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Internet Engineering Task Force Dulaunoy Internet Engineering Task Force Dulaunoy
Internet-Draft CIRCL Internet-Draft CIRCL
Intended status: Informational Kaplan Intended status: Informational Kaplan
Expires: October 13, 2013 CERT.at Expires: June 12, 2014 CERT.at
Vixie Vixie
Farsight Security, Inc. Farsight Security, Inc.
hs Stern hs. Stern
Cisco Cisco
April 2013 December 9, 2013
Passive DNS - Common Output Format
draft-ietf-dulaunoy-kaplan-pdns-cof-01 Passive DNS - Common Output Format
draft-ietf-dulaunoy-kaplan-pdns-cof-01
Abstract
Abstract
This document describes the output format used between Passive DNS
query interface. The output format description includes also a This document describes the output format used between Passive DNS
common meaning per Passive DNS system. query interface. The output format description includes also a
common meaning per Passive DNS system.
Status of this Memo
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 13, 2013.
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
Copyright Notice applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
document authors. All rights reserved.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/ working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
Table of Contents This Internet-Draft will expire on June 12, 2014.
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Common Output Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Overview and Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. Mandatory Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2.1. rrname . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2.2. rrtype . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2.3. rdata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2.4. time_first . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2.5. time_last . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. Optional Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3.1. count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Dulaunoy, et al. Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 1]
Dulaunoy, Kaplan, Vixie & Stern info [Page 1] Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title December 2013
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title April 2013
Table of Contents
3.3.2. bailiwick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.4. Additional Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.4.1. sensor_id . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Common Output Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1. Overview and Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. Mandatory Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2.1. rrname . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2.2. rrtype . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Appendix A. Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2.3. rdata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2.4. time_first . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.5. time_last . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Introduction 3.3. Optional Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3.1. count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Passive DNS is a technique described by Florian Weimer in 2005 in 3.3.2. bailiwick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Passive DNS replication, F Weimer - 17th Annual FIRST Conference on 3.4. Additional Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Computer Security. Since then multiple Passive DNS implementations 3.4.1. sensor_id . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
evolved over time. Users of these Passive DNS servers query a server 3.4.2. zone_time_first . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
(often via Whois [Ref: WHOIS] or HTTP and ReST), parse the results 3.4.3. zone_time_last . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
and process them in other applications. 4. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
There are multiple implementation of Passive DNS software. Users of 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
passive DNS query each implementation and aggregate the results for 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
their search. This document describes the output format of three 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Passive DNS Systems which are in use today and which already share a 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
nearly identical output format. As the format and the meaning of Appendix A. Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
output fields from each Passive DNS need to be consistent, we propose Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
in this document a solution to commonly name each field along with Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 9
their corresponding interpretation. The format format is following a
simple key-value structure in JSON [RFC4627] format. The benefit of
having a consistent Passive DNS output format is that multiple client
implementations can query different servers without having to have a
separate parser for each individual server. [http://code.google.com/
p/passive-dns-query-tool/] currently implements multiple parsers due
to a lack of standardization. The document does not describe the
protocol (e.g. whois, HTTP REST or XMPP) nor the query format used
to query the Passive DNS. Neither does this document describe "pre-
recursor" Passive DNS Systems.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Limitation
As a Passive DNS can include protection mechanisms for their
operation, results might be different due to those protection
measures. These mechanisms filter out DNS answers if they fail some
criteria. The bailiwick algorithm (c.f. http://www.isc.org/files/ Dulaunoy, et al. Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 2]
passive_dns_hardening_handout.pdf) protects the Passive DNS Database
from cache poisoning attacks [ref: Dan Kaminsky]. Another Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title December 2013
limitiation that clients querying the database need to be aware of is
1. Introduction
Dulaunoy, Kaplan, Vixie & Stern info [Page 2] Passive DNS is a technique described by Florian Weimer in 2005 in
Passive DNS replication, F Weimer - 17th Annual FIRST Conference on
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title April 2013 Computer Security. Since then multiple Passive DNS implementations
evolved over time. Users of these Passive DNS servers query a server
that each query simply gets an snapshot-answer of the time of (often via Whois [Ref: WHOIS] or HTTP and ReST), parse the results
querying. Clients MUST NOT rely on consistent answers. and process them in other applications.
3. Common Output Format There are multiple implementation of Passive DNS software. Users of
passive DNS query each implementation and aggregate the results for
The formatting of the answer follows the JSON [RFC4627] format. The their search. This document describes the output format of three
order of the fields is not significant for the same resource type. Passive DNS Systems which are in use today and which already share a
That means, the same name tuple plus timing information identifies a nearly identical output format. As the format and the meaning of
unique answer per server. output fields from each Passive DNS need to be consistent, we propose
in this document a solution to commonly name each field along with
3.1. Overview and Example their corresponding interpretation. The format format is following a
simple key-value structure in JSON [RFC4627] format. The benefit of
The intent of this output format is to be easily parseable by having a consistent Passive DNS output format is that multiple client
scripts. Every implementation MUST support the JSON output format. implementations can query different servers without having to have a
separate parser for each individual server.
A sample output using the JSON format: [https://github.com/chrislee35/passivedns-client] currently
implements multiple parsers due to a lack of standardization. The
... (list of )... document does not describe the protocol (e.g. whois, HTTP REST or
{ "count": 97167, XMPP) nor the query format used to query the Passive DNS. Neither
"time_first": "2010-06-25 17:07:02", does this document describe "pre-recursor" Passive DNS Systems.
"rrtype": "A", "rrname": "google-public-dns-a.google.com.",
"rdata": "8.8.8.8", 1.1. Requirements Language
"time_last": "2013-02-05 17:34:03" }
... (separated by newline)... The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
3.2. Mandatory Fields document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Implementation MUST support all the mandatory fields.
2. Limitation
The tuple (rrtype,rrname,rdata) will always be unique within one
answer per server. As a Passive DNS can include protection mechanisms for their
operation, results might be different due to those protection
3.2.1. rrname measures. These mechanisms filter out DNS answers if they fail some
criteria. The bailiwick algorithm (c.f.
This field returns the name of the queried resource. http://www.isc.org/files/passive_dns_hardening_handout.pdf) protects
the Passive DNS Database from cache poisoning attacks [ref: Dan
3.2.2. rrtype Kaminsky]. Another limitiation that clients querying the database
need to be aware of is that each query simply gets an snapshot-answer
This field returns the resource record type as seen by the passive of the time of querying. Clients MUST NOT rely on consistent
DNS. The key is rrtype and the value is in the interpreted record answers.
type. If the value cannot be interpreted the decimal value is
returned following the principle of transparency as described in RFC
3597 [RFC3597]. The resource record type can be any values as
described by IANA in the DNS parameters document in the section 'DNS
Label types' (http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-parameters).
Currently known and supported textual descritptions of rrtypes are: Dulaunoy, et al. Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 3]
A, AAAA, CNAME, PTR, SOA, TXT, DNAME, NS, SRV, RP, NAPTR, HINFO, A6 A
client MUST be able to understand these textual rtype values. In Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title December 2013
addition, a client MUST be able to handle a decimal value (as
mentioned above) as answer.
3. Common Output Format
3.2.3. rdata
The formatting of the answer follows the JSON [RFC4627] format. The
order of the fields is not significant for the same resource type.
That means, the same name tuple plus timing information identifies a
unique answer per server.
Dulaunoy, Kaplan, Vixie & Stern info [Page 3] 3.1. Overview and Example
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title April 2013 The intent of this output format is to be easily parseable by
scripts. Every implementation MUST support the JSON output format.
This field returns the data of the queried resource. In general, A sample output using the JSON format:
this is to be interpreted as string. Depending on the rtype, this
can be an IPv4 or IPv6 address, a domain name (as in the case of ... (list of )...
CNAMEs), an SPF record, etc. A client MUST be able to interpret any { "count": 97167,
value which is legal as the right hand side in a DNS zone file RFC "time_first": "1277353744",
1035 [RFC1035] and RFC 1034 [RFC1034]. If the rdata came from an "rrtype": "A", "rrname": "google-public-dns-a.google.com.",
unknown DNS resource records, the server must follow the transparency "rdata": "8.8.8.8",
principle as described in RFC 3597 [RFC3597]. (binary stream if any? "time_last": "1386405372" }
base64?) ... (separated by newline)...
3.2.4. time_first 3.2. Mandatory Fields
This field returns the first time that the record / unique tuple Implementation MUST support all the mandatory fields.
(rrname, rrtype, rdata) has been seen by the passive DNS. The date is
expressed in seconds (decimal ascii) since 1st of January 1970 (unix The tuple (rrtype,rrname,rdata) will always be unique within one
timestamp). The time zone MUST be UTC. answer per server.
3.2.5. time_last 3.2.1. rrname
This field returns the last time that the unique tuple (rrname, This field returns the name of the queried resource.
rrtype, rdata) record has been seen by the passive DNS. The date is
expressed in seconds (decimal ascii) since 1st of January 1970 (unix 3.2.2. rrtype
timestamp). The time zone MUST be UTC..
This field returns the resource record type as seen by the passive
3.3. Optional Fields DNS. The key is rrtype and the value is in the interpreted record
type. If the value cannot be interpreted the decimal value is
Implementation SHOULD support one or more field. returned following the principle of transparency as described in RFC
3597 [RFC3597]. The resource record type can be any values as
3.3.1. count described by IANA in the DNS parameters document in the section 'DNS
Label types' (http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-parameters).
Specifies how many answers were received with the set of answers Currently known and supported textual descritptions of rrtypes are:
(i.e. same data). The number of requests is expressed as a decimal A, AAAA, CNAME, PTR, SOA, TXT, DNAME, NS, SRV, RP, NAPTR, HINFO, A6 A
value. client MUST be able to understand these textual rtype values. In
addition, a client MUST be able to handle a decimal value (as
Specifies the number of times this particular event denoted by the mentioned above) as answer.
other type fields has been seen in the given time interval (between
time_last and time_first). Decimal number.
3.3.2. bailiwick
Dulaunoy, et al. Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 4]
The bailiwick is the best estimate of the apex of the zone where this
data is authoritative. String. Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title December 2013
3.4. Additional Fields
3.2.3. rdata
Implementations MAY support the following fields:
This field returns the data of the queried resource. In general,
3.4.1. sensor_id this is to be interpreted as string. Depending on the rtype, this
can be an IPv4 or IPv6 address, a domain name (as in the case of
This field returns the sensor information where the record was seen. CNAMEs), an SPF record, etc. A client MUST be able to interpret any
The sensor_id is an opaque byte string as defined by RFC 5001 in value which is legal as the right hand side in a DNS zone file RFC
section 2.3 [RFC5001]. 1035 [RFC1035] and RFC 1034 [RFC1034]. If the rdata came from an
unknown DNS resource records, the server must follow the transparency
4. Acknowledgements principle as described in RFC 3597 [RFC3597]. (binary stream if any?
base64?)
Dulaunoy, Kaplan, Vixie & Stern info [Page 4] 3.2.4. time_first
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title April 2013 This field returns the first time that the record / unique tuple
(rrname, rrtype, rdata) has been seen by the passive DNS. The date
is expressed in seconds (decimal ascii) since 1st of January 1970
Thanks to the Passive DNS developers who contributed to the document. (unix timestamp). The time zone MUST be UTC.
5. IANA Considerations 3.2.5. time_last
This memo includes no request to IANA. This field returns the last time that the unique tuple (rrname,
rrtype, rdata) record has been seen by the passive DNS. The date is
6. Security Considerations expressed in seconds (decimal ascii) since 1st of January 1970 (unix
timestamp). The time zone MUST be UTC.
In some cases, Passive DNS output might contain confidential
information and its access might be restricted. When an user is 3.3. Optional Fields
querying multiple Passive DNS and aggregating the data, the
sensitivity of the data must be considered. Implementation SHOULD support one or more field.
7. References 3.3.1. count
7.1. Normative References Specifies how many answers were received with the set of answers
(i.e. same data). The number of requests is expressed as a decimal
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", value.
STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
Specifies the number of times this particular event denoted by the
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and other type fields has been seen in the given time interval (between
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987. time_last and time_first). Decimal number.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 3.3.2. bailiwick
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
The bailiwick is the best estimate of the apex of the zone where this
[RFC3597] Gustafsson, A., "Handling of Unknown DNS Resource Record data is authoritative. String.
(RR) Types", RFC 3597, September 2003.
[RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", RFC 4627, July 2006.
[RFC5001] Austein, R., "DNS Name Server Identifier (NSID) Option",
RFC 5001, August 2007.
Dulaunoy, et al. Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 5]
[min_ref] authSurName, authInitials, "Minimal Reference", 2006.
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title December 2013
7.2. Informative References
[I-D.narten-iana-considerations-rfc2434bis] 3.4. Additional Fields
Narten, T and H Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", Internet-Draft Implementations MAY support the following fields:
draft-narten-iana-considerations-rfc2434bis-09, March
2008. 3.4.1. sensor_id
[RFC2629] Rose, M.T., "Writing I-Ds and RFCs using XML", RFC 2629, This field returns the sensor information where the record was seen.
June 1999. The sensor_id is an opaque byte string as defined by RFC 5001 in
section 2.3 [RFC5001].
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552, July 3.4.2. zone_time_first
2003.
This field returns the first time that the unique tuple (rrname,
Appendix A. Appendix rrtype, rdata) record has been seen via zone file import. The date
is expressed in seconds (decimal ascii) since 1st of January 1970
This becomes an Appendix. (unix timestamp). The time zone MUST be UTC.
Dulaunoy, Kaplan, Vixie & Stern info [Page 5] 3.4.3. zone_time_last
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title April 2013 This field returns the last time that the unique tuple (rrname,
rrtype, rdata) record has been seen via zone file import. The date
is expressed in seconds (decimal ascii) since 1st of January 1970
Authors' Addresses (unix timestamp). The time zone MUST be UTC.
Alexandre Dulaunoy
CIRCL 4. Acknowledgements
41, avenue de la gare
Luxembourg, L-1611 Thanks to the Passive DNS developers who contributed to the document.
LU
Phone: (+352) 247 88444 5. IANA Considerations
Email: alexandre.dulaunoy@circl.lu
URI: http://www.circl.lu/ This memo includes no request to IANA.
Leon Aaron Kaplan 6. Security Considerations
CERT.at
Karlsplatz 1/2/9 In some cases, Passive DNS output might contain confidential
Vienna, A-1010 information and its access might be restricted. When an user is
AT querying multiple Passive DNS and aggregating the data, the
sensitivity of the data must be considered.
Phone: +43 1 5056416 78
Email: kaplan@cert.at
URI: http://www.cert.at/ 7. References
Paul Vixie
Farsight Security, Inc.
Email: paul@redbarn.org
URI: /
Dulaunoy, et al. Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 6]
Henry Stern Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title December 2013
Cisco
1741 Brunswick Street, Suite 500
Halifax, Nova Scotia B3J 3X8 7.1. Normative References
Canada
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
Phone: +1 408 922 4555 STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
Email: hestern@cisco.com
URI: http://www.cisco.com/security [RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3597] Gustafsson, A., "Handling of Unknown DNS Resource Record
(RR) Types", RFC 3597, September 2003.
[RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", RFC 4627, July 2006.
[RFC5001] Austein, R., "DNS Name Server Identifier (NSID) Option",
RFC 5001, August 2007.
[min_ref] authSurName, authInitials., "Minimal Reference", 2006.
Dulaunoy, Kaplan, Vixie & Stern info [Page 6] 7.2. Informative References
[I-D.narten-iana-considerations-rfc2434bis]
Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs",
draft-narten-iana-considerations-rfc2434bis-09 (work in
progress), March 2008.
[RFC2629] Rose, M., "Writing I-Ds and RFCs using XML", RFC 2629,
June 1999.
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
July 2003.
Appendix A. Appendix
This becomes an Appendix.
Dulaunoy, et al. Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title December 2013
Authors' Addresses
Alexandre Dulaunoy
CIRCL
41, avenue de la gare
Luxembourg, L-1611
LU
Phone: (+352) 247 88444
Email: alexandre.dulaunoy@circl.lu
URI: http://www.circl.lu/
Leon Aaron Kaplan
CERT.at
Karlsplatz 1/2/9
Vienna, A-1010
AT
Phone: +43 1 5056416 78
Email: kaplan@cert.at
URI: http://www.cert.at/
Paul Vixie
Farsight Security, Inc.
Phone:
Email: paul@redbarn.org
URI: /
Henry Stern
Cisco
1741 Brunswick Street, Suite 500
Halifax, Nova Scotia B3J 3X8
Canada
Phone: +1 408 922 4555
Email: hestern@cisco.com
URI: http://www.cisco.com/security
Dulaunoy, et al. Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title December 2013
Full Copyright Statement
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This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
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Dulaunoy, et al. Expires June 12, 2014 [Page 9]