requirements Language
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"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Limitation
2. Limitations
As Passive DNS servers can include protection mechanisms for their
operation, results might be different due to those protection
measures. These mechanisms filter out DNS answers if they fail some
criteria. The bailiwick algorithm [BAILIWICK] protects the Passive
DNS Database from cache poisoning attacks [CACHEPOISONING]. Another
limitation that clients querying the database need to be aware of is
that each query simply gets a snapshot-in-time answer at the time of
querying. Clients MUST NOT rely on existing answers from different
Passive DNS database. Nor should they assume that answers will be
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identical across multiple Passive DNS Servers.
DNS Database from cache poisoning attacks. Another limitation that
clients querying the database need to be aware of is that each query
simply gets a snapshot-in-time answer at the time of querying.
Clients MUST NOT rely on existing answers from different Passive DNS
database. Nor should they assume that answers will be identical
across multiple Passive DNS servers.
3. Common Output Format
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Formal grammar as defined in ABNF [RFC2234]
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answer = entries
entries = * ( entry newline )
entry = ws "{" ws keyvallist ws "}" ws
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)
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Figure 1
Note that value is defined in JSON [RFC4627] and has the same
specification as there. The same goes for the definition of string.
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Senders SHOULD send an array for rdata, but receivers MUST be able to
accept a single-string result for rdata.
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3.3.1. rrname
This field returns the name of the queried resource. Represented as
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a decimal value (as mentioned above) answer represented as a JSON
[RFC4627] number.
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3.3.3. rdata
This field returns the resource records of the queried resource.
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timestamp). The time zone MUST be UTC. This field is represented as
a JSON [RFC4627] number.
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3.3.5. time_last
This field returns the last time that the unique tuple (rrname,
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3.4.1. count
Specifies how many authoritative DNS answers were received at the
Passive DNS Server's collectors with exactly the given set of values
Passive DNS server's collectors with exactly the given set of values
as answers (i.e. same data in the answer set - compare with the
uniqueness property in "Mandatory Fields"). The number of requests
is expressed as a decimal value. This field is represented as a JSON
[RFC4627] number.
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3.4.2. bailiwick
The bailiwick is the best estimate of the apex of the zone where this
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timestamp). The time zone MUST be UTC. This field is represented as
a JSON [RFC4627] number.
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3.5.3. zone_time_last
This field returns the last time that the unique tuple (rrname,
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that the resolution is in milliseconds since 1st of January 1970
(UTC).
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3.5.6. time_last_ms
Same meaning as the field "time_last", with the only difference, that
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3.7. Additional notes
An implementer of a passive DNS Server MAY chose to either return
An implementer of a passive DNS server MAY chose to either return
time_first and time_last OR return zone_time_first and
zone_time_last. In pseudocode: (time_first AND time_last) OR
(zone_time_first AND zone_time_last). In this case,
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3.8. Suggested MIME Types
An implementer of a passive DNS Server SHOULD serve a document in
An implementer of a passive DNS server SHOULD serve a document in
this Common Output Format with a MIME header of "application/
x-ndjson".
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4. Acknowledgements
Thanks to the Passive DNS developers who contributed to the document.
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6. Privacy Considerations
Passive DNS Servers capture DNS answers from multiple collection
Passive DNS servers capture DNS answers from multiple collection
points ("sensors") which are located on the Internet-facing side of
DNS recursors ("post-recursor passive DNS"). In this process, they
intentionally omit the source IP, source port, destination IP and
destination port from the captured packets. Since the data is
captured "post-recursor", the timing information (who queries what)
is lost, since the recursor will cache the results. Furthermore,
since multiple sensors feed into a passive DNS server, the resulting
since multiple sensors feed into a passive DNS system, the resulting
data gets mixed together, reducing the likelihood that Passive DNS
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Servers are able to find out much about the actual person querying
the DNS records. In this sense, passive DNS Servers are similar to
systems are able to find out much about the actual person querying
the DNS records. In this sense, passive DNS systems are similar to
keeping an archive of all previous phone books - if public DNS
records can be compared to phone numbers - as they often are.
Nevertheless, the authors strongly encourage Passive DNS implementors
to take special care of privacy issues. bortzmeyer-dnsop-dns-privacy
is an excellent starting point for this. Finally, the overall
to take special care of privacy issues. Finally, the overall
recommendations in RFC6973 [RFC6973] should be taken into
consideration when designing any application which uses Passive DNS
data.
Passive DNS attempts to collect information necessary for security
(such as malware protection) in as privacy protecting a manner as
possible, and is intended to be used instead of more invasive
methods. It does this by only collecting DNS cache-fill answers, and
not any information associated with who caused the name to be
resolved, nor why the name was resolved. Nevertheless, it is
possible that this may still lead to privacy concerns - for example,
if Passive DNS records show that a recursive resolver resolved the
name the-mary-and-john-smith-family.example.com, it may be possible
to infer that the Smith family is using that resolver. Operators of
Passive DNS servers should be aware of this and take appropriate
steps to limit access to the data.
Passive DNS operators are encouraged to read and understand RFC7258
[RFC7258]
In the scope of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR -
Directive 95/46/EC), operators of Passive DNS Server needs to ensure
Directive 95/46/EC), operators of Passive DNS server needs to ensure
the legal ground and lawfulness of its operation.
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7. Security Considerations
In some cases, Passive DNS output might contain confidential
information and its access might be restricted. When a user is
information and its access should be restricted. When a user is
querying multiple Passive DNS and aggregating the data, the
sensitivity of the data must be considered.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.
8. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, DOI 10.17487/RFC2234,
November 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2234>.
[RFC3597] Gustafsson, A., "Handling of Unknown DNS Resource Record
(RR) Types", RFC 3597, DOI 10.17487/RFC3597, September
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3597>.
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[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
[RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3912, September 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3912>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", RFC 4627,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4627, July 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4627>.
[RFC3597] Gustafsson, A., "Handling of Unknown DNS Resource Record
(RR) Types", RFC 3597, DOI 10.17487/RFC3597, September
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3597>.
[RFC6648] Saint-Andre, P., Crocker, D., and M. Nottingham,
"Deprecating the "X-" Prefix and Similar Constructs in
Application Protocols", BCP 178, RFC 6648,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6648, June 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6648>.
[RFC2234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, DOI 10.17487/RFC2234,
November 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2234>.
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[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.
8.2. References
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[BAILIWICK]
Edmonds, R., "Passive DNS Hardening", 2010,
<https://archive.farsightsecurity.com/Passive_DNS/
passive_dns_hardening_handout.pdf>.
[RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.
[CACHEPOISONING]
Kaminsky, D., "Black ops 2008: It's the end of the cache
as we know it.", 2008,
<http://kurser.lobner.dk/dDist/DMK_BO2K8.pdf>.
[DNSDB] Security, F., "DNSDB API", 2013,
<https://api.dnsdb.info/>.
[DNSDBQ] Vixie, P., "DNSDB API Client, C Version", 2018,
<https://github.com/dnsdb/dnsdbq>.
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[WEIMERPDNS]
Weimer, F., "Passive DNS Replication", 2005,
<http://www.enyo.de/fw/software/dnslogger/
first2005-paper.pdf>.
[PDNSCOF] Dulaunoy, D. P. A., "Passive DNS server interface using
the common output format", 2019,
<https://github.com/D4-project/analyzer-d4-passivedns/>.
[github_issue_17]
et.al, P. V. W. A. K., "Discussion on the existing
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OR time_{first,last}", 2020,
<https://github.com/adulau/pdns-qof/issues/17>.
9. Informative References
[RFC7871] Contavalli, C., van der Gaast, W., Lawrence, D., and W.
Kumari, "Client Subnet in DNS Queries", RFC 7871,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7871, May 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7871>.
[BAILIWICK]
Edmonds, R., "Passive DNS Hardening", 2010,
<https://archive.farsightsecurity.com/Passive_DNS/
passive_dns_hardening_handout.pdf>.
[PDNSCLIENT]
Lee, C., "Queries 5 major Passive DNS databases: BFK,
CERTEE, DNSParse, ISC, and VirusTotal.", 2013,
<https://github.com/chrislee35/passivedns-client>.
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[REST] Fielding, R. T., "Representational State Transfer (REST)",
2000, <http://www.ics.uci.edu/~fielding/pubs/dissertation/
rest_arch_style.htm>.
[DNSDB] Security, F., "DNSDB API", 2013,
<https://api.dnsdb.info/>.
[PDNSCERTAT]
CERT.at, "pDNS presentation at 4th Centr R&D workshop
Frankfurt Jun 5th 2012", 2012,
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Luxembourg, C. -. I. R. C., "CIRCL Passive DNS", 2012,
<https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/>.
[PDNSCLIENT]
Lee, C., "Queries 5 major Passive DNS databases: BFK,
CERTEE, DNSParse, ISC, and VirusTotal.", 2013,
<https://github.com/chrislee35/passivedns-client>.
[PDNSCOF] Dulaunoy, D. P. A., "Passive DNS server interface using
the common output format", 2019,
<https://github.com/D4-project/analyzer-d4-passivedns/>.
[REST] Fielding, R. T., "Representational State Transfer (REST)",
2000, <http://www.ics.uci.edu/~fielding/pubs/dissertation/
rest_arch_style.htm>.
[WEIMERPDNS]
Weimer, F., "Passive DNS Replication", 2005,
<http://www.enyo.de/fw/software/dnslogger/
first2005-paper.pdf>.
8.3. Informative References
[DNSDBQ] Vixie, P., "DNSDB API Client, C Version", 2018,
<https://github.com/dnsdb/dnsdbq>.
Appendix A. Examples
@ -606,18 +646,6 @@ Appendix A. Examples
If you query a passive DNS for the rrname www.ietf.org, the passive
dns common output format can be:
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{"count": 102, "time_first": 1298412391, "rrtype": "AAAA",
"rrname": "www.ietf.org", "rdata": "2001:1890:1112:1::20",
"time_last": 1302506851}
@ -625,9 +653,27 @@ Internet-Draft Passive DNS - Common Output Format April 2024
"rrname": "www.ietf.org", "rdata": "4.31.198.44",
"time_last": 1389022219}
Figure 2
If you query a passive DNS for the rrname ietf.org, the passive dns
common output format can be:
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{"count": 109877, "time_first": 1298398002, "rrtype": "NS",
"rrname": "ietf.org", "rdata": "ns1.yyz1.afilias-nst.info",
"time_last": 1389095375}
@ -638,6 +684,8 @@ Internet-Draft Passive DNS - Common Output Format April 2024
"rrname": "ietf.org", "rdata": "2001:1890:123a::1:1e",
"time_last": 1330209752}
Figure 3
Please note that the examples imply that a single query returns a
single set of JSON objects. For example, two queries were made; one
query returned a set of two JSON objects and the other query returned
@ -655,7 +703,7 @@ Authors' Addresses
Alexandre Dulaunoy
CIRCL
122, rue Adolphe Fischer
L-1521 Luxembourg
L-L-1521 Luxembourg
Luxembourg
Phone: (+352) 247 88444
Email: alexandre.dulaunoy@circl.lu
@ -668,18 +716,20 @@ Authors' Addresses
Email: aaron@lo-res.org
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Paul Vixie
Farsight Security, Inc.
11400 La Honda Road
Woodside, California 94062
United States of America
Email: paul@redbarn.org
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URI: https://www.farsightsecurity.com/
@ -725,4 +775,10 @@ Internet-Draft Passive DNS - Common Output Format April 2024
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