From dd7c7964601ccf48e97bbacddff0b1c082766b67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandre Dulaunoy Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2020 17:33:04 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] new: [napkin] first release Napkin is a Python tool to produce statistical analysis of a text. Analysis features are : - Verbs frequency - Nouns frequency - Digit frequency - Labels frequency such as (Person, organisation, product, location) as defined in spacy.io [named entities](https://spacy.io/api/annotation#named-entities) - URL frequency - Email frequency - Mention frequency (everything prefixed with an @ symbol) - Out-Of-Vocabulary (OOV) word frequency meaning any words outside English dictionary --- README.md | 166 +- bin/napkin.py | 80 + samples/the-prince.txt | 3312 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 3557 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 bin/napkin.py create mode 100644 samples/the-prince.txt diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index c1b051e..5199042 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -1,2 +1,166 @@ # napkin-text-analysis -Napking is a simple tool to produce statistical analysis of a text + +Napkin is a Python tool to produce statistical analysis of a text. + +Analysis features are : + +- Verbs frequency +- Nouns frequency +- Digit frequency +- Labels frequency such as (Person, organisation, product, location) as defined in spacy.io [named entities](https://spacy.io/api/annotation#named-entities) +- URL frequency +- Email frequency +- Mention frequency (everything prefixed with an @ symbol) +- Out-Of-Vocabulary (OOV) word frequency meaning any words outside English dictionary + +# requirements + +- Python >= 3.6 +- spacy.io +- redis (a redis server running on port 6380) + +# how to use napkin + +~~~~ +usage: napkin.py [-h] [-v V] [-f F] [-t T] [-o O] + +Extract statistical analysis of text + +optional arguments: + -h, --help show this help message and exit + -v V verbose output + -f F file to analyse + -t T maximum value for the top list (default is 100) -1 is no limit + -o O output format (default is csv) +~~~~ + +# example usage of napkin + +A sample file "The Prince, by Nicoló Machiavelli" is included to test napkin. + +`python3 napkin.py -f ../samples/the-prince.txt` + +Example output: + +~~~~ +# Top 100 of verb:napkin +b'can',137.0 +b'make',116.0 +b'may',106.0 +b'would',102.0 +b'must',97.0 +b'take',86.0 +b'have',73.0 +b'see',72.0 +b'become',62.0 +b'find',61.0 +b'know',59.0 +b'should',54.0 +b'keep',53.0 +b'give',53.0 +b'hold',51.0 +b'say',50.0 +b'wish',48.0 +b'could',48.0 +b'fear',46.0 +b'maintain',45.0 +b'think',42.0 +b'use',40.0 +b'consider',40.0 +b'come',40.0 +b'lose',37.0 +b'live',35.0 +b'follow',33.0 +b'do',33.0 +b'remain',32.0 +b'gain',31.0 +b'avoid',31.0 +b'arise',31.0 +b'speak',29.0 +... +# Top 100 of noun:napkin +b'man',120.0 +b'state',108.0 +b'people',90.0 +b'one',90.0 +b'time',85.0 +b'work',83.0 +b'other',82.0 +b'thing',71.0 +b'way',60.0 +b'order',57.0 +b'fortune',49.0 +b'army',45.0 +b'force',44.0 +b'arm',44.0 +b'soldier',43.0 +b'subject',42.0 +b'power',41.0 +b'difficulty',39.0 +b'law',34.0 +b'reputation',33.0 +b'position',33.0 +b'enemy',33.0 +b'war',32.0 +b'kingdom',32.0 +b'cause',31.0 +b'possession',29.0 +b'action',29.0 +b'ruler',28.0 +b'rule',28.0 +b'example',28.0 +b'hand',27.0 +b'friend',27.0 +b'country',27.0 +b'king',26.0 +b'case',26.0 +... +# Top 100 of digit:napkin +b'84116',1.0 +b'750175',1.0 +b'6221541',1.0 +b'57037',1.0 +b'55901',1.0 +# +# Top 100 of url:napking +# +# Top 100 of oov:napkin +b'Fermo',7.0 +b'Vitelli',6.0 +b'Pertinax',6.0 +b'Orsinis',6.0 +b'Colonnas',6.0 +b'Bentivogli',6.0 +b'Agathocles',6.0 +b'Oliverotto',5.0 +b'C\xc3\xa6sar',5.0 +... +# Top 100 of labels:napkin +b'GPE',305.0 +b'CARDINAL',197.0 +b'ORG',189.0 +b'NORP',131.0 +b'ORDINAL',72.0 +b'DATE',44.0 +b'LAW',30.0 +b'LOC',18.0 +b'PRODUCT',9.0 +b'LANGUAGE',5.0 +b'WORK_OF_ART',4.0 +b'QUANTITY',4.0 +b'TIME',3.0 +b'FAC',3.0 +b'MONEY',2.0 +b'PERCENT',1.0 +b'EVENT',1.0 + +~~~~ + +# LICENSE + +napkin is free software under the AGPLv3 license. + +~~~~ +Copyright (C) 2020 Alexandre Dulaunoy +Copyright (C) 2020 Pauline Bourmeau +~~~~ diff --git a/bin/napkin.py b/bin/napkin.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8695c9b --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/napkin.py @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- + +import redis +import spacy +from spacy_langdetect import LanguageDetector +import argparse +import sys + +parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Extract statistical analysis of text") +parser.add_argument('-v', help="verbose output") +parser.add_argument('-f', help="file to analyse") +parser.add_argument('-t', help="maximum value for the top list (default is 100) -1 is no limit", default=100) +parser.add_argument('-o', help="output format (default is csv)", default="csv") +args = parser.parse_args() +if args.f is None: + parser.print_help() + sys.exit() + +redisdb = redis.Redis(host="localhost", port=6380, db=5) + +try: + redisdb.flushdb() +except: + print("Redis database on port 6380 is not running...", file=sys.stderr) + sys.exit() + +nlp = spacy.load("en_core_web_md") +nlp.add_pipe(LanguageDetector(), name='language_detector', last=True) + +nlp.max_length = 2000000 + +with open(args.f, 'r') as file: + text = file.read() + +doc = nlp(text) + +analysis = ["verb:napkin", "noun:napkin", "hashtag:napkin", "mention:napkin", "digit:napkin", "url:napking", "oov:napkin", "labels:napkin"] + +for token in doc: + if token.pos_ == "VERB" and not token.is_oov: + redisdb.zincrby("verb:napkin", 1, token.lemma_) + continue + if token.pos_ == "NOUN" and not token.is_oov: + redisdb.zincrby("noun:napkin", 1, token.lemma_) + continue + + if token.is_oov: + value = "{}".format(token) + if value.startswith('#'): + redisdb.zincrby("hashtag:napkin", 1, value[1:]) + continue + if value.startswith('@'): + redisdb.zincrby("mention:napkin", 1, value[1:]) + continue + if token.is_digit: + redisdb.zincrby("digit:napkin", 1, value) + continue + if token.is_space: + continue + if token.like_url: + redisdb.zincrby("url:napkin", 1, value) + continue + if token.like_email: + redisdb.zincrby("email:napkin", 1, value) + continue + redisdb.zincrby("oov:napkin", 1, value) + + +for entity in doc.ents: + redisdb.zincrby("labels:napkin", 1, entity.label_) + +for anal in analysis: + x = redisdb.zrevrange(anal, 1, args.t, withscores=True) + print ("# Top {} of {}".format(args.t, anal)) + for a in x: + if args.o == "csv": + print ("{},{}".format(a[0],a[1])) + print ("#") + diff --git a/samples/the-prince.txt b/samples/the-prince.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c969196 --- /dev/null +++ b/samples/the-prince.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3312 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Prince, by Nicoló Machiavelli + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most +other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of +the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at +www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have +to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. + +Title: The Prince + +Author: Nicoló Machiavelli + +Translator: Luigi Ricci + +Release Date: April 23, 2018 [EBook #57037] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PRINCE *** + + + + +Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at Free Literature + + + + +THE PRINCE + +BY + +NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI + +TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY + +LUIGI RICCI + +HUMPHREY MILFORD + +OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS + +LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW + +NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE CAPETOWN + +BOMBAY CALCUTTA AND MADRAS + +1909 + + + + +PREFACE + + +Of all Machiavelli's works _The Prince_ is undoubtedly the greatest; +and a new English edition of it is likely to be welcome to all those +who have not the advantage of reading it in the classical Italian +original. + +For a true appreciation of Machiavelli, impossible in a brief Preface, +I must refer the English reader to Macaulay's Essay on the Italian +historian and statesman.[1] In it he will see how our Author's ideas and +work were wrongfully and wilfully misinterpreted by the very men who, +while profiting by his wisdom, have with great ingratitude criticised +the statesman and defamed his name, as that of the inventor of the +worst political system ever imagined. Yet, as his whole life was an +indefatigable and unremitting endeavour to secure for his native +Florence a good and popular government, and as he lost his great office +of Secretary to the Florentine Republic on account of his avowed +liberal opinions, it is not only unjust but ridiculous to accuse him of +helping tyrants to enslave the people. What he did was to show in the +most deliberate and in the plainest way the arts by which free peoples +were made slaves; and, had his words of advice been always heeded, no +tyrant in Italy or elsewhere could have been successful in his policy. +That he was not listened to, and his advice scorned and spurned, was +not Machiavelli's fault. + +Those who still share the opinion of his interested detractors should +read his private correspondence with the leaders of liberal ideas +in Italy--many of his letters being still left unpublished in the +MS. Collection of Giuliano Ricci in the National Library, in the +Riccardiana Library (No. 2467), in the Government Archives (Strozzi, +Nos. 133 and 1028) of Florence, in the Barberini Library, and in the +Collezione Gonnelli of the Palatine Library in Rome. + +LUIGI RICCI. + +22 ALBEMARLE STREET, LONDON, W. + + +[1] "Machiavelli" by Thomas Babington Macaulay is available at Project +Gutenberg in Critical, Historical, and Miscellaneous Essays; Vol. 1, +ebook 55901. + + + +CONTENTS + + +NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI TO LORENZO THE MAGNIFICENT + +1. The various kinds of Government and the ways by which they are +established. + +2. Of Hereditary Monarchies. + +3. Of Mixed Monarchies. + +4. Why the Kingdom of Darius, occupied by Alexander, did not rebel +against the successors of the latter after his death. + +5. The way to govern Cities or Dominions that, previous to being +occupied, lived under their own Laws. + +6. Of New Dominions which have been acquired by one's own Arms and +Powers. + +7. Of New Dominions acquired by the Power of others or by Fortune. + +8. Of those who have attained the position of Prince by villainy. + +9. Of the Civic Principality. + +10. How the strength of all States should be measured. + +11. Of Ecclesiastical Principalities. + +12. The different kinds of Militia and Mercenary Soldiers. + +13. Of Auxiliary, Mixed, and Native Troops + +14. What the duties of a Prince are with regard to the Militia. + +16. Of the things for which Men, and especially Princes, are praised or +blamed. + +16. Of Liberality and Niggardliness. + +17. Of Cruelty and Clemency, and whether it is better to be loved or +feared. + +18. In what way Princes must keep faith. + +19. That we must avoid being despised and hated. + +20. Whether Fortresses and other things which Princes often make are +useful or injurious. + +21. How a Prince must act in order to gain reputation. + +22. Of the Secretaries of Princes. + +23. How Flatterers must be shunned. + +24. Why the Princes of Italy have lost their States. + +25. How much Fortune can do in human affairs, and how it may be opposed. + +26. Exhortation to liberate Italy from the Barbarians. + + + + +NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI + +TO + +LORENZO THE MAGNIFICENT + +SON OF PIERO DI MEDICI + + +It is customary for those who wish to gain the favour of a prince to +endeavour to do so by offering him gifts of those things which they +hold most precious, or in which they know him to take especial delight. +In this way princes are often presented with horses, arms, cloth of +gold, gems, and such-like ornaments worthy of their grandeur. In my +desire, however, to offer to Your Highness some humble testimony of +my devotion, I have been unable to find among my possessions anything +which I hold so dear or esteem so highly as that knowledge of the deeds +of great men which I have acquired through a long experience of modern +events and a constant study of the past. + +The results of my long observations and reflections are recorded in the +little volume which I now offer to Your Highness: and although I deem +this work unworthy of Your Highness's notice, yet my confidence in your +humanity assures me that you will accept it, knowing that it is not +in my power to offer you a greater gift than that of enabling you to +understand in the shortest possible time all those things which I have +learnt through danger and suffering in the course of many years. I have +not sought to adorn my work with long phrases or high-sounding words or +any of those allurements and ornaments with which many writers seek to +embellish their books, as I desire no honour for my work but such as +its truth and the gravity of its subject may justly deserve. Nor will +it, I trust, be deemed presumptuous on the part of a man of humble and +obscure condition to attempt to discuss and criticise the government of +princes; for in the same way that landscape painters station themselves +in the valleys in order to draw mountains or elevated ground, and +ascend an eminence in order to get a good view of the plains, so it +is necessary to be a prince to be able to know thoroughly the nature +of a people, and to know the nature of princes one must be one of the +populace. + +May I trust, therefore, that Your Highness will accept this little gift +in the spirit in which it is offered; and if Your Highness will deign +to peruse it, you will recognise in it my ardent desire that you may +attain to that grandeur which fortune and your own merits presage for +you. + +And should Your Highness gaze down from the summit of that eminence +towards this humble spot, you will recognise the great and unmerited +sufferings inflicted on me by a cruel fate. + + + + +THE PRINCE + + + + +CHAPTER I + + +THE VARIOUS KINDS OF GOVERNMENT AND THE WAYS BY WHICH THEY ARE +ESTABLISHED + + +All states and dominions which hold or have held sway over mankind are +either republics or monarchies. Monarchies are either hereditary ones, +in which the rulers have been for many years of the same family, or +else they are those of recent foundation. The newly founded ones are +either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or else they +are, as it were, new members grafted on to the hereditary possessions +of the prince that annexes them, as is the kingdom of Naples to the +King of Spain. The dominions thus acquired have either been previously +accustomed to the rule of another prince, or else have been free +states, and they are annexed either by force of arms of the prince, or +of others, or else fall to him by good fortune or merit. + + + + +CHAPTER II + + +OF HEREDITARY MONARCHIES + + +I will not here speak of republics, having already treated of them +fully in another place. I will deal only with monarchies, and will show +how the various kinds described above can be governed and maintained. +In the first place, in hereditary states accustomed to the reigning +family the difficulty of maintaining them is far less than in new +monarchies; for it is sufficient not to exceed the ancestral usages, +and to accommodate one's self to accidental circumstances; in this way +such a prince, if of ordinary ability, will always be able to maintain +his position, unless some very exceptional and excessive force deprives +him of it; and even if he be thus deprived of it, on the slightest +misfortune happening to the new occupier, he will be able to regain it. + +We have in Italy the example of the Duke of Ferrara, who was able +to withstand the assaults of the Venetians in the year '84, and of +Pope Julius in the year '10, for no other reason than because of the +antiquity of his family in that dominion. In as much as the legitimate +prince has less cause and less necessity to give offence, it is only +natural that he should be more loved; and, if no extraordinary vices +make him hated, it is only reasonable for his subjects to be naturally +attached to him, the memories and causes of innovations being forgotten +in the long period over which his rule has existed; whereas one change +always leaves the way prepared for the introduction of another. + + + + +CHAPTER III + + +OF MIXED MONARCHIES + + +But it is in the new monarchy that difficulties really exist. Firstly, +if it is not entirely new, but a member as it were of a mixed state, +its disorders spring at first from a natural difficulty which exists +in all new dominions, because men change masters willingly, hoping to +better themselves; and this belief makes them take arms against their +rulers, in which they are deceived, as experience shows them that they +have gone from bad to worse. This is the result of another very natural +cause, which is the necessary harm inflicted on those over whom the +prince obtains dominion, both by his soldiers and by an infinite number +of other injuries unavoidably caused by his occupation. + +Thus you find enemies in all those whom you have injured by occupying +that dominion, and you cannot maintain the friendship of those who have +helped you to obtain this possession, as you will not be able to fulfil +their expectations, nor can you use strong measures with them, being +under an obligation to them; for which reason, however strong your +armies may be, you will always need the favour of the inhabitants to +take possession of a province. It was from these causes that Louis XII. +of France, though able to occupy Milan without trouble, immediately +lost it, and the forces of Ludovico alone were sufficient to take it +from him the first time, for the inhabitants who had willingly opened +their gates to him, finding themselves deluded in the hopes they had +cherished and not obtaining those benefits that they had anticipated, +could not bear the vexatious rule of their new prince. + +It is indeed true that, after reconquering the rebel territories they +are not so easily lost again, for the ruler is now, by the fact of the +rebellion, less averse to secure his position by punishing offenders, +investigating any suspicious circumstances, and strengthening himself +in weak places. So that although the mere appearance of such a person +as Duke Ludovico on the frontier was sufficient to cause France to lose +Milan the first time, to make her lose her grip of it the second time +was only possible when all the world was against her, and after her +enemies had been defeated and driven out of Italy; which was the result +of the causes above mentioned. Nevertheless it was taken from her both +the first and the second time. The general causes of the first loss +have been already discussed; it remains now to be seen what were the +causes of the second loss and by what means France could have avoided +it, or what measures might have been taken by another ruler in that +position which were not taken by the King of France. Be it observed, +therefore, that those states which on annexation are united to a +previously existing state may or may not be of the same nationality +and language. If they are, it is very easy to hold them, especially if +they are not accustomed to freedom; and to possess them securely it +suffices that the family of the princes which formerly governed them +be extinct. For the rest, their old condition not being disturbed, and +there being no dissimilarity of customs, the people settle down quietly +under their new rulers, as is seen in the case of Burgundy, Brittany, +Gascony, and Normandy, which have been so long united to France; and +although there may be some slight differences of language, the customs +of the people are nevertheless similar, and they can get along well +together, and whoever obtains possession of them and wishes to retain +them must bear in mind two things: the one, that the blood of their old +rulers is extinct; the other, to make no alteration either in their +laws or in their taxes; in this way they will in a very short space of +time become united with their old possessions and form one state. But +when dominions are acquired in a province differing in language, laws, +and customs, the difficulties to be overcome are great, and it requires +good fortune as well as great industry to retain them; one of the best +and most certain means of doing so would be for the new ruler to take +up his residence in them. This would render their possession more +secure and durable, it is what the Turk has done in Greece; in spite of +all the other measures taken by him to hold that state, it would not +have been possible to retain it had he not gone to live there. Being +on the spot, disorders can be seen as they arise and can quickly be +remedied, but living at a distance, they are only heard of when they +get beyond remedy. Besides which, the province is not despoiled by +your officials, the subjects are pleased with the easy accessibility +of their prince; and wishing to be loyal they have more reason to love +him, and should they be otherwise they will have greater cause to fear +him. + +Any external Power who wishes to assail that state will be less +disposed to do so; so that as long as he resides there he will be very +hard to dispossess. The other and better remedy is to plant colonies +in one or two of those places which form as it were the keys of the +land, for it is necessary either to do this or to maintain a large +force of armed men. The colonies will cost the prince little; with +little or no expense on his part, he can send and maintain them; he +only injures those whose lands and houses are taken to give to the new +inhabitants, and these form but a small proportion of the state, and +those who are injured, remaining poor and scattered, can never do any +harm to him, and all the others are, on the one hand, not injured and +therefore easily pacified; and, on the other, are fearful of offending +lest they should be treated like those who have been dispossessed of +their property. To conclude, these colonies cost nothing, are more +faithful, and give less offence; and the injured parties being poor +and scattered are unable to do mischief, as I have shown. For it must +be noted, that men must either be caressed or else annihilated; they +will revenge themselves for small injuries, but cannot do so for great +ones; the injury therefore that we do to a man must be such that we +need not fear his vengeance. But by maintaining a garrison instead of +colonists, one will spend much more, and consume in guarding it all +the revenues of that state, so that the acquisition will result in +a loss, besides giving much greater offence, since it injures every +one in that state with the quartering of the army on it; which being +an inconvenience felt, by all, every one becomes an enemy, and these +are enemies which can do mischief, as, though beaten, they remain in +their own homes. In every way, therefore, a garrison is as useless +as colonies are useful. Further, the ruler of a foreign province as +described, should make himself the leader and defender of his less +powerful neighbours, and endeavour to weaken the stronger ones, and +take care that his possessions are not entered by some foreigner not +less powerful than himself, who will always intervene at the request +of those who are discontented either through ambition or fear, as was +seen when the Ætoli invited the Romans into Greece; and in whatever +province they entered, it was always at the request of the inhabitants. +And the rule is that when a powerful foreigner enters a province, all +the less powerful inhabitants become his adherents, moved by the envy +they bear to those ruling over them; so much so that with regard to +these minor potentates he has no trouble whatever in winning them over, +for they willingly join forces with the state that he has acquired. +He has merely to be careful that they do not assume too much power +and authority, and he can easily with his own forces and their favour +put down those that are powerful and remain in everything the arbiter +of that province. And he who does not govern well in this way will +soon lose what he has acquired, and while he holds it will meet with +infinite difficulty and trouble. + +The Romans in the provinces they took, always followed this policy; +they established colonies, flattered the less powerful without +increasing their strength, put down the most powerful and did not allow +foreign rulers to obtain influence in them. I will let the single +province of Greece suffice as an example. They made friends with the +Achæi and the Ætoli, the kingdom of Macedonia was cast down, and +Antiochus driven out, nor did they allow the merits of the Achæi or the +Ætoli to gain them any increase of territory, nor did the persuasions +of Philip induce them to befriend him without lowering him, nor could +the power of Antiochus make them consent to allow him to hold any state +in that province. + +For the Romans did in this case what all wise princes should do, who +look not only at present dangers but also at future ones and diligently +guard against them; for being foreseen they can easily be remedied, +but if one waits till they are at hand, the medicine is no longer in +time as the malady has become incurable; it happening with this as with +those hectic fevers spoken of by doctors, which at their beginning +are easy to cure but difficult to recognise, but in course of time +when they have not at first been recognised and treated, become easy +to recognise and difficult to cure. Thus it happens in matters of +state; for knowing afar off (which it is only given to a prudent man +to do) the evils that are brewing, they are easily cured. But when, +for want of such knowledge, they are allowed to grow so that every +one can recognise them, there is no longer any remedy to be found. +However, the Romans, observing these disorders while yet remote, were +always able to find a remedy, and never allowed them to proceed in +order to avoid a war; for they knew that war was not to be avoided, +and could be deferred only to the advantage of the other side; they +therefore declared war against Philip and Antiochus in Greece, so as +not to have to fight them in Italy, though they might at the time +have avoided either; this they did not choose to do, never caring to +do that which is now every day to be heard in the mouths of our wise +men, to enjoy the benefits of time, but preferring those of their +own virtue and prudence, for time brings with it all things, and may +produce indifferently either good or evil. But let us return to France +and examine whether she did any of these things; and I will speak not +of Charles, but of Louis as the one whose proceedings can be better +seen, as he held possession in Italy for a longer time; you will then +see that he did the opposite of all those things which must be done to +keep possession of a foreign state. King Louis was called into Italy by +the ambition of the Venetians, who wished by his coming to gain half +of Lombardy. I will not blame the king for coming nor for the part +he took, because wishing to plant his foot in Italy, and not having +friends in the country, on the contrary the conduct of King Charles +having caused all doors to be closed to him, he was forced to accept +what friendships he could find, and his schemes would have quickly +been successful if he had made no mistakes in his other proceedings. + +The king then having acquired Lombardy regained immediately the +reputation lost by Charles. Genoa yielded, the Florentines became his +friends, the Marquis of Mantua, the Dukes of Ferrara and Bentivogli, +the Lady of Furlì, the Lords of Faenza, Pesaro, Rimini, Camerino, +and Piombino, the inhabitants of Lucca, of Pisa, and of Sienna, all +approached him with offers of friendship. The Venetians might then +have seen the effects of their temerity, how to gain a few lands +in Lombardy they had made the king ruler over two-thirds of Italy. +Consider how little difficulty the king would have had in maintaining +his reputation in Italy if he had observed the rules above given, and +kept a firm and sure hold over all those friends of his, who being +many in number, and weak, and fearful one of the Church, another of +the Venetians, were always obliged to hold fast to him, and by whose +aid he could easily make sure of any who were still great. But he was +hardly in Milan before he did exactly the opposite, by giving aid to +Pope Alexander to occupy the Romagna. Nor did he perceive that, in +taking this course, he weakened himself, by casting off his friends +and those who had placed themselves at his disposal, and strengthened +the Church by adding to the spiritual power, which gives it such +authority, further temporal powers. And having made the first mistake, +he was obliged to follow it up, whilst, to put a stop to the ambition +of Alexander and prevent him becoming ruler of Tuscany, he was forced +to come to Italy. And not content with having increased the power +of the Church and lost his friends, he now desiring the kingdom of +Naples, divided it with the king of Spain; and where he alone was the +arbiter of Italy, he now brought in a companion, so that the ambitious +of that province who were dissatisfied with him might have some one +else to appeal to; and where he might have left in that kingdom a king +tributary to him, he dispossessed him in order to bring in another who +was capable of driving him out. The desire to acquire possessions is +a very natural and ordinary thing, and when those men do it who can +do so successfully, they are always praised and not blamed, but when +they cannot and yet want to do so at all costs, they make a mistake +deserving of great blame. If France, therefore, with her own forces +could have taken Naples, she ought to have done so; if she could not +she ought not to have divided it. And if the partition of Lombardy with +the Venetians is to be excused, as having been the means of allowing +the French king to set foot in Italy, this other partition deserves +blame, not having the excuse of necessity. Louis had thus made these +five mistakes: he had crushed the smaller Powers, increased the power +in Italy of one ruler, brought into the land a very powerful foreigner, +and he had not come to live there himself, nor had he established +any colonies. Still these mistakes might, if he had lived, not have +injured him, had he not made the sixth, that of taking the state from +the Venetians; for, if he had not strengthened the Church and brought +the Spaniards into Italy, it would have been right and necessary to +humble them; having once taken those measures, he ought never to have +consented to their ruin; because, had the Venetians been strong, it +would have kept the others from making attempts on Lombardy, partly +because the Venetians would not have consented to any measures by which +they did not get it for themselves, and partly because the others would +not have wanted to take it from France to give it to Venice, and would +not have had the courage to attack both. + +If any one urges that King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander +and the kingdom to Spain in order to avoid war, I reply, with the +reasons already given, that one ought never to allow a disorder to take +place in order to avoid war, for war is not thereby avoided, but only +deferred to your disadvantage. And if others allege the promise given +by the king to the pope to undertake that enterprise for him, in return +for the dissolution of his marriage and for the cardinalship of Rohan, +I reply with what I shall say later on about the faith of princes and +how it is to be observed. Thus King Louis lost Lombardy through not +observing any of those conditions which have been observed by others +who have taken provinces and wished to retain them. Nor is this any +miracle, but very reasonable and natural. I spoke of this matter with +Cardinal Rohan at Nantes when Valentine, as Cesare Borgia, son of Pope +Alexander, was commonly called, was occupying the Romagna, for on +Cardinal Rohan saying to me that the Italians did not understand war, +I replied that the French did not understand politics, for if they did +they would never allow the Church to become so great. And experience +shows us that the greatness in Italy of the Church and also of Spain +have been caused by France, and her ruin has proceeded from them. From +which may be drawn a general rule, which never or very rarely fails, +that whoever is the cause of another becoming powerful, is ruined +himself; for that power is produced by him either through craft or +force; and both of these are suspected by the one that has become +powerful. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + + +WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, OCCUPIED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST +THE SUCCESSORS OF THE LATTER AFTER HIS DEATH. + + +Considering the difficulties there are in holding a newly acquired +state, some may wonder how it came to pass that Alexander the Great +became master of Asia in a few years, and had hardly occupied it +when he died, from which it might be supposed that the whole state +would have rebelled. However, his successors maintained themselves in +possession, and had no further difficulty in doing so than those which +arose among themselves from their own ambitions. + +I reply that the kingdoms known to history have been governed in two +ways: either by a prince and his servants, who, as ministers by his +grace and permission, assist in governing the realm; or by a prince +and by barons, who hold their positions not by favour of the ruler but +by antiquity of blood. Such barons have states and subjects of their +own, who recognise them as their lords, and are naturally attached to +them. In those states which are governed by a prince and his servants, +the prince possesses more authority, because there is no one in the +state regarded as a superior besides himself, and if others are obeyed +it is merely as ministers and officials of the prince, and no one +regards them with any special affection. Examples of these two kinds +of government in our own time are the Turk and the King of France. +All the Turkish monarchy is governed by one ruler, the others are his +servants, and dividing his kingdom into "sangiacates," he sends to them +various administrators, and changes or recalls them at his pleasure. +But the King of France is surrounded by a large number of ancient +nobles, recognised as such by their subjects, and loved by them; they +have their prerogatives, which the king cannot deprive them of without +danger to himself. Whoever now considers these two states will see that +it would be difficult to acquire the state of the Turk; but having +conquered it, it would be very easy to hold it. + +The causes of the difficulty of occupying the Turkish kingdom are, that +the invader could not be invited by princes of that kingdom, nor hope +to facilitate his enterprise by the rebellion of those around him, as +will be evident from reasons given above. Because, being all slaves, +and bound, it will be more difficult to corrupt them, and even if +they were corrupted, little effect could be hoped for, as they would +not be able to carry the people with them for the reasons mentioned. +Therefore, whoever assaults the Turk must be prepared to meet his +united forces, and must rely more on his own strength than on the +disorders of others; but having once conquered him, and beaten him in +battle so that he can no longer raise armies, nothing else is to be +feared except the family of the prince, and if this is extinguished, +there is no longer any one to be feared, the others having no credit +with the people; and as the victor before the victory could place no +hope in them, so he need not fear them afterwards. The contrary is +the case in kingdoms governed like that of France, because it is easy +to enter them by winning over some baron of the kingdom, there being +always some malcontents, and those desiring innovations. These can, +for the reasons stated, open the way to you and facilitate victory; +but afterwards, if you wish to keep possession, infinite difficulties +arise, both from those who have aided you and from those you have +oppressed. Nor is it sufficient to extinguish the family of the prince, +for there remain those nobles who will make themselves the head of new +changes, and being neither able to content them nor exterminate them, +you will lose the state whenever an occasion arises. Now if you will +consider what was the nature of the government of Darius you will find +it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and therefore Alexander had +first to completely overthrow it and seize the country, after which +victory, Darius being dead, the state remained secure to Alexander, +for the reasons discussed above. And his successors, had they remained +united, might have enjoyed it in peace, nor did any tumults arise in +the kingdom except those fomented by themselves. But it is impossible +to possess with such ease countries constituted like France. + +Hence arose the frequent rebellions of Spain, France, and Greece +against the Romans, owing to the numerous principalities which existed +in those states; for, as long as the memory of these lasted, the Romans +were always uncertain of their possessions; but when the memory of +these principalities had been extinguished they became, with the power +and duration of the empire, secure possessions. + +And afterwards the latter could, when fighting among themselves, draw +each one with him a portion of these provinces, according to the +authority he had established there, and these provinces, when the +family of their ancient princes was extinct, recognised no other rulers +but the Romans. Considering these things, therefore, let no one be +surprised at the facility with which Alexander could hold Asia, and at +the difficulties that others have had in holding acquired possessions, +like Pyrrhus and many others; as this was not caused by the greater or +smaller ability of the conqueror, but depended on the dissimilarity of +the conditions. + + + + +CHAPTER V + + +THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR DOMINIONS THAT, PREVIOUS TO BEING OCCUPIED, +LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS. + + +When those states which have been acquired are accustomed to live at +liberty under their own laws, there are three ways of holding them. The +first is to ruin them; the second is to go and live there in person; +the third is to allow them to live under their own laws, taking tribute +of them, and creating there within the country a state composed of a +few who will keep it friendly to you. Because this state, being created +by the prince, knows that it cannot exist without his friendship and +protection, and will do all it can to keep them, and a city used to +liberty can be more easily held by means of its citizens than in +any other way, if you wish to preserve it. There is the example of +the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held Athens and Thebes by +creating within them a state of a few people; nevertheless they lost +them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, +destroyed them, but did not lose them. They wanted to hold Greece in +almost the same way as the Spartans held it, leaving it free and under +its own laws, but they did not succeed; so that they were compelled +to destroy many cities in that province in order to keep it, because +in truth there is no sure method of holding them except by ruining +them. And whoever becomes the ruler of a free city and does not destroy +it, can expect to be destroyed by it, for it can always find a motive +for rebellion in the name of liberty and of its ancient usages, which +are forgotten neither by lapse of time nor by benefits received, and +whatever one does or provides, so long as the inhabitants are not +separated or dispersed, they do not forget that name and those usages, +but appeal to them at once in every emergency, as did Pisa after being +so many years held in servitude by the Florentines. But when cities or +provinces have been accustomed to live under a prince, and the family +of that prince is extinguished, being on the one hand used to obey, and +on the other not having their old prince, they cannot unite in choosing +one from among themselves, and they do not know how to live in freedom, +so that they are slower to take arms, and a prince can win them over +with greater facility and establish himself securely. But in republics +there is greater life, greater hatred, and more desire for vengeance; +they do not and cannot cast aside the memory of their ancient liberty, +so that the surest way is either to destroy them or reside in them. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + + +OF NEW DOMINIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN ACQUIRED BY ONE'S OWN ARMS AND POWERS + + +Let no one marvel if in speaking of new dominions both as to prince +and state, I bring forward very exalted instances, for as men walk +almost always in the paths trodden by others, proceeding in their +actions by imitation, and not being always able to follow others +exactly, nor attain to the excellence of those they imitate, a prudent +man should always follow in the path trodden by great men and imitate +those who are most excellent, so that if he does not attain to their +greatness, at any rate he will get some tinge of it. He will do like +prudent archers, who when the place they wish to hit is too far off, +knowing how far their bow will carry, aim at a spot much higher than +the one they wish to hit, not in order to reach this height with +their arrow, but by help of this high aim to hit the spot they wish +to. I say then that in new dominions, where there is a new prince, +it is more or less easy to hold them according to the greater or +lesser ability of him who acquires them. And as the fact of a private +individual becoming a prince presupposes either great ability or good +fortune, it would appear that either of these things would mitigate +in part many difficulties. Nevertheless those who have been wanting +as regards good fortune have maintained themselves best. The matter +is also facilitated by the prince being obliged to reside personally +in his territory, having no others. But to come to those who have +become princes through their own merits and not by fortune, I regard +as the greatest, Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and such like. And +although one should not speak of Moses, he having merely carried out +what was ordered him by God, still he deserves admiration, if only +for that grace which made him worthy to speak with God. But regarding +Cyrus and others who have acquired or founded kingdoms, they will all +be found worthy of admiration; and if their particular actions and +methods are examined they will not appear very different from those of +Moses, although he had so great a Master. And in examining their life +and deeds it will be seen that they owed nothing to fortune but the +opportunity which gave them matter to be shaped into the form that they +thought fit; and without that opportunity their powers would have been +wasted, and without their powers the opportunity would have come in +vain. It was thus necessary that Moses should find the people of Israel +slaves in Egypt and oppressed by the Egyptians, so that they were +disposed to follow him in order to escape from their servitude. It was +necessary that Romulus should be unable to remain in Alba, and should +have been exposed at his birth, in order that he might become King of +Rome and founder of that nation. It was necessary that Cyrus should +find the Persians discontented with the empire of the Medes, and the +Medes weak and effeminate through long peace. Theseus could not have +showed his abilities if he had not found the Athenians dispersed. + +These opportunities, therefore, gave these men their chance, and their +own great qualities enabled them to profit by them, so as to ennoble +their country and augment its fortunes. Those who by heroic means such +as these become princes, obtain their dominions with difficulty but +retain them easily, and the difficulties which they have in acquiring +their dominions arise in part from the new rules and regulations that +they have to introduce in order to establish their position securely. +It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry +out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than +to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all +those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all +those who would profit by the new order, this lukewarmness arising +partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the laws in their +favour; and partly from the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly +believe in anything new until they have had actual experience of it. +Thus it arises that on every opportunity for attacking the reformer, +his opponents do so with the zeal of partisans, the others only defend +him half-heartedly, so that between them he runs great danger. It is +necessary, however, in order to investigate thoroughly this question, +to examine whether these innovators are independent, or whether they +depend upon others, that is to say, whether in order to carry out +their designs they have to entreat or are able to force. In the first +case they invariably succeed ill, and accomplish nothing; but when +they can depend on their own strength and are able to use force, they +rarely fail. Thus it comes about that all armed prophets have conquered +and unarmed ones failed; for besides what has been already said, the +character of people varies, and it is easy to persuade them of a thing, +but difficult to keep them in that persuasion. And so it is necessary +to order things so that when they no longer believe, they can be made +to believe by force. Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus would not have +been able to make their institutions observed for so long had they +been disarmed, as happened in our own time to Fra Girolamo Savonarola, +who failed entirely in his new rules when the multitude began to +disbelieve in him, and he had no means of holding fast those who had +believed nor of compelling the unbelievers to believe. Therefore +such men as these have great difficulty in making their way, and all +their dangers are met on the road and must be overcome by their own +abilities; but when once they have overcome them and have begun to be +held in veneration, and have suppressed those who envied them, they +remain powerful and secure, honoured and happy. To the high examples +given I will add a lesser one, which, however, is to be compared in +some measure with them and will serve as an instance of all such cases, +that of Jerone of Syracuse, who from a private individual became Prince +of Siracusa, without other aid from fortune beyond the opportunity; +for the Siracusans being oppressed elected him as their captain, from +which by merit he was made prince; while still in private life his +virtues were such that it was written of him, that he lacked nothing +to reign but the kingdom. He abolished the old militia, raised a new +one, abandoned his old friendships and formed new ones; and as he had +thus friends and soldiers of his own, he was able on this foundation +to build securely, so that while he had great trouble in acquiring his +position he had little in maintaining it. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + + +OF NEW DOMINIONS ACQUIRED BY THE POWER OF OTHERS OR BY FORTUNE + + +Those who rise from private citizens to be princes merely by fortune +have little trouble in rising but very much in maintaining their +position. They meet with no difficulties on the way as they fly over +them, but all their difficulties arise when they are established. Such +are they who are granted a state either for money, or by favour of him +who grants it, as happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia +and of the Hellespont, who were created princes by Darius in order to +hold these places for his security and glory; such were also those +emperors who from private citizens became emperors by bribing the +army. Such as these depend absolutely on the good will and fortune of +those who have raised them, both of which are extremely inconstant and +unstable. They neither know how to, nor are in a position to maintain +their rank, for unless he be a man of great genius it is not likely +that one who has always lived in a private position should know how to +command, and they are unable to command because they possess no forces +which will be friendly and faithful to them. Moreover, states quickly +founded, like all other things which are horn and grow rapidly, cannot +have deep roots, so that the first storm destroys them, unless, as +already said, the man who thus becomes a prince is of such great genius +as to be able to take immediate steps for maintaining what fortune +has thrown into his lap, and lay afterwards those foundations which +others make before becoming princes. With regard to these two methods +of becoming a prince,--by ability or by good fortune, I will here +adduce two examples which have taken place within our memory, those of +Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia. + +Francesco, by appropriate means and through great abilities, from +citizen became Duke of Milan, and what he had attained after a thousand +difficulties he maintained with little trouble. On the other hand, +Cesare Borgia, commonly called Duke Valentine, acquired the state +through the fortune of his father and by the same means lost it, and +that although every measure was adopted by him and everything done +that a prudent and capable man could do to establish himself firmly +in that state that the arms and the favours of others had given him. +For, as we have said, he who does not lay his foundations beforehand +may by great abilities do so afterwards, although with great trouble +to the architect and danger to the building. If, then, one considers +the progress made by the duke, it will be seen how firm were the +foundations he had laid to his future power, which I do not think it +superfluous to examine, as I know of no better precepts for a new +prince to follow than the example of his actions; and if his measures +were not successful, it was through no fault of his own but only by +the most extraordinary malignity of fortune. In wishing to aggrandise +the duke his son, Alexander VI. had to meet very great difficulties +both present and future. In the first place, he saw no way of making +him ruler of any state that was not a possession of the Church. And in +attempting to take that of the Church, he knew that the Duke of Milan +and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini were +already under the protection of the Venetians. He saw, moreover, that +the arms of Italy, especially of those who might have served him, were +in the hands of those who would fear the greatness of the pope, and +therefore he could not depend upon them, being all under the Orsinis +and Colonnas and their adherents. It was, therefore, necessary to +disturb the existing condition and bring about disorders in the states +of Italy in order to obtain secure mastery over a part of them; this +was easy, for he found the Venetians, who, actuated by other motives, +had invited the French into Italy, which he not only did not oppose, +but facilitated by dissolving the marriage of King Louis. The king +came thus into Italy with the aid of the Venetians and the consent of +Alexander, and had hardly arrived at Milan before the pope obtained +troops from him for his enterprise in the Romagna, which he carried out +by means of the reputation of the king. The duke having thus obtained +the Romagna and defeated the Colonnas, was hindered in maintaining it +and proceeding further by two things: the one, his forces, of which he +doubted the fidelity; the other the will of France, that is to say, +he feared lest the arms of the Orsini of which he had availed himself +should fail him, and not only hinder him in obtaining more but take +from him what he had already conquered, and he also feared that the +king might do the same. He had evidence of this as regards the Orsini +when, after taking Faenza, he assaulted Bologna and observed their +backwardness in the assault. And as regards the king, he perceived his +designs when, after taking the dukedom of Urbino, he attacked Tuscany, +and the king made him desist from that enterprise; whereupon the +duke decided to depend no longer on the fortunes and arms of others. +The first thing he did was to weaken the parties of the Orsinis and +Colonnas in Rome by gaining all their adherents who were gentlemen and +making them followers of himself, by granting them large pensions, +and appointing them to commands and offices according to their rank, +so that their attachment to their parties was extinguished in a few +months, and entirely concentrated on the duke. After this he awaited an +opportunity for crushing the Orsinis, having dispersed the adherents of +the Colonna family, and when the opportunity arrived he made good use +of it, for the Orsini seeing at length that the greatness of the duke +and of the Church meant their own ruin, convoked a diet at Magione in +the Perugino. Hence sprang the rebellion of Urbino and the tumults in +Romagna and infinite dangers to the duke, who overcame them all with +the help of the French; and having regained his reputation, neither +trusting France nor other foreign forces in order not to have to oppose +them, he had recourse to stratagem. He dissembled his aims so well that +the Orsini, through the mediation of Signor Pavolo, made their peace +with him, which the duke spared no efforts to make secure, presenting +them with robes, money, and horses, so that in their simplicity they +were induced to come to Sinigaglia and fell into his hands. Having +thus suppressed these leaders and made their partisans his friends, +the duke had laid a very good foundation to his power, having all the +Romagna with the duchy of Urbino, and having gained the favour of +the inhabitants, who began to feel the benefit of his rule. And as +this part is worthy of note and of imitation by others, I will not +omit mention of it. When he took the Romagna, it had previously been +governed by weak rulers, who had rather despoiled their subjects than +governed them, and given them more cause for disunion than for union, +so that the province was a prey to robbery, assaults, and every kind +of disorder. He, therefore, judged it necessary to give them a good +government in order to make them peaceful and obedient to his rule. +For this purpose he appointed Messer Remiro d' Orco, a cruel and able +man, to whom he gave the fullest authority. This man, in a short time, +was highly successful in rendering the country orderly and united, +whereupon the duke, not deeming such excessive authority expedient, +lest it should become hateful, appointed a civil court of justice in +the middle of the province under an excellent president, to which each +city appointed its own advocate. And as he knew that the harshness of +the past had engendered some amount of hatred, in order to purge the +minds of the people and to win them over completely, he resolved to +show that if any cruelty had taken place it was not by his orders, but +through the harsh disposition of his minister. And taking him on some +pretext, he had him placed one morning in the public square at Cesena, +cut in half, with a piece of wood and blood-stained knife by his side. +The ferocity of this spectacle caused the people both satisfaction and +amazement. But to return to where we left off. + +The duke being now powerful and partly secured against present perils, +being armed himself, and having in a great measure put down those +neighbouring forces which might injure him, had now to get the respect +of France, if he wished to proceed with his acquisitions, for he +knew that the king, who had lately discovered his error, would not +give him any help. He began therefore to seek fresh alliances and to +vacillate with France in the expedition that the French made towards +the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards, who were besieging Gaeta. +His intention was to assure himself of them, which he would soon have +succeeded in doing if Alexander had lived. These were the measures +taken by him with regard to the present. As to the future, he feared +that a new successor to the Church might not be friendly to him and +might seek to deprive him of what Alexander had given him, and he +sought to provide against this in four ways. Firstly, by destroying all +who were of the blood of those ruling families which he had despoiled, +in order to deprive the pope of any opportunity. Secondly, by gaining +the friendship of the Roman nobles, so that he might through them hold +as it were the pope in check. Thirdly, by obtaining as great a hold on +the College as he could. Fourthly, by acquiring such power before the +pope died as to be able to resist alone the first onslaught. Of these +four things he had at the death of Alexander accomplished three, and +the fourth he had almost accomplished. + +For of the dispossessed rulers he killed as many as he could lay hands +on, and very few escaped; he had gained to his party the Roman nobles; +and he had a great share in the College. As to new possessions, he +designed to become lord of Tuscany, and already possessed Perugia and +Piombino, and had assumed the protectorate over Pisa; and as he had +no longer to fear the French (for the French had been deprived of the +kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards in such a way that both parties +were obliged to buy his friendship) he seized Pisa. After this, Lucca +and Siena at once yielded, partly through envy of the Florentines and +partly through fear; the Florentines had no resources, so that, had he +succeeded as he had done before, in the very year that Alexander died +he would have gained such strength and renown as to be able to maintain +himself without depending on the fortunes or strength of others, but +solely by his own power and ability. But Alexander died five years +after he had first drawn his sword. He left him with the state of +Romagna only firmly established, and all the other schemes in mid-air, +between two very powerful and hostile armies, and suffering from a +fatal illness. But the valour and ability of the duke were such, and +he knew so well how to win over men or vanquish them, and so strong +were the foundations that he had laid in this short time, that if he +had not had those two armies upon him, or else had been in good health, +he would have survived every difficulty. And that his foundations were +good is seen from the fact that the Romagna waited for him more than a +month; in Rome, although half dead, he remained secure, and although +the Baglioni, Vitelli, and Orsini entered Rome they found no followers +against him. He was able, if not to make pope whom he wished, at any +rate to prevent a pope being created whom he did not wish. But if at +the death of Alexander he had been well everything would have been +easy. And he told me on the day that Pope Julius II. was created, +that he had thought of everything which might happen on the death of +his father, and provided against everything, except that he had never +thought that at his father's death he would be dying himself. Reviewing +thus all the actions of the duke, I find nothing to blame, on the +contrary, I feel bound, as I have done, to hold him up as an example +to be imitated by all who by fortune and with the arms of others have +risen to power. For with his great courage and high ambition he could +not have acted otherwise, and his designs were only frustrated by the +short life of Alexander and his own illness. + +Whoever, therefore, deems it necessary in his new principality to +secure himself against enemies, to gain friends, to conquer by force +or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the people, followed +and reverenced by the soldiers, to destroy those who can and may injure +him, introduce innovations into old customs, to be severe and kind, +magnanimous and liberal, suppress the old militia, create a new one, +maintain the friendship of kings and princes in such a way that they +are glad to benefit him and fear to injure him, such a one can find no +better example than the actions of this man. The only thing he can be +accused of is that in the creation of Julius II. he made a bad choice; +for, as has been said, not being able to choose his own pope, he could +still prevent any one being made pope, and he ought never to have +permitted any of those cardinals to be raised to the papacy whom he had +injured, or who when pope would stand in fear of him. For men commit +injuries either through fear or through hate. + +Those whom he had injured were, among others, San Pietro ad Vincula, +Colonna, San Giorgio, and Ascanio. All the others, if assumed to the +pontificate, would have had to fear him except Rohan and the Spaniards; +the latter through their relationship and obligations to him, the +former from his great power, being related to the King of France. +For these reasons the duke ought above all things to have created a +Spaniard pope; and if unable to, then he should have consented to Rohan +being appointed and not San Pietro ad Vincula. And whoever thinks that +in high personages new benefits cause old offences to be forgotten, +makes a great mistake. The duke, therefore, erred in this choice, and +it was the cause of his ultimate ruin. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + + +OF THOSE WHO HAVE ATTAINED THE POSITION OF PRINCE BY VILLAINY + + +But as there are still two ways of becoming prince which cannot be +attributed entirely either to fortune or to ability, they must not be +passed over, although one of them could be more fully discussed if we +were treating of republics. These are when one becomes prince by some +nefarious or villainous means, or when a private citizen becomes the +prince of his country through the favour of his fellow-citizens. And in +speaking of the former means, I will give two examples, one ancient, +the other modern, without entering further into the merits of this +method, as I judge them to be sufficient for any one obliged to imitate +them. Agathocles the Sicilian rose not only from private life but from +the lowest and most abject position to be King of Syracuse. The son +of a potter, he led a life of the utmost wickedness through all the +stages of his fortune. Nevertheless, his wickedness was accompanied +by such vigour of mind and body that, having joined the militia, he +rose through all its grades to be prætor of Syracuse. Having been +appointed to this position, and having decided to become prince, and +to hold with violence and without the support of others that which +had been granted him; and having imparted his design to Hamilcar the +Carthaginian, who with his armies was fighting in Sicily, he called +together one morning the people and senate of Syracuse, as if he had +to deliberate on matters of importance to the republic, and at a given +signal had all the senators and the richest men of the people killed by +his soldiers; after their death he occupied and held rule over the city +without any civil disorders. And although he was twice beaten by the +Carthaginians and ultimately besieged, he was able not only to defend +the city, but leaving a portion of his forces for its defence, with the +remainder he invaded Africa, and in a short time liberated Syracuse +from the siege and brought the Carthaginians to great extremities, so +that they were obliged to come to terms with him, and remain contented +with the possession of Africa, leaving Sicily to Agathocles. Whoever +considers, therefore, the actions and qualities of this man, will see +few if any things which can be attributed to fortune; for, as above +stated, it was not by the favour of any person, but through the grades +of the militia, which he had gained with a thousand hardships and +perils, that he arrived at the position of prince, which he afterwards +maintained by so many courageous and perilous expedients. It cannot be +called a virtue to kill one's fellow-citizens, betray one's friends, +be without faith, without pity, and without religion, by which methods +one may indeed gain an empire, but not glory. For if the virtues of +Agathocles in braving and overcoming perils, and his greatness of soul +in supporting and surmounting obstacles be considered, one sees no +reason for holding him inferior to any of the most renowned captains. +Nevertheless his barbarous cruelty and inhumanity, together with his +countless atrocities, do not permit of his being named among the +most famous men. We cannot attribute to fortune or merit that which +he achieved without either. In our own times, during the reign of +Alexander VI., Oliverotto du Fermo had been left a young boy under the +care of his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, who brought him up, and +sent him in early youth to fight under Paolo Vitelli, in order that he +might, under that discipline, obtain a good military position. On the +death of Paolo he fought under his brother Vitellozzo, and in a very +short time, being of great intelligence, and active in mind and body, +he became one of the leaders of his troops. But deeming it servile to +be under others, he resolved, with the help of some citizens of Fermo, +who preferred servitude to the liberty of their country, and with the +favour of the Vitellis, to occupy Fermo; he therefore wrote to Giovanni +Fogliani, how, having been for many years away from home, he wished +to come to see him and his city, and in some measure to revisit his +estates. And as he had only laboured to gain honour, in order that +his fellow-citizens might see that he had not spent his time in vain, +he wished to come honourably accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his +friends and followers, and prayed him that he would be pleased to +order that he should be received with honour by the citizens of Fermo, +by which he would honour not only him, Oliverotto, but also himself, +as he had been his pupil. Giovanni did not fail in any duty towards +his nephew; he caused him to be honourably received by the people of +Fermo, and lodged him in his own houses. After waiting some days to +arrange all that was necessary to his villainous projects, Oliverotto +invited Giovanni Fogliani and all the principal men of Fermo to a +grand banquet. After the dinner and the entertainments usual at such +feasts, Oliverotto artfully introduced certain important matters of +discussion, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander, and of his +son Cesare, and of their enterprises. To which discourses Giovanni +and others having replied, he all at once rose, saying that these +matters should be spoken of in a more secret place, and withdrew into +a room where Giovanni and the other citizens followed him. They were +no sooner seated than soldiers rushed out of hiding-places and killed +Giovanni and all the others. After which massacre Oliverotto mounted +his horse, rode through the town and besieged the chief magistrate in +his palace, so that through fear they were obliged to obey him and form +a government, of which he made himself prince. And all those being +dead who, if discontented, could injure him, he fortified himself +with new orders, civil and military, in such a way that within the +year that he held the principality he was not only safe himself in +the city of Fermo, but had become formidable to all his neighbours. +And his overthrow would have been difficult, like that of Agathocles, +if he had not allowed himself to be deceived by Cesare Borgia, when +he besieged the Orsinis and Vitellis at Sinigaglia, as already +related, where he also was taken, one year after the parricide he had +committed, and strangled, together with Vitellozzo, who had been his +teacher in ability and atrocity. Some may wonder how it came about +that Agathocles, and others like him, could, after infinite treachery +and cruelty, live secure for many years in their country and defend +themselves from external enemies without being conspired against by +their subjects; although many others have, through their cruelty, been +unable to maintain their position in times of peace, not to speak of +the uncertain times of war. + +I believe this arises from the cruelties being used well or badly. +Well used may be called those (if it is permissible to use the word +well of evil) which are committed once for the need of securing one's +self, and which afterwards are not persisted in, but are exchanged for +measures as useful to the subjects as possible. Cruelties ill used +are those which, although at first few, increase rather than diminish +with time. Those who follow the former method may remedy in some +measure their condition, both with God and man; as did Agathocles. +As to the others, it is impossible for them to maintain themselves. +Whence it is to be noted, that in taking a state the conqueror must +arrange to commit all his cruelties at once, so as not to have to recur +to them every day, and so as to be able, by not making fresh changes, +to reassure people and win them over by benefiting them. Whoever acts +otherwise, either through timidity or bad counsels, is always obliged +to stand with knife in hand, and can never depend on his subjects, +because they, through continually fresh injuries, are unable to depend +upon him. For injuries should be done all together, so that being less +tasted, they will give less offence. Benefits should be granted little +by little, so that they may be better enjoyed. And above all, a prince +must live with his subjects in such a way that no accident should make +him change it, for good or evil; for necessity arising in adverse +times, you are not in time with severity, and the good that you do does +not profit you, as it is judged to be forced, and you will derive no +benefit whatever from it. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + + +OF THE CIVIC PRINCIPALITY + + +But we now come to the case where a citizen becomes prince not +through crime or intolerable violence, but by the favour of his +fellow-citizens, which may be called a civic principality. To arrive +at this position depends not entirely on worth or entirely on fortune, +but rather on cunning assisted by fortune. One attains it by help of +popular favour or by the favour of the aristocracy. For in every city +these two opposite parties are to be found, arising from the desire +of the populace to avoid the oppression of the great, and the desire +of the great to command and oppress the people. And from these two +opposing interests arises in the city one of three effects: either +absolute government, liberty, or license. The former is created either +by the populace or the nobility depending on the relative opportunities +of the two parties; for when the nobility see that they are unable to +resist the people they unite in creating one of their number prince, +so as to be able to carry out their own designs under the shadow of +his authority. The populace, on the other hand, when unable to resist +the nobility, endeavour to create a prince in order to be protected +by his authority. He who becomes prince by help of the nobility has +greater difficulty in maintaining his power than he who is raised by +the populace, for he is surrounded by those who think themselves his +equals, and is thus unable to direct or command as he pleases. But one +who is raised to the leadership by popular favour finds himself alone, +and has no one or very few who are not ready to obey him. Besides +which, it is impossible to satisfy the nobility by fair dealing and +without inflicting injury on others, whereas it is very easy to satisfy +the mass of the people in this way. For the aim of the people is more +honest than that of the nobility, the latter desiring to oppress, and +the former merely to avoid oppression. It must also be added that the +prince can never insure himself against a hostile populace on account +of their number, but he can against the hostility of the great, as +they are but few. The worst that a prince has to expect from a hostile +people is to be abandoned, but from hostile nobles he has to fear not +only abandonment but their active opposition, and as they are more +farseeing and more cunning, they are always in time to save themselves +and take sides with the one who they expect will conquer. The prince +is, moreover, obliged to live always with the same people, but he can +easily do without the same nobility, being able to make and unmake them +at any time, and increase their position or deprive them of it as he +pleases. And to throw further light on this part, I would say, that the +nobles are to be considered in two different manners; that is, they are +either to be ruled so as to make them entirely depend on your fortunes, +or else not. Those that are thus bound to you and are not rapacious, +must be honoured and loved; those who are not bound must be considered +in two ways, they either do this through pusillanimity and natural +want of courage, and in this case you ought to make use of them, and +especially such as are of good counsel, so that they may honour you in +prosperity and in adversity you have not to fear them. But when they +are not bound to you of set purpose and for ambitious ends, it is a +sign that they think more of themselves than of you; and from such men +the prince must guard himself and look upon them as secret enemies, +who will help to ruin him when in adversity. One, however, who becomes +prince by favour of the populace, must maintain its friendship, which +he will find easy, the people asking nothing but not to be oppressed. +But one who against the people's wishes becomes prince by favour of +the nobles, should above all endeavour to gain the favour of the +people; this will be easy to him if he protects them. And as men, who +receive good from those they expected evil from, feel under a greater +obligation to their benefactor, so the subject populace will become +even better disposed towards him than if he had become prince through +their favour. The prince can win their favour in many ways, which vary +according to circumstances, for which no certain rule can be given, and +will therefore be passed over. + +I will only say, in conclusion, that it is necessary for a prince to +possess the friendship of the people; otherwise he has no resource in +times of adversity. Nabis, prince of the Spartans, sustained a siege by +the whole of Greece and a victorious Roman army, and defended against +them his country and maintained his own position. It sufficed when the +danger arose for him to make sure of a few, which would not have been +enough if the populace had been hostile to him. And let no one oppose +my opinion in this by quoting the trite proverb, "He who builds on the +people, builds on mud"; because that is true when a private citizen +relies upon the people and persuades himself that they will liberate +him if he is oppressed by enemies or by the magistrates; in this case +he might often find himself deceived, as happened in Rome to the +Gracchi and in Florence to Messer Georgio Scali. + +But when it is a prince who founds himself on this basis, one who +can command and is a man of courage, and does not get frightened in +adversity, and does not neglect other preparations, and one who by his +own courage and measures animates the mass of the people, he will not +find himself deceived by them, and he will find that he has laid his +foundations well. Usually these principalities are in danger when the +prince from the position of a civil ruler changes to an absolute one, +for these princes either command themselves or by means of magistrates. +In the latter case their position is weaker and more dangerous, for +they are at the mercy of those citizens who are appointed magistrates, +who can, especially in times of adversity, with great facility deprive +them of their position, either by acting against them or by not obeying +them. The prince is not in time, in such dangers, to assume absolute +authority, for the citizens and subjects who are accustomed to take +their orders from the magistrates are not ready in these emergencies +to obey his, and he will always in doubtful times lack men whom he can +rely on. Such a prince cannot base himself on what he sees in quiet +times, when the citizens have need of the state; for then every one is +full of promises and each one is ready to die for him when death is +far off; but in adversity, when the state has need of citizens, then +he will find but few. And this experience is the more dangerous, in +that it can only be had once. Therefore a wise prince will seek means +by which his subjects will always and in every possible condition +of things have need of his government, and then they will always be +faithful to him. + + + + +CHAPTER X + + +HOW THE STRENGTH OF ALL STATES SHOULD BE MEASURED + + +In examining the character of these principalities it is necessary to +consider another point, namely, whether the prince has such a position +as to be able in case of need to maintain himself alone, or whether he +has always need of the protection of others. The better to explain this +I would say, that I consider those capable of maintaining themselves +alone who can, through abundance of men or money, put together a +sufficient army, and hold the field against any one who assails them; +and I consider to have need of others, those who cannot take the +field against their enemies, but are obliged to take refuge within +their walls and stand on the defensive. We have already discussed the +former case and will speak in future of it as occasion arises. In +the second case there is nothing to be said except to encourage such +a prince to provision and fortify his own town, and not to trouble +about the country. And whoever has strongly fortified his town and, +as regards the government of his subjects, has proceeded as we have +already described and will further relate, will be attacked with great +reluctance, for men are always averse to enterprises in which they +foresee difficulties, and it can never appear easy to attack one who +has his town well guarded and is not hated by the people. The cities +of Germany are extremely liberal, have little surrounding country, and +obey the emperor when they choose, and they do not fear him or any +other potentate that they have about them. They are fortified in such +a manner that every one thinks that to reduce them would be tedious +and difficult, for they all have the necessary moats and bastions, +sufficient artillery, and always keep in the public storehouses food +and drink and fuel for one year. Beyond which, to keep the lower +classes satisfied, and without loss to the public, they have always +enough means to give them work for one year in these employments which +form the nerve and life of the town, and in the industries by which the +lower classes live; military exercises are still held in reputation, +and many regulations are in force for maintaining them. A prince, +therefore, who possesses a strong city and does not make himself hated, +cannot be assaulted; and if he were to be so, the assailant would +be obliged to retire shamefully; for so many things change, that it +is almost impossible for any one to hold the field for a year with +his armies idle. And to those who urge that the people, having their +possessions outside and seeing them burnt, will not have patience, and +the long siege and self-interest will make them forget their prince, +I reply that a powerful and courageous prince will always overcome +those difficulties by now raising the hopes of his subjects that the +evils will not last long, now impressing them with fear of the enemy's +cruelty, now by dextrously assuring himself of those who appear too +bold. Besides which, the enemy would naturally burn and ruin the +country on first arriving and in the time when men's minds are still +hot and eager to defend themselves, and therefore the prince has still +less to fear, for after some days, when people have cooled down, the +damage is done, the evil has been suffered, and there is no remedy, so +that they are the more ready to unite with their prince, as it appears +that he is under an obligation to them, their houses having been burnt +and their possessions ruined in his defence. + +It is the nature of men to be us much bound by the benefits that they +confer as by those they receive. From which it follows that, everything +considered, a prudent prince will not find it difficult to uphold the +courage of his subjects both at the commencement and during a state of +siege, if he possesses provisions and means to defend himself. + + + + +CHAPTER XI + + +OF ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES + + +It now remains to us only to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, +with regard to which the difficulties lie wholly before they are +possessed. They are acquired either by ability or by fortune; but +are maintained without either, for they are sustained by the ancient +religious customs, which are so powerful and of such quality, that they +keep their princes in power in whatever manner they proceed and live. +These alone have a state without defending it, have subjects without +governing them, and the states, not being defended, are not taken from +them; the subjects not being governed do not disturb themselves, and +neither think of nor are capable of alienating themselves from them. +Only these principalities, therefore, are secure and happy. But as they +are upheld by higher causes, which the human mind cannot attain to, I +will abstain from speaking of them; for being exalted and maintained by +God, it would be the work of a presumptuous and foolish man to discuss +them. + +However, I might be asked how it has come about that the Church has +reached such great temporal power, when, previous to Alexander VI., +the Italian potentates,--and not merely the really powerful ones, but +every lord or baron, however insignificant, held it in slight esteem +as regards temporal power; whereas now it is dreaded by a king of +France, whom it has been able to drive out of Italy, and has also been +able to ruin the Venetians. Therefore, although this is well known, I +do not think it superfluous to call it to mind. Before Charles, King +of France, came into Italy, this country was under the rule of the +pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and the +Florentines. These potentates had to have two chief cares: one, that no +foreigner should enter Italy by force of arms, the other that none of +the existing governments should extend its dominions. Those chiefly to +be watched were the pope and the Venetians. To keep back the Venetians +required the ruin of all the others, as in the defence of Ferrara, +and to keep down the pope they made use of the Roman barons. These +were divided into two factions, the Orsinis and the Colonnas, and as +there was constant quarrelling between them, and they were constantly +under arms, before the eyes of the pope, they kept the papacy weak and +infirm. And although there arose now and then a resolute pope like +Sextus, yet his fortune or ability was never able to liberate him from +these evils. The shortness of their life was the reason of this, for +in the course of ten years which, as a general rule, a pope lived, he +had great difficulty in suppressing even one of the factions, and if, +for example, a pope had almost put down the Colonnas, a new pope would +succeed who was hostile to the Orsinis, which caused the Colonnas to +spring up again, and he was not in time to suppress them. This caused +the temporal power of the pope to be of little esteem in Italy. + +Then arose Alexander VI. who of all the pontiffs who have ever +reigned, best showed how a pope might prevail both by money and by +force. With Duke Valentine as his instrument, and on the occasion of +the French invasion, he did all that I have previously described +in speaking of the actions of the duke. And although his object was +to aggrandise not the Church but the duke, what he did resulted in +the aggrandisement of the Church, which after the death of the duke +became the heir of his labours. Then came Pope Julius, who found +the Church powerful, possessing all Romagna, all the Roman barons +suppressed, and the factions destroyed by the severity of Alexander. +He also found the way open for accumulating wealth in ways never used +before the time of Alexander. These measures were not only followed +by Julius, but increased; he resolved to gain Bologna, put down the +Venetians and drive the French from Italy, in all which enterprises +he was successful. He merits the greater praise, as he did everything +to increase the power of the Church and not of any private person. He +also kept the Orsini and Colonna parties in the conditions in which he +found them, and although there were some leaders among them who might +have made changes, there were two things that kept them steady: one, +the greatness of the Church, which they dreaded; the other, the fact +that they had no cardinals, who are the origin of the tumults among +them. For these parties are never at rest when they have cardinals, +for these stir up the parties both within Rome and outside, and the +barons are forced to defend them. Thus from the ambitions of prelates +arise the discords and tumults among the barons. His holiness, Pope Leo +X., therefore, has found the pontificate in a very powerful condition, +from which it is hoped, that as those popes made it great by force of +armies, so he through his goodness and infinite other virtues will make +it both great and venerated. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + + +THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF MILITIA AND MERCENARY SOLDIERS + + +Having now discussed fully the qualities of these principalities of +which I proposed to treat, and partially considered the causes of their +prosperity or failure, and having also showed the methods by which +many have sought to obtain such states, it now remains for me to treat +generally of the methods of attack and defence that can be used in +each of them. We have said already how necessary it is for a prince +to have his foundations good, otherwise he is certain to be ruined. +The chief foundations of all states, whether new, old, or mixed, are +good laws and good arms. And as there cannot be good laws where there +are not good arms, and where there are good arms there should be good +laws, I will not now discuss the laws, but will speak of the arms. I +say, therefore, that the arms by which a prince defends his possessions +are either his own, or else mercenaries, or auxiliaries, or mixed. The +mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous, and if any one +keeps his state based on the arms of mercenaries, he will never stand +firm or sure, as they are disunited, ambitious, without discipline, +faithless, bold amongst friends, cowardly amongst enemies, they have no +fear of God, and keep no faith with men. Ruin is only deferred as long +as the assault is postponed; in peace you are despoiled by them, and in +war by the enemy. The cause of this is that they have no love or other +motive to keep them in the field beyond a trifling wage, which is not +enough to make them ready to die for you. They are quite willing to be +your soldiers so long as you do not make war, but when war comes, it is +either fly or be off. I ought to have little trouble in proving this, +since the ruin of Italy is now caused by nothing else but through her +having relied for many years on mercenary arms. These were somewhat +improved in a few cases, and appeared courageous among themselves, but +when the foreigner came they showed their worthlessness. Thus it came +about that King Charles of France was allowed to take Italy without the +slightest trouble, and those who said that it was owing to our sins, +spoke the truth, but it was not the sins that they believed but those +that I have related. And as it was the sins of princes, they too have +suffered the punishment. I will explain more fully the defects of these +arms. Mercenary captains are either very capable men or not; if they +are, you cannot rely upon them, for they will always aspire to their +own greatness, either by oppressing you, their master, or by oppressing +others against your intentions; but if the captain is not an able man, +he will generally ruin you. And if it is replied to this, that whoever +has armed forces will do the same, whether these are mercenary or not, +I would reply that as armies are to be used either by a prince or by a +republic, the prince must go in person to take the position of captain, +and the republic must send its own citizens. If the one sent turns, +out incompetent, it must change him; and if capable, keep him by law +from going beyond the proper limits. And it is seen by experience that +only princes and armed republics make very great progress, whereas +mercenary forces do nothing but damage, and also an armed republic +submits less easily to the rule of one of its citizens than a republic +armed by foreign forces. Rome and Sparta were for many centuries well +armed and free. The Swiss are well armed and enjoy great freedom. As an +example of mercenary armies in antiquity there are the Carthaginians, +who were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers, after the termination +of the first war with the Romans, even while they still had their own +citizens as captains. Philip of Macedon was made captain of their +forces by the Thebans after the death of Epaminondas, and after gaining +the victory he deprived them of liberty. The Milanese, on the death +of Duke Philip, hired Francesco Sforza against the Venetians, who +having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio, allied himself with them to +oppress the Milanese his employers. The father of this Sforza, being +a soldier in the service of the Queen Giovanna of Naples, left her +suddenly unarmed, by which she was compelled, in order not to lose the +kingdom, to throw herself into the arms of the King of Aragon. And +if the Venetians and Florentines have in times past increased their +dominions by means of such forces, and their captains have not made +themselves princes but have defended them, I reply that the Florentines +in this case have been favoured by chance, for of the capable leaders +whom they might have feared, some did not conquer, some met with +opposition, and others directed their ambition elsewhere. The one who +did not conquer was Sir John Hawkwood, whose fidelity could not be +known as he was not victorious, but every one will admit that, had he +conquered, the Florentines would have been at his mercy. Sforza had +always the Bracceschi against him, they being constantly at enmity. +Francesco directed his ambition towards Lombardy; Braccio against the +Church and the kingdom of Naples. But let us look at what followed a +short time ago. The Florentines appointed Paolo Vitelli their captain, +a man of great prudence, who had risen from a private station to the +highest reputation. If he had taken Pisa no one can deny that it was +highly important for the Florentines to retain his friendship, because +had he become the soldier of their enemies they would have had no +means of opposing him; and in order to retain him they would have been +obliged to obey him. As to the Venetians, if one considers the progress +they made, it will be seen that they acted surely and gloriously so +long as they made war with their own forces; that it was before they +commenced their enterprises on land that they fought courageously with +their own gentlemen and armed populace, but when they began to fight +on land they abandoned this virtue, and began to follow the Italian +custom. And at the commencement of their land conquests they had not +much to fear from their captains, their land possessions not being +very large, and their reputation being great, but as their possessions +increased, as they did under Carmagnola, they had an example of their +mistake. For seeing that he was very powerful, after he had defeated +the Duke of Milan, and knowing, on the other hand, that he was not +enterprising in warfare, they considered that they would not make any +more conquests with him, and they neither would nor could dismiss him, +for fear of losing what they had already gained. They were therefore +obliged, in order to make sure of him, to have him killed. They then +had for captains Bartolommeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, Count +di Pitigliano, and such like, from whom they had to fear loss instead +of gain, as happened subsequently at Vailà, where in one day they lost +what they had laboriously gained in eight hundred years; for with these +forces, only slow and trifling acquisitions are made, but sudden and +miraculous losses. And as I have cited these examples from Italy, +which has now for many years been governed by mercenary forces, I will +now deal more largely with them, so that having seen their origin and +progress, they can be better remedied. You must understand that in +these latter times, as soon as the empire began to be repudiated in +Italy and the pope to gain greater reputation in temporal matters, +Italy was divided into many states; many of the principal cities took +up arms against their nobles, who, favoured by the emperor, had held +them in subjection, and the Church encouraged this in order to increase +its temporal power. In many other cities one of the inhabitants became +prince. Thus Italy having fallen almost entirely into the hands of +the Church and a few republics, and the priests and other citizens +not being accustomed to bear arms, they began to hire foreigners as +soldiers. The first to bring reputation for this kind of militia was +Alberigo da Como, a native of Romagna. The discipline of this man +produced, among others, Braccio and Sforza, who were in their day the +arbiters of Italy. After these came all those others who up to the +present day have commanded the armies of Italy, and the result of their +prowess has been that Italy has been overrun by Charles, preyed on by +Louis, tyrannised over by Ferrando, and insulted by the Swiss. The +system adopted by them was, in the first place, to increase their own +reputation by discrediting the infantry. They did this because, as they +had no country and lived on their earnings, a few foot soldiers did not +augment their reputation, and they could not maintain a large number +and therefore they restricted themselves almost entirely to cavalry, +by which with a smaller number they were well paid and honoured. They +reduced things to such a state that in an army of 20,000 soldiers there +were not 2000 foot. They had also used every means to spare themselves +and the soldiers any hardship or fear by not killing each other in +their encounters, but taking prisoners without a blow. They made no +attacks on fortifications by night; and those in the fortifications did +not attack the tents at night, they made no stockades on ditches round +their camps, and did not take the field in winter. All these things +were permitted by their military rules, and adopted, as we have said, +to avoid trouble and danger, so that they have reduced Italy to slavery +and degradation. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + + +OF AUXILIARY, MIXED, AND NATIVE TROOPS + + +Auxiliary forces, which are the other kind of useless forces, are +when one calls on a potentate to come and aid one with his troops, as +was done in recent times by Julius, who seeing the wretched failure +of his mercenary forces, in his Ferrara enterprise, had recourse to +auxiliaries, and arranged with Ferrando, King of Spain, that he should +help him with his armies. These forces may be good in themselves, but +they are always dangerous for those who borrow them, for if they lose +you are defeated, and if they conquer you remain their prisoner. And +although ancient history is full of examples of this, I will not depart +from the example of Pope Julius II., which is still fresh. Nothing +could be less prudent than the course he adopted; for, wishing to take +Ferrara, he put himself entirely into the power of a foreigner. But +by good fortune there arose a third cause which prevented him reaping +the effects of his bad choice; for when his auxiliaries were beaten +at Ravenna, the Swiss rose up and drove back the victors, against all +expectation of himself or others, so that he was not taken prisoner by +the enemy which had fled, nor by his own auxiliaries, having conquered +by other arms than theirs. The Florentines, being totally disarmed, +hired 10,000 Frenchmen to attack Pisa, by which measure they ran +greater risk than at any period of their struggles. The emperor of +Constantinople, to oppose his neighbours, put 10,000 Turks into Greece, +who after the war would not go away again, which was the beginning of +the servitude of Greece to the infidels. Any one, therefore, who wishes +not to conquer, would do well to use these forces, which are much more +dangerous than mercenaries, as with them ruin is complete, for they +are all united, and owe obedience to others, whereas with mercenaries, +when they have conquered, it requires more time and a good opportunity +for them to injure you, as they do not form a single body and have been +engaged and paid by you, therefore a third party that you have made +leader cannot at once acquire enough authority to be able to injure +you. In a word, the greatest dangers with mercenaries lies in their +cowardice and reluctance to fight, but with auxiliaries the danger +lies in their courage. A wise prince, therefore, always avoids these +forces and has recourse to his own, and would prefer rather to lose +with his own men than conquer with the forces of others, not deeming +it a true victory which is gained by foreign arms. I never hesitate to +cite the example of Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke entered +Romagna with auxiliary troops, leading forces composed entirely of +French soldiers, and with these he took Imola and Forli; but as they +seemed unsafe, he had recourse to mercenaries, and hired the Orsini and +Vitelli; afterwards finding these uncertain to handle, unfaithful and +dangerous, he suppressed them, and relied upon his own men. And the +difference between these forces can be easily seen if one considers +the difference between the reputation of the duke when he had only the +French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he had to rely +on himself and his own soldiers. His reputation will be found to have +constantly increased, and he was never so highly esteemed as when +every one saw that he was the sole master of his forces. + +I do not wish to go away from recent Italian instances, but I cannot +omit Hiero of Syracuse, whom I have already mentioned. This man being, +as I said, made head of the army by the Syracusans, immediately +recognised the uselessness of that mercenary militia which was composed +like our Italian mercenary troops, and as he thought it unsafe +either to retain them or dismiss them, he had them cut in pieces and +thenceforward made war with his own arms and not those of others. I +would also call to mind a figure out of the Old Testament which well +illustrates this point. When David offered to Saul to go and fight with +the Philistine champion Goliath, Saul, to encourage him, armed him +with his own arms, which when David had tried on he refused saying, +that with them he could not fight so well; he preferred, therefore, +to face the enemy with his own sling and knife. In short, the arms of +others either fall away from you, or overburden you, or else impede +you. Charles VIII., father of King Louis XL, having through good +fortune and bravery liberated France from the English, recognised this +necessity of being armed with his own forces, and established in his +kingdom a system of men-at-arms and infantry. Afterwards King Louis +his son abolished the infantry and began to hire Swiss, which mistake +being followed by others is, as may now be seen, a cause of danger to +that kingdom. For by giving such reputation to the Swiss, France has +disheartened all her own troops, the infantry having been abolished and +the men-at-arms being obliged to foreigners for assistance; for being +accustomed to fight with Swiss troops, they think they cannot conquer +without them. Whence it comes that the French are insufficiently strong +to oppose the Swiss, and without the aid of the Swiss they will not +venture against others. The armies of the French are thus of a mixed +kind, partly mercenary and partly her own; taken together they are much +better than troops entirely composed of mercenaries or auxiliaries, but +much inferior to national forces. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV + + +WHAT THE DUTIES OF A PRINCE ARE WITH REGARD TO THE MILITIA + + +A Prince should therefore have no other aim or thought, nor take up +any other thing for his study, but war and its order and discipline, +for that is the only art that is necessary to one who commands, and +it is of such virtue that it not only maintains those who are born +princes, but often enables men of private fortune to attain to that +rank. And one sees, on the other hand, that when princes think more of +luxury than of arms, they lose their state. The chief cause which makes +any one lose it, is the contempt of this art, and the way to acquire +it is to be well versed in the same. Francesco Sforza, through being +well armed, became, from a private position, Duke of Milan; his sons, +through wishing to avoid the fatigue and hardship of war, from dukes +became private persons. For among other evils caused by being disarmed, +it renders you contemptible; which is one of those disgraceful things +which a prince must guard against, as will be explained later. Because +there is no comparison whatever between an armed man and a disarmed +one; it is not reasonable to suppose that one who is armed will obey +willingly one who is unarmed; or that any unarmed man will remain +safe among armed servants. For one being disdainful and the other +suspicious, it is not possible for them to act well together. And +yet a prince who is ignorant of military matters, besides the other +misfortunes already mentioned, cannot be esteemed by his soldiers, nor +have confidence in them. He ought, therefore, never to let his thoughts +stray from the exercise of war; and in peace he ought to practise it +more than in war, which he can do in two ways: both by action and by +study. As to action, he must, besides keeping his men well disciplined +and exercised, engage continually in hunting, and thus accustom his +body to hardships; and on the other hand learn the nature of the +land, how the mountains rise, how the valleys are disposed, where the +plains lie, and understand the nature of the rivers and swamps, and +to this he should devote great attention. This knowledge is useful in +two ways. In the first place, one learns to know one's country, and +can the better see how to defend it. Then by means of the knowledge +and experience gained in one locality, one can easily understand +any other that it may be necessary to venture on, for the hills and +valleys, plains and rivers of Tuscany, for instance, have a certain +resemblance to those of other provinces, so that from a knowledge of +the country in one province one can easily arrive at a knowledge of +others. And that prince who is lacking in this skill is wanting in the +first essentials of a leader; for it is this which teaches how to find +the enemy, take up quarters, lead armies, arrange marches and occupy +positions with advantage. Philopœmen, prince of the Achæi, among other +praises bestowed on him by writers, is lauded because in times of peace +he thought of nothing but the methods of warfare, and when he was in +the country with his friends, he often stopped and asked them: If the +enemy were on that hill and we found ourselves here with our army, +which of us would have the advantage? How could we safely approach +him maintaining our order? If we wished to retire, what ought we to +do? If they retired, how should we follow them? And he put before them +as they went along all the cases that might happen to an army, heard +their opinion, gave his own, fortifying it by argument; so that through +these continued cogitations there could never happen any incident when +leading his armies for which he was not prepared. But as to exercise +for the mind, the prince ought to read history and study the actions +of eminent men, see how they acted in warfare, examine the causes of +their victories and losses in order to imitate the former and avoid the +latter, and above all, do as some eminent men have done in the past, +who have imitated some one, who has been much praised and glorified, +and have always kept their deeds and actions before them, as they say +Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, Cæsar Alexander, and Scipio +Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of Cyrus written by Xenophon, will +perceive in the life of Scipio how gloriously he imitated him, and how, +in chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to +those qualities of Cyrus described by Xenophon. + +A wise prince should follow similar methods and never remain idle in +peaceful times, but by industry make such good use of the time as may +serve him in adversity, so that when fortune changes she may find him +prepared to resist her blows. + + + + +CHAPTER XV + + +OF THE THINGS FOB WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR +BLAMED + + +It remains now to be seen what are the methods and rules for a +prince as regards his subjects and friends. And as I know that many +have written of this, I fear that my writing about it may be deemed +presumptuous, differing as I do, especially in this matter, from the +opinions of others. But my intention being to write something of use to +those who understand it, it appears to me more proper to go to the real +truth of the matter than to its imagination; and many have imagined +republics and principalities which have never been seen or known to +exist in reality; for how we live is so far removed from how we ought +to live, that he who abandons what is done for what ought to be done, +will rather learn to bring about his own ruin than his preservation. +A man who wishes to make a profession of goodness in everything must +necessarily come to grief among so many who are not good. Therefore it +is necessary for a prince, who wishes to maintain himself, to learn how +not to be good, and to use it and not use it according to the necessity +of the case. Leaving on one side then those things which concern only +an imaginary prince, and speaking of those that are real, I state that +all men, when spoken of, and especially princes, who are placed at +a greater height, are noted for some of those qualities which bring +them either praise or blame. Thus one is considered liberal, another +miserly; one a free giver, another rapacious; one cruel, another +merciful; one a breaker of his word, another faithful; one effeminate +and pusillanimous, another fierce and high-spirited; one humane, +another proud; one lascivious, another chaste; one frank, another +astute; one hard, another easy; one serious, another frivolous; one +religious, another incredulous, and so on. I know that every one will +admit that it would be highly praiseworthy in a prince to possess all +the above-named qualities that are reputed good, but as they cannot all +be possessed or observed, human conditions not permitting of it, it is +necessary that he should be prudent enough to avoid the disgrace of +those vices which would lose him the state, and guard himself against +those which will not lose it him, if possible, but if not able to, he +can indulge them with less scruple. And yet he must not mind incurring +the disgrace of those vices, without which it would be difficult to +save the state, for if one considers well, it will be found that some +things which seem virtues would, if followed, lead to one's ruin, and +some others which appear vices result, if followed, in one's greater +security and well being. + + + + +CHAPTER XVI + + +OF LIBERALITY AND NIGGARDLINESS + + +Beginning now with the first qualities above named, I say that it +would be well to be considered liberal; nevertheless liberality used +in such a way that you are not feared will injure you, because if +used virtuously and in the proper way, it will not be known, and you +will not incur the disgrace of the contrary vice. But one who wishes +to obtain the reputation of liberality among men, must not omit every +kind of sumptuous display, and to such an extent that a prince of this +character will consume by such means all his resources, and will be +at last compelled, if he wishes to maintain his name for liberality, +to impose heavy charges on his people, become an extortioner, and do +everything possible to obtain money. This will make his subjects begin +to hate him and he will be little esteemed being poor, so that having +by this liberality injured many and benefited but few, he will feel +the first little disturbance and be endangered by every accident. If +he recognises this and wishes to change his system, he incurs at once +the charge of niggardliness; a prince, therefore, not being able to +exercise this virtue of liberality without risk if it is known, must +not, if he is prudent, object to be called miserly. In course of time +he will be thought more liberal, when it is seen that by his parsimony +his revenue is sufficient, that he can defend himself against those +who make war on him, and undertake enterprises without burdening his +people, so that he is really liberal to all those from whom he does not +take, who are infinite in number, and niggardly to all to whom he does +not give, who are few. + +In our times we have seen nothing great done except by those who have +been esteemed niggardly; the others have all been ruined. Pope Julius +II., although he had made use of a reputation for liberality in order +to attain the papacy, did not seek to retain it afterwards, so that +he might be able to make war on the King of France, and he earned on +so many wars without imposing an extraordinary tax, because his extra +expenses were covered by the parsimony he had so long practised. The +present King of Spain, if he had been thought liberal, would not have +engaged in and won so many enterprises. For these reasons a prince must +care little for the reputation of being a miser, if he wishes to avoid +robbing his subjects, if he wishes to be able to defend himself, to not +become poor and contemptible, and not to be forced to become rapacious; +this vice of niggardliness is one of those vices which enable him to +reign. If it is said that Cæsar attained the empire through liberality, +and that many others have reached the highest positions through being +liberal or being thought so, I would reply that you are either a prince +already or else on the way to become one. In the first case, this +liberality is harmful; in the second, it is certainly necessary to be +considered liberal, and Cæsar was one of those who wished to attain the +mastery over Rome, but if after attaining it he had lived and had not +moderated his expenses, he would have destroyed that empire. And should +any one reply that there have been many princes, who have done great +things with their armies, who have been thought extremely liberal, I +would answer by saying that the prince may either spend his own wealth +and that of his subjects or the wealth of others. In the first case +he must be sparing, but in the second he must not neglect to be very +liberal. This liberality is very necessary to a prince who marches with +his armies, and lives by plunder, sacking and extorting, and is dealing +with the wealth of others, for without it he would not be followed +by his soldiers. And you may be very generous indeed with what is +not the property of yourself or your subjects, as were Cyrus, Cæsar, +and Alexander; for spending the wealth of others will not diminish +your reputation, but increase it, only spending your own resources +will injure you. There is nothing which destroys itself so much as +liberality, for by using it you lose the power of using it, and become +either poor and despicable, or, to escape poverty, rapacious and hated. +And of all things that a prince must guard against, the most important +are being despicable or hated, and liberality will lead you to one or +other of these conditions. It is, therefore, wiser to have the name +of a miser, which produces disgrace without hatred, than to incur of +necessity the name of being rapacious, which produces both disgrace and +hatred. + + + + +CHAPTER XVII + + +OF CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED OR FEARED + + +Proceeding to the other qualities before named, I say that every prince +must desire to be considered merciful and not cruel. He must, however, +take care not to misuse this mercifulness. Cesare Borgia was considered +cruel, but his cruelty had settled the Romagna, united it, and brought +it peace and confidence. If this is considered a benefit, it will be +seen that he was really much more merciful than the Florentine people, +who, to avoid the name of cruelty, allowed Pistoia to be destroyed. A +prince, therefore, must not mind incurring the charge of cruelty for +the purpose of keeping his subjects united and confident; for, with a +very few examples, he will be more merciful than those who, from excess +of tenderness, allow disorders to arise, from whence spring murders +and rapine; for these as a rule injure the whole community, while the +executions carried out by the prince injure only one individual. And of +all princes, it is impossible for a new prince to escape the name of +cruel, new states being always full of dangers. Wherefore Virgil makes +Dido excuse the inhumanity of her rule by its being new, where she says: + + Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt + Moliri, et late fines custode tueri. + +Nevertheless, he must be cautious in believing and acting, and must +not inspire fear of his own accord, and must proceed in a temperate +manner with prudence and humanity, so that too much confidence does +not render him incautious, and too much diffidence does not render him +intolerant. From this arises the question whether it is better to be +loved more than feared, or feared more than loved. The reply is, that +one ought to be both feared and loved, but as it is difficult for the +two to go together, it is much safer to be feared than loved, if one of +the two has to be wanting. For it may be said of men in general that +they are ungrateful, voluble, dissemblers, anxious to avoid danger, +and covetous of gain; as long as you benefit them, they are entirely +yours; they offer you their blood, their goods, their life, and their +children, as I have before said, when the necessity is remote; but +when it approaches, they revolt And the prince who has relied solely +on their words, without making other preparations, is ruined, for the +friendship which is gained by purchase and not through grandeur and +nobility of spirit is merited but is not secured, and at times is not +to be had. And men have less scruple in offending one who makes himself +loved than one who makes himself feared; for love is held by a chain of +obligation which, men being selfish, is broken whenever it serves their +purpose; but fear is maintained by a dread of punishment which never +fails. Still, a prince should make himself feared in such a way that if +he does not gain love, he at any rate avoids hatred; for fear, and the +absence of hatred may well go together, and will be always attained by +one who abstains from interfering with the property of his citizens and +subjects or with their women. And when he is obliged to take the life +of any one, to do so when there is a proper justification and manifest +reason for it; but above all he must abstain from taking the property +of others, for men forget more easily the death of their father than +the loss of their patrimony. Then also pretexts for seizing property +are never wanting, and one who begins to live by rapine will always +find some reason for taking the goods of others, whereas causes for +taking life are rarer and more quickly destroyed. But when the prince +is with his army and has a large number of soldiers under his control, +then it is extremely necessary that he should not mind being thought +cruel; for without, this reputation he could not keep an army united, +or disposed to any duty. + +Among the noteworthy actions of Hannibal is numbered this, that +although he had an enormous army, composed of men of all nations +and fighting in foreign countries, there never arose any dissension +either among them or against the prince, either in good fortune or in +bad. This could not be due to anything but his inhuman cruelty, which +together with his infinite other virtues, made him always venerated +and terrible in the sight of his soldiers, and without it his other +virtues would not have sufficed to produce that effect. Thoughtless +writers admire on the one hand his actions, and on the other blame the +principal cause of them. And that it is true that his other virtues +would not have sufficed may be seen from the case of Scipio (very rare +not only in his own times, but in all times of which memory remains), +whose armies rebelled against him in Spain, which arose from nothing +but his excessive kindness, which allowed more license to the soldiers +than was consonant with military discipline. He was reproached with +this in the senate by Fabius Maximus, who called him a corrupter of the +Roman militia. + +The Locri having been destroyed by one of Scipio's officers were not +revenged by him, nor was the insolence of that officer punished, +simply by reason of his easy nature; so much so, that some one wishing +to excuse him in the senate, said that there were many men who knew +rather how not to err, than how to correct the errors of others. This +disposition would in time have tarnished the fame and glory of Scipio +had he persevered in it under the empire, but living under the rule of +the senate this harmful quality was not only concealed but became a +glory to him. I conclude, therefore, with regard to being feared and +loved, that men love at their own free will, but fear at the will of +the prince, and that a wise prince must rely on what is in his power +and not on what is in the power of others, and he must only trouble +himself to avoid incurring hatred, as has been explained. + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII + + +IN WHAT WAY PRINCES MUST KEEP FAITH + + +How laudable it is for a prince to keep good faith and live with +integrity, and not with astuteness, every one knows. Still the +experience of our times shows those princes to have done great things +who have had little regard for good faith, and have been able by +astuteness to confuse men's brains, and who have ultimately overcome +those who have, made loyalty their foundation. You must know, then, +that there are two methods of fighting, the one by law, the other by +force: the first method is that of men, the second of beasts; but as +the first method is often insufficient, one must have recourse to the +second. It is therefore necessary to know well how to use both the +beast and the man. This was covertly taught to princes by ancient +writers, who relate how Achilles and many others of those princes were +given to Chiron the centaur to be brought up, who kept them under his +discipline; this system of having for teacher one who was half beast +and half man is meant to indicate that a prince must know how to use +both natures, and that the one without the other is not durable. A +prince being thus obliged to know well how to act as a beast must +imitate the fox and the lion, for the lion cannot protect himself +from snares, and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. One must +therefore be a fox to recognise snares, and a lion to frighten wolves. +Those that wish to be only lions do not understand this. Therefore, +a prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when by so doing it would be +against his interest, and when the reasons which made him bind himself +no longer exist. If men were all good, this precept would not be a +good one; but as they are bad, and would not observe their faith with +you, so you are not bound to keep faith with them. Nor are legitimate +grounds ever wanting to a prince to give colour to the non-fulfilment +of his promise. Of this one could furnish an infinite number of modern +examples, and show how many times peace has been broken, and how many +promises rendered worthless, by the faithlessness of princes, and those +that have been best able to imitate the fox have succeeded best. But +it is necessary to be able to disguise this character well, and to be +a great feigner and dissembler; and men are so simple and so ready to +obey present necessities, that one who deceives will always find those +who allow themselves to be deceived. I will only mention one modern +instance. Alexander VI. did nothing else but deceive men, he thought +of nothing else, and found the way to do it; no man was ever more able +to give assurances, or affirmed things with stronger oaths, and no man +observed them less; however, he always succeeded in his deceptions, as +he knew well this side of the world. It is not, therefore, necessary +for a prince to have all the above-named qualities, but it is very +necessary to seem to have them. I would even be bold to say that to +possess them and to always observe them is dangerous, but to appear +to possess them is useful. Thus it is well to seem pious, faithful, +humane, religious, sincere, and also to be so; but you must have the +mind so watchful that when it is needful to be otherwise you may be +able to change to the opposite qualities. And it must be understood +that a prince, and especially a new prince, cannot observe all those +things which are considered good in men, being often obliged, in order +to maintain the state, to act against faith, against charity, against +humanity, and against religion. And, therefore, he must have a mind +disposed to adapt itself according to the wind, and as the variations +of fortune dictate, and, as I said before, not deviate from what is +good, if possible, but be able to do evil if necessitated. A prince +must take great care that nothing goes out of his mouth which is not +full of the above-named five qualities, and, to see and hear him, he +should seem to be all faith, all integrity, all humanity, and all, +religion. And nothing is more necessary than to seem to have this last +quality, for men in general judge more by the eyes than by the hands, +for every one can see, but very few have to feel. Everybody sees what +you appear to be, few feel what you are, and those few will not dare +to oppose themselves to the many, who have the majesty of the state to +defend them; and in the actions of men, and especially of princes, from +which there is no appeal, the end is everything. + +Let a prince therefore aim at living and maintaining state the state, +the means will always be judged honourable and praised by every one, +for the vulgar is always taken by appearances and the result of things; +and the world consists only of the vulgar, and the few find a place +when the many have nothing to rest upon. A certain prince of the +present time, whom it is well not to name, never does anything but +preach peace and good faith, but he is really a great enemy to both, +and either of them, had he observed them, would have lost him both +state and reputation on many occasions. + + + + +CHAPTER XIX + + +THAT WE MUST AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED + + +But as I have now spoken of the most important of the qualities +in question, I will now deal briefly with the rest on the general +principle, that the prince must, as already stated, avoid those things +which will make him hated or despised; and whenever he succeeds in +this, he will have done his part, and will find no danger in other +vices. + +He will chiefly become hated, as I said, by being rapacious, and +usurping the property and women of his subjects, which he must abstain +from doing, and whenever one does not attack the property or honour +of the generality of men, they will live contented; and one will only +have to combat the ambition of a few, who can be easily held in check +in many ways. He is rendered despicable by being thought changeable, +frivolous, effeminate, timid, and irresolute; which a prince must +guard against as a rock of danger, and manage so that his actions +show grandeur, high courage, seriousness, and strength; and as to the +government of his subjects, let his sentence be irrevocable, and let +him adhere to his decisions so that no one may think of deceiving him +or making him change. The prince who creates such an opinion of himself +gets a great reputation, and it is very difficult to conspire against +one who has a great reputation, and he will not easily be attacked, so +long as it is known that he is esteemed and reverenced by his subjects. +For a prince must have two kinds of fear: one internal as regards his +subjects, one external as regards foreign powers. From the latter he +can defend himself with good arms and good friends, and he will always +have good friends if he has good arms; and internal matters will always +remain quiet, if they are not perturbed by conspiracy; and even if +external powers sought to foment one, if he has ruled and lived as I +have described, he will always if he stands firm be able to sustain +every shock, as I have shown that Nabis the Spartan did. But with +regard to the subjects, if not acted on from outside, it is still to be +feared lest they conspire in secret, from which the prince may guard +himself well by avoiding hatred and contempt, and keeping the people +satisfied with him, which it is necessary to accomplish, as has been +related at length. And one of the most potent remedies that a prince +has against conspiracies, is that of not being hated or despised by +the mass of the people; for whoever conspires always believes that +he will satisfy the people by the death of their prince; but if he +thought to offend them by doing this, he would fear to engage in such +an undertaking, for the difficulties that conspirators have to meet are +infinite. Experience shows that there have been very many conspiracies, +but few have turned out well, for whoever conspires cannot act alone, +and cannot find companions except among those who are discontented; +and as soon as you have disclosed your intention to a malcontent, you +give him the means of satisfying himself, for by revealing it he can +hope to secure everything he wants; to such an extent that seeing +a certain gain by doing this, and seeing on the other hand only a +doubtful one and full of danger, he must either be a rare friend to +you or else a very bitter enemy to the prince if he keeps faith with +you. And to reduce the matter to narrow limits, I say, that on the side +of the conspirator there is nothing but fear, jealousy, suspicion, +and dread of punishment which frightens him; and on the side of the +prince there is the majesty of government, the laws, the protection +of friends and of the state which guard him. When to these things are +added the goodwill of the people, it is impossible that any one should +have the temerity to conspire. For whereas generally a conspirator +has to fear before the execution of his plot, in this case he must +also fear afterwards, having the people for an enemy, when his crime +is accomplished, and thus not being able to hope for any refuge. +Numberless instances might be given of this, but I will content myself +with one which took place within the memory of our fathers. Messer +Annibale Bentivogli, Prince of Bologna, ancestor of the present Messer +Annibale, was killed by the Canneschi, who conspired against him. He +left no relations but Messer Giovanni, who was then an infant, but +after the murder the people rose up and killed all the Canneschi. This +arose from the popular goodwill that the house of Bentivogli enjoyed at +that time in Bologna, which was so great that, as there was nobody left +after the death of Annibale who could govern the state, the Bolognese +hearing that there was one of the Bentivogli family in Florence, who +had till then been thought the son of a blacksmith, came to fetch him +and gave him the government of the city, and it was governed by him +until Messer Giovanni was old enough to assume the government. + +I conclude, therefore, that a prince need trouble little about +conspiracies when the people are well disposed, but when they +are hostile and hold him in hatred, then he must fear everything +and everybody. Well-ordered states and wise princes have studied +diligently not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to satisfy the +populace and keep it contented, for this is one of the most important +matters that a prince has to deal with. Among the kingdoms that are +well ordered and governed in our time is France, and there we find +numberless good institutions on which depend the liberty and security +of the king; of these the chief is the parliament and its authority, +because he who established that kingdom, knowing the ambition and +insolence of the great nobles, and deeming it necessary to have a bit +in their mouths to check them; and knowing on the other hand the hatred +of the mass of the people to the great, based on fear, and wishing to +secure them, did not wish to make this the special care of the king, +to relieve him of the dissatisfaction that he might incur among the +nobles by favouring the people, and among the people by favouring the +nobles. He therefore established a third judge that, without direct +charge of the king, kept in check the great and favoured the lesser +people. Nor could any better or more prudent measure have been adopted, +nor better precaution for the safety of the king and the kingdom. From +which another notable rule can be drawn, that princes should let the +carrying out of unpopular duties devolve on others, and bestow favours +themselves. I conclude again by saying that a prince must esteem his +nobles, but not make himself hated by the populace. It may perhaps seem +to some, that considering the life and death of many Roman emperors +that they are instances contrary to my opinion, finding that some who +lived always nobly and showed great strength of character, nevertheless +lost the empire, or were killed by their subjects who conspired against +them. Wishing to answer these objections, I will discuss the qualities +of some emperors, showing the cause of their ruin not to be at variance +with what I have stated, and I will also partly consider the things to +be noted by whoever reads the deeds of these times. I will content +myself with taking all those emperors who succeeded to the empire from +Marcus the philosopher to Maximinus; these were Marcus, Commodus his +son, Pertinax, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus. And the first +thing to note is, that whereas other princes have only to contend +against the ambition of the great and the insolence of the people, the +Roman emperors had a third difficulty, that of having to support the +cruelty and avarice of the soldiers, which was such a difficulty that +it was the cause of the ruin of many, it being difficult to satisfy +both the soldiers and the people. For the people love tranquillity, +and therefore like princes who are pacific, but the soldiers prefer +a prince of military spirit, who is insolent, cruel, and rapacious. +They wish him to exercise these qualities on the people so that they +may get double pay and give vent to their avarice and cruelty. Thus it +came about that those emperors who, by nature or art, had not such a +reputation as could keep both parties in check, invariably were ruined, +and the greater number of them who were raised to the empire being +new men, knowing the difficulties of these two opposite dispositions, +confined themselves to satisfying the soldiers, and thought little of +injuring the people. This choice was necessary, princes not being able +to avoid being hated by some one. They must first try not to be hated +by the mass of the people; if they cannot accomplish this they must +use every means to escape the hatred of the most powerful parties. And +therefore these emperors, who being new men had need of extraordinary +favours, adhered to the soldiers more willingly than to the people; +whether this, however, was of use to them or not, depended on whether +the prince knew how to maintain his reputation with them. + +From these causes it resulted that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, +being all of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies of cruelty, +humane and benign, had all a sad ending except Marcus. Marcus alone +lived and died in honour, because he succeeded to the empire by +hereditary right and did not owe it either to the soldiers or to the +people; besides which, possessing many virtues which made him revered, +he kept both parties in their place as long as he lived and was never +either hated or despised. But Pertinax was created emperor against the +will of the soldiers, who being accustomed to live licentiously under +Commodus, could not put up with the honest life to which Pertinax +wished to limit them, so that having made himself hated, and to this +contempt being added because he was old, he was ruined at the very +beginning of his administration. Whence it may be seen that hatred +is gained as much by good works as by evil, and therefore, as I said +before, a prince who wishes to maintain the state is often forced to +do evil, for when that party, whether populace, soldiery, or nobles, +whichever it be that you consider necessary to you for keeping your +position, is corrupt, you must follow its humour and satisfy it, and +in that case good works will be inimical to you. But let us come to +Alexander, who was of such goodness, that among other things for which +he is praised, it is said that in the fourteen years that he reigned +no one was put to death by him without a fair trial. Nevertheless, +being considered effeminate, and a man who allowed himself to be +ruled by his mother, and having thus fallen into contempt, the army +conspired against him and killed him. Looking, on the other hand, +at the qualities of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus, extremely cruel +and rapacious; to satisfy the soldiers there was no injury which +they would not inflict on the people, and all except Severus ended +badly. Severus, however, had such abilities that by maintaining the +soldiers friendly to him, he was able to reign happily, although he +oppressed the people, for his virtues made him so admirable in the +sight both of the soldiers and the people that the latter were, as it +were, astonished and stupefied, while the former were respectful and +contented. As the deeds of this ruler were great for a new prince, I +will briefly show how well he could use the qualities of the fox and +the lion, whose natures, as I said before, it is necessary for a prince +to imitate. Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, Severus, who was +leader of the army in Slavonia, persuaded the troops that it would be +well to go to Rome to avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been slain +by the Imperial guard, and under this pretext, without revealing his +aspirations to the throne, marched with his army to Rome and was in +Italy before his design was known. On his arrival in Rome the senate +elected him emperor through fear, and Julian died. There remained +after this beginning two difficulties to be faced by Severus before +he could obtain the whole control of the empire: one in Asia, where +Nigrinus, head of the Asiatic armies, had declared himself emperor; the +other in the west from Albinus, who also aspired to the empire. And +as he judged it dangerous to show himself hostile to both, he decided +to attack Nigrinus and deceive Albinus, to whom he wrote that having +been elected emperor by the senate he wished to share that dignity +with him; he sent him the title of Cæsar and, by deliberation of the +senate, he was declared his colleague; all of which was accepted as +true by Albinus. But when Severus had defeated and killed Nigrinus, +and pacified things in the East, he returned to Rome and charged +Albinus in the senate with having, unmindful of the benefits received +from him, traitorously sought to assassinate him, and stated that he +was therefore obliged to go and punish his ingratitude. He then went +to France to meet him, and there deprived him of both his position +and his life. Whoever examines in detail the actions of Severus, will +find him to have been a very ferocious lion and an extremely astute +fox, and will see him to have been feared and respected by all and not +hated by the army; and will not be surprised that he, a new man, should +have been able to hold the empire so well, since his great reputation +defended him always from that hatred that his rapacity might have +produced in the people. But Antoninus his son was also a man of great +ability, and possessed qualities that rendered him admirable in the +sight of the people and also made him popular with the soldiers, for +he was a military man, capable of enduring the most extreme hardships, +disdainful of delicate food, and every other luxury, which made him +loved by all the armies. However, his ferocity and cruelty were so +great and unheard of, through his having, after executing many private +individuals, caused a large part of the population of Rome and all that +of Alexandria to be killed, that he became hated by all the world and +began to be feared by those about him to such an extent that he was +finally killed by a centurion in the midst of his army. Whence it is to +be noted that this kind of death, which proceeds from the deliberate +action of a determined man, cannot be avoided by princes, since any one +who does not fear death himself can inflict it, but a prince need not +fear much on this account, as such actions are extremely rare. He must +only guard against committing any grave injury to any one he makes use +of, or has about him for his service, like Antoninus had done, having +caused the death with contumely of the brother of that centurion, and +also threatened him every day, although he still retained him in his +bodyguard, which was a foolish and dangerous thing to do, as the fact +proved. But let us come to Commodus, who might easily have kept the +empire, having succeeded to it by heredity, being the son of Marcus, +and it would have sufficed for him to follow in the steps of his father +to have satisfied both the people and the soldiers. But being of a +cruel and bestial disposition, in order to be able to exercise his +rapacity on the people, he sought to amuse the soldiers and render +them licentious; on the other hand, by not maintaining his dignity, +by often descending into the theatre to fight with gladiators and +committing other contemptible actions, little worthy of the imperial +dignity, he became despicable in the eyes of the soldiers, and being +hated on the one hand and despised on the other, he was conspired +against and killed. There remains to be described the character of +Maximinus. He was an extremely warlike man, and as the armies were +annoyed with the effeminacy of Alexander, which we have already spoken +of, he was after the death of the latter elected emperor. He did not +enjoy it for long, as two things made him hated and despised: the +one his base origin, as he had been a shepherd in Thrace, which was +generally known and caused great disdain on all sides; the other, +because he had at the commencement of his rule deferred going to Rome +to take possession of the Imperial seat, and had obtained a reputation +for great cruelty, having through his prefects in Rome and other parts +of the empire committed many acts of cruelty. The whole world being +thus moved by indignation for the baseness of his blood, and also by +the hatred caused by fear of his ferocity, he was conspired against +first by Africa and afterwards by the senate and all the people of Rome +and Italy. His own army also joined them, for besieging Aquileia and +finding it difficult to take, they became enraged at his cruelty, and +seeing that he had so many enemies, they feared him less and put him to +death. I will not speak of Heliogabalus, of Macrinus, or Julian, who +being entirely contemptible were immediately suppressed, but I will +come to the conclusion of this discourse by saying that the princes of +our time have less difficulty than these of being obliged to satisfy in +an extraordinary degree their soldiers in their states; for although +they must have a certain consideration for them, yet it is soon +settled, for none of these princes have armies that are inextricably +bound up with the administration of the government and the rule of +their provinces as were the armies of the Roman empire; and therefore +if it was then necessary to satisfy the soldiers rather than the +people, it was because the soldiers could do more than the people; now, +it is more necessary to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, +to satisfy the people than the soldiers, for the people can do more +than the soldiers. I except the Turk, because he always keeps about +him twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry, on which +depend the security and strength of his kingdom; and it is necessary +for him to postpone every other consideration of the people to keep +them friendly. It is the same with the kingdom of the Soldan, which +being entirely in the hands of the soldiers, he is bound to keep their +friendship regardless of the people. And it is to be noted that this +state of the Soldan is different from that of all other princes, being +similar to the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either +a hereditary kingdom or a new one, for the sons of the dead prince +are not his heirs, but he who is elected to that position by those +who have authority. And as this order is ancient it cannot be called +a new kingdom, there being none of these difficulties which exist in +new ones; as although the prince is new, the rules of that state are +old and arranged to receive him as if he were their hereditary lord. +But returning to our matter, I say that whoever studies the preceding +argument will see that either hatred or contempt were the causes of +the ruin of the emperors named, and will also observe how it came about +that, some of them acting in one way and some in another, in both ways +there were some who had a fortunate and others an unfortunate ending. +As Pertinax and Alexander were both new rulers, it was useless and +injurious for them to try and imitate Marcus, who was a hereditary +prince; and similarly with Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus it was +pernicious for them to imitate Severus, as they had not sufficient +ability to follow in his footsteps. Thus a new prince cannot imitate +the actions of Marcus, in his dominions, nor is it necessary for him to +imitate those of Severus; but he must take from Severus those portions +that are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those that are +useful and glorious for conserving a state that is already established +and secure. + + + + +CHAPTER XX + + +WHETHER FORTRESSES AND OTHER THINGS WHICH PRINCES OFTEN MAKE ARE USEFUL +OR INJURIOUS + + +Some princes, in order to securely hold their possessions, have +disarmed their subjects, some others have kept their subject lands +divided into parts, others have fomented enmities against themselves, +others have endeavoured to win over those whom they suspected at the +commencement of their rule: some have constructed fortresses, others +have ruined and destroyed them. And although one cannot pronounce a +definite judgment as to these things without going into the particulars +of the state to which such a deliberation is to be applied, still I +will speak in such a broad way as the matter will permit of. + +A new prince has never been known to disarm his subjects, on the +contrary, when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, for +by arming them these arms become your own, those that you suspected +become faithful and those that were faithful remain so, and from being +merely subjects become your partisans. And since all the subjects +cannot be armed, when you benefit those that you arm, you can deal more +safely with the others; and this different treatment that they notice +renders your men more obliged to you, the others will excuse you, +judging that those have necessarily greater merit who have greater +danger and heavier duties. But when you disarm them, you commence to +offend them and show that you distrust them either through cowardice or +lack of confidence, and both of these opinions generate hatred against +you. And as you cannot remain unarmed, you are obliged to resort to a +mercenary militia, of which we have already stated the value; and even +if it were good it cannot be sufficient in number to defend you against +powerful enemies and suspected subjects. But, as I have said, a new +prince in a new dominion always has his subjects armed. History is full +of such examples. But when a prince acquires a new state as an addition +to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm that state, except those +who in acquiring it have sided with you; and even these one must, when +time and opportunity serve, render weak and effeminate, and arrange +things so that all the arms of the new state are in the hands of your +own soldiers who in your old state live near you. + +Our forefathers and those who were esteemed wise used to say that +it was necessary to hold Pistoia by means of factious and Pisa with +fortresses, and for this purpose they fomented differences among their +subjects in some town in order to possess it more easily. This, in +those days when Italy was fairly divided, was doubtless well done, out +does not seem to me to be a good precept for the present time, for I do +not believe that the divisions thus created ever do any good; on the +contrary it is certain that when the enemy approaches the cities thus +divided will be at once lost, for the weaker faction will always side +with the enemy and the other will not be able to stand. The Venetians, +actuated, I believe, by the aforesaid motives, cherished the Guelf +and Ghibelline factions in the cities subject to them, and although +they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, they yet encouraged +these differences among them, so that the citizens, being occupied in +their own quarrels, might not act against them. This, however, did +not avail them anything, as was seen when, after the defeat of Vaila, +a part of those subjects immediately took courage and took from them +the whole state. Such methods, besides, argue weakness in a prince, +for in a strong government such dissensions will never be permitted. +They are profitable only in time of peace, as by means of them it is +easy to manage one's subjects, but when it comes to war, the fallacy +of such a policy is at once shown. Without doubt princes become great +when they overcome difficulties and opposition, and therefore fortune, +especially when it wants to render a new prince great, who has greater +need of gaining a great reputation than a hereditary prince, raises up +enemies and compels him to undertake wars against them, so that he may +have cause to overcome them, and thus raise himself higher by means +of that ladder which his enemies have brought him. There are many who +think therefore that a wise prince ought, when he has the chance, to +foment astutely some enmity, so that by suppressing it he will augment +his greatness. Princes, and especially new ones, have found more faith +and more usefulness in those men, whom at the beginning of their power +they regarded with suspicion, than in those they at first confided +in. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, governed his state more by +those whom he suspected than by others. But of this we cannot speak at +large, as it varies according to the subject; I will merely say that +these men who at the beginning of a new government were enemies, if +they are of a kind to need support to maintain their position, can be +very easily gained by the prince, and they are the more compelled to +serve him faithfully as they know they must by their deeds cancel the +bad opinion previously held of them, and thus the prince will always +derive greater help from them than from those who, serving him with +greater security, neglect his interest? And as the matter requires it, +I will not omit to remind a prince who has newly taken a state with the +secret help of its inhabitants, that he must consider well the motives +that have induced those who have favoured him to do so, and if it is +not natural affection for him, but only because they were not contented +with the state as it was, he will have great trouble and difficulty in +maintaining their friendship, because it will be impossible for him to +content them. And on well examining the cause of this in the examples +drawn from ancient and modern times it will be seen that it is much +easier to gain the friendship, of those men who were contented with +the previous condition and were therefore at first enemies, than that +of those who not being contented, became his friends and helped him to +occupy it. It has been the custom of princes in order to be able to +hold securely their state, to erect fortresses, as a bridle and bit +to those who have designs against them, and in order to have a secure +refuge against a sudden assault. I approve this method, because it was +anciently used. Nevertheless, Messer Niccolo Vitelli has been seen in +our own time to destroy two fortresses in Città di Castello in order +to keep that state. Guid' Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on returning to his +dominions from which he had been driven by Cesare Borgia, razed to +their foundations all the fortresses of that province, and considered +that without them it would be more difficult for him to lose again the +state. The Bentivogli, in returning to Bologna, used similar measures. +Therefore fortresses may or may not be useful according to the times; +if they do good in one way, they do harm in another. + +The question may be discussed thus: a prince who fears his own people +more than foreigners ought to build fortresses, but he who has greater +fear of foreigners than of his own people ought to do without them. The +castle of Milan built by Francesco Sforza has given and will give more +trouble to the house of Sforza than any other disorder in that state. +Therefore the best fortress is to be found in the love of the people, +for although you may have fortresses they will not save you if you are +hated by the people. When once the people have taken arms against you, +there will never be lacking foreigners to assist them. In our times +we do not see that they have profited any ruler, except the Countess +of Forli on the death of her consort Count Girolamo, for she was thus +enabled to escape the popular rising and await help from Milan and +recover the state; the circumstances being then such that no foreigner +could assist the people. But afterwards they were of little use to her +when Cesare Borgia attacked her and the people being hostile to her +allied themselves with the foreigner. So that then and before it would +have been safer for her not to be hated by the people than to have the +fortresses. Having considered these things I would therefore praise the +one who erects fortresses and the one who does not, and would blame any +one who, trusting in them, thinks little of being hated by his people. + + + + +CHAPTER XXI + + +HOW A PRINCE MUST ACT IN ORDER TO GAIN REPUTATION + + +Nothing causes a prince to be so much esteemed as great enterprises +and setting a rare example. We have in our own day Ferdinand, King of +Aragon, at present King of Spain. He may almost be termed a new prince, +because from a weak king he has become for fame and glory the first +king in Christendom, and if you regard his actions you will find them +all very great and some of them extraordinary. At the beginning of +his reign he assailed Granada, and that enterprise was the foundation +of his state. At first he did it leisurely and without fear of being +interfered with; he kept the minds of the barons of Castile occupied in +this enterprise, so that thinking only of that war they did not think +of making innovations, and he thus acquired reputation and power over +them without their being aware of it. He was able with the money of +the Church and the people to maintain his armies, and by that long war +lay the foundations of his military power, which afterwards has made +him famous. Besides this, to be able to undertake greater enterprises, +and always under the pretext of religion, he had recourse to a pious +cruelty, driving out the Moors from his kingdom and despoiling them. +No more admirable or rare example can be found. He also attacked +under the same pretext Africa, undertook his Italian enterprise, and +has lately attacked France; so that he has continually contrived great +things, which have kept his subjects' minds uncertain and astonished, +and occupied in watching their result. + +And these actions have arisen one out of the other, so that they have +left no time for men to settle down and act against him. It is also +very profitable for a prince to give some rare examples of himself in +the internal administration, like those related of Messer Bernabò of +Milan, when it happens that some one does something extraordinary, +either good or evil, in civil life, and to take a means of rewarding +or punishing him which will be much talked about. And above all a +prince must endeavour in every action to obtain fame for being great +and excellent. A prince is further esteemed when he is a true friend +or a true enemy, when, that is, he declares himself without reserve in +favour of some one against another. + +This policy is always more useful than remaining neutral. For if two +neighbouring powers come to blows, they are either such that if one +wins, you will have to fear the victor, or else not. In either of these +two cases it will be better for you to declare yourself openly and make +war, because in the first case if you do not declare yourself, you will +fall a prey to the victor, to the pleasure and satisfaction of the one +who has been defeated, and you will have no reason nor anything to +defend you and nobody to receive you. For, whoever wins will not desire +friends whom he suspects and who do not help him when in trouble, and +whoever loses will not receive you as you did not take up arms to +assist his cause. Antiochus went to Greece, being sent by the Ætoli +to expel the Romans. He sent orators to the Achæi who were friends of +the Romans to encourage them to remain neutral, on the other hand the +Romans persuaded them to take up arms on their side. The matter was +brought before the council of the Achæi for deliberation, where the +ambassador of Antiochus sought to persuade them to remain neutral, to +which the Roman ambassador replied: "As to what is said that it is best +and most useful for your state not to meddle in our war, nothing is +further from the truth; for if you do not meddle in it you will become, +without any favour or any reputation, the prize of the victor." And it +will always happen that the one who is not your friend will want you +to remain neutral, and the one who is your friend will require you to +declare yourself by taking arms. Irresolute princes, to avoid present +dangers, usually follow the way of neutrality and are mostly ruined +by it. But when the prince declares himself frankly in favour of one +side, if the one to whom you adhere conquers, even if he is powerful +and you remain at his discretion, he is under an obligation to you and +friendship has been established, and men are never so dishonest as to +oppress you with such ingratitude. + +Moreover, victories are never so prosperous that the victor does not +need to have some scruples, especially as to justice. But if he to whom +you adhere loses, you are sheltered by him, and so long as he can, he +will assist you; you become the companion of a fortune which may rise +again. In the second case, when those who fight are such that you have +nothing to fear from the victor, it is still more prudent on your part +to adhere to one; for you go to the ruin of one with the help of him +who ought to save him if he were wise, and if he conquers he rests +at your discretion, and it is impossible that he should not conquer +with your help. And here it should be noted that a prince ought never +to make common cause with one more powerful than himself to injure +another, unless necessity forces him to it, as before said; for if he +wins you rest at his discretion, and princes must avoid as much as +possible being at the discretion of others. The Venetians united with +France against the Duke of Milan, although they could have avoided that +union, and from it resulted their own ruin. But when one cannot avoid +it, as happened to the Florentines when the pope and Spain went with +their armies to attack Lombardy, then the prince ought to join for the +above reasons. Let no state believe that it can follow a secure policy, +rather let it think that all are doubtful. This is found in the nature +of things, that one never tries to avoid one difficulty without running +into another, but prudence consists in being able to know the nature of +the difficulties, and taking the least harmful as good. A prince must +also show himself a lover of merit, and honour those who excel in every +art. Moreover he must encourage his citizens to follow their callings +quietly, whether in commerce, or agriculture, or any other trade that +men follow, so that this one shall not refrain from improving his +possessions through fear that they may be taken from him, and that one +from starting a trade for fear of taxes; but he should offer rewards to +whoever does these things, and to whoever seeks in any way to improve +his city or state. Besides this, he ought, at convenient seasons of the +year, to keep the people occupied with festivals and spectacles; and +as every city is divided either into trades or into classes, he ought +to pay attention to all these things, mingle with them from time to +time, and give them an example of his humanity and magnificence, always +holding firm, however, the majesty of his dignity, which must never be +allowed to fan in anything whatever. + + + + +CHAPTER XXII + + +OF THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES + + +The choice of a prince's ministers is a matter of no little importance; +they are either good or not according to the prudence of the prince. +The first impression that one gets of a ruler and of his brains is +from seeing the men that he has about him. When they are competent +and faithful one can always consider him wise, as he has been able to +recognise their ability and keep them faithful. But when they are the +reverse, one can always form an unfavourable opinion of him, because +the first mistake that he makes is in making this choice. There was +nobody who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the minister of Pandolfo +Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who did not consider Pandolfo to be a very +prudent man, having him for his minister. There are three different +kinds of brains, the one understands things unassisted, the other +understands things when shown by others, the third understands neither +alone nor with the explanations of others. The first kind is most +excellent, the second also excellent, but the third useless. It is +therefore evident that if Pandolfo was not of the first kind, he was +at any rate of the second. For every time that one has the judgment to +know the good and evil that any one does or says, even if he has no +invention, yet he recognises the bad and good works or his minister +and corrects the one and supports the other; and the minister cannot +hope to deceive him and therefore remains good. For a prince to be +able to know a minister there is this method which never fails. When +you see the minister think more of himself than of you, and in all his +actions seek his own profit, such a man will never be a good minister, +and you can never rely on him; for whoever has in hand the state of +another must never think of himself but of the prince, and not call +to mind anything but what relates to him. And, on the other hand, the +prince, in order to retain his fidelity ought to think of his minister, +honouring and enriching him, doing him kindnesses, and conferring on +him honours and giving him responsible tasks, so that the great honours +and riches bestowed on him cause him not to desire other honours and +riches, and the tasks he has to fulfil make him fearful of changes, +knowing that he could not execute them without the prince. When princes +and their ministers stand in this relation to each other, they can +rely the one upon the other; when it is otherwise, the end is always +injurious either for one or the other of them. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIII + + +HOW FLATTERERS MUST BE SHUNNED + + +I must not omit an important subject, and a mistake which princes +can with difficulty avoid, if they are not very prudent, or if they +do not make a good choice. And this is with regard to flatterers, of +which courts are full, because men take such pleasure in their own +things and deceive themselves about them that they can with difficulty +guard against this plague; and by wishing to guard against it they run +the risk of becoming contemptible. Because there is no other way of +guarding one's self against flattery than by letting men understand +that they will not offend you by speaking the truth; but when every one +can tell you the truth, you lose their respect. A prudent prince must +therefore take a third course, by choosing in his state wise men, and +giving these alone full liberty to speak the truth to him, but only of +those things that he asks and of nothing else; but he must ask them +about everything and hear their opinion, and afterwards deliberate by +himself in his own way, and in these councils and with each of these +men comport himself so that every one may see that the more freely he +speaks, the more he will be acceptable. Outside these he should listen +to no one, go about the matter deliberately, and be determined in his +decisions. Whoever acts otherwise either acts precipitately through +flattery or else changes often through the variety of opinions, from +which it happens that he is little esteemed. I will give a modern +instance of this. Pre' Luca, a follower of Maximilian, the present +emperor, speaking of his majesty said that he never took counsel with +anybody, and yet that he never did anything as he wished; this arose +from his following the contrary method to the aforesaid. As the emperor +is a secret man he does not communicate his designs to any one or +take any one's advice, but as on putting them into effect they begin +to be known and discovered, they begin to be opposed by those he has +about him, and he is easily diverted from his purpose. Hence it comes +to pass that what he does one day he undoes the next, no one ever +understands what he wishes or intends to do, and no reliance is to be +placed on his deliberations. A prince, therefore, ought always to take +counsel, but only when he wishes, not when others wish; on the contrary +he ought to discourage absolutely attempts to advise him unless he +asks it, but he ought to be a great asker, and a patient hearer of +the truth about those things which he has inquired of; indeed, if he +finds that any one has scruples in telling him the truth he should be +angry. And since some think that a prince who gains the reputation +of being prudent is so considered, not by his nature but by the good +councillors he has about him, they are undoubtedly deceived. It is an +infallible rule that a prince who is not wise himself cannot be well +advised, unless by chance he left himself entirely in the hands of one +man who ruled him in everything, and happened to be a very prudent +man. In this case he may doubtless be well governed, but it would not +last long, for that governor would in a short time deprive him of the +state; but by taking counsel with many, a prince who is not wise will +never have united councils and will not be able to unite them for +himself. The councillors will all think of their own interests, and he +will be unable either to correct or to understand them. And it cannot +be otherwise, for men will always be false to you unless they are +compelled by necessity to be true. + +Therefore it must be concluded that wise counsels, from whoever they +come, must necessarily be due to the prudence of the prince, and not +the prudence of the prince to the good counsels received. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIV + + +WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES + + +The before-mentioned things, if prudently observed, make a new prince +seem ancient, and render him at once more secure and firmer in the +state than if he had been established there of old. For a new prince is +much more observed in his actions than a hereditary one, and when these +are recognised as virtuous, he gains men more and they are more bound +to him than if he were of the ancient blood. For men are much more +taken by present than by past things, and when they find themselves +well off in the present, they enjoy it and seek nothing more; on the +contrary, they will do all they can to defend him, so long as the +prince is not in other things wanting to himself. And thus he will +have the double glory of having founded a new realm and adorned it and +fortified it with good laws, good arms, good friends and good examples; +as he will have double shame who is born a prince and through want of +prudence has lost it. + +And if one considers those rulers who have lost their position in +Italy in our days, such as the King of Naples, the Dukè of Milan and +others, one will find in them first a common defect as to their arms, +for the reasons discussed at length, then we observe that some of +them either had the people hostile to them, or that if the people were +friendly they were not able to make sure of the nobility, for without +these defects, states are not lost that have enough strength to be able +to keep an army in the field. Philip of Macedon, not the father of +Alexander the Great, but the one who was conquered by Titus Quinteus, +did not possess a great state compared to the greatness of Rome and +Greece which assailed him, but being a military man and one who knew +how to divert the people and make sure of the great, he was able to +sustain the war against them for many years; and if at length he lost +his power over several cities, he was still able to keep his kingdom. +Therefore, those of our princes who had held their possessions for many +years must not accuse fortune for having lost them, but rather their +own negligence; for having never in quiet times considered that things +might change (as it is a common fault of men not to reckon on storms, +in fair weather) when adverse times came, they only thought of fleeing +from them, instead of defending themselves; and hoped that the people, +enraged by the insolence of the conquerors, would recall them. This +measure, when others are wanting, is good; but it is very bad to have +neglected the other remedies for that one, for nobody would desire to +fall because he believed that he would then find some one to pick him +up. This may or may not take place, and if it does, it is not with +safety to you, as that defence is known to be cowardly and not to be +depended on; and only those defences are good, certain and durable, +which depend only on yourself and your own ability. + + + + +CHAPTER XXV + + +HOW MUCH FORTUNE CAN DO IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW IT MAY BE OPPOSED + + +It is not unknown to me how many have been and are of opinion that +worldly events are so governed by fortune and by God, that men cannot +by their prudence change them, and that on the contrary there is no +remedy whatever, and for this they may judge it to be useless to toil +much about them, but let things be ruled by chance. This opinion has +been more believed in in our day, from the great changes that have been +seen, and are daily seen, beyond every human conjecture. + +When I think about them at times, I am partly inclined to share +this opinion. Nevertheless, that our freewill may not be altogether +extinguished, I think it may be true that fortune is the ruler of half +our actions, but that she allows the other half or a little less to be +governed by us. I would compare her to an impetuous river that, when +turbulent, inundates the plains, ruins trees and buildings, removes +earth from this side and places it on the other; every one flies before +it, and everything yields to its fury without being able to oppose it; +and yet though it is of such a kind, still when it is quiet, men can +make provision against it by dams and banks, so that when it rises +it will either go into a canal or its rush will not be so wild and +dangerous. It happens similarly with fortune, which shows her power +where no measures have been taken to resist her, and turns her fury +where she knows that no dams or barriers have been made to hold her. +And if you regard Italy, which has been the seat of these changes, and +who has given the impulse to them, you will see her to be a country +without dams or barriers of any kind. If she had been protected by +proper measures, like Germany, Spain, and France, this inundation +would not have caused the great changes that it has, or would not have +happened at all. This must suffice as regards opposition to fortune +in general. But limiting myself more to particular cases, I would +point out how one sees a certain prince to-day fortunate and to-morrow +ruined, without seeing that he has changed in character or otherwise. +I believe this arises in the first place from the causes that we have +already discussed at length; that is to say, because the prince who +bases himself entirely on fortune is ruined when fortune varies. I +also believe that he is happy whose mode of proceeding accords with +the needs of the times, and similarly he is unfortunate whose mode of +proceeding is opposed to the times. For one sees that men in those +things which lead them to the aim that each one has in view, namely, +glory and riches, proceed in various ways; one with circumspection, +another with impetuosity, one by violence, another by cunning, one with +patience, another with the reverse; and each by these diverse ways +may arrive at his aim. One sees also two cautious men, one of whom +succeeds in his designs, and the other not, and in the same way two men +succeed equally by different methods, one being cautious, the other +impetuous, which arises only from the nature of the times, which does +or does not conform to their method of proceeding. From this results, +as I have said, that two men, acting differently, attain the same +effect, and of two others acting in the same way, one arrives at his +good and not the other. From this depend also the changes in fortune, +for if it happens that time and circumstances are favourable to one +who acts with caution and prudence he will be successful, but if time +and circumstances change he will be ruined, because he does not change +his mode of proceeding. No man is found able to adapt himself to this, +either because he cannot deviate from that to which his nature disposes +him, or else because having always prospered by walking in one path, +he cannot persuade himself that it is well to leave it; and therefore +the cautious man, when it is time to act suddenly, does not know how +to do so and is consequently ruined; for if one could change one's +nature with time and circumstances, fortune would never change. Pope +Julius II. acted impetuously in everything he did and found the times +and conditions so in conformity with that mode of proceeding, that he +always obtained a good result. Consider the first war that he made +against Bologna while Messer Giovanni Bentivogli was still living. The +Venetians were not pleased with it, the King of Spain and likewise +France had objections to this enterprise, notwithstanding which with +his fierce and impetuous disposition he engaged personally in the +expedition. This move caused both Spain and the Venetians to halt and +hesitate, the latter through fear, the former through the desire to +regain the entire kingdom of Naples. On the other hand, he engaged +with him the King of France, because seeing him make this move and +desiring his friendship in order to put down the Venetians, that king +judged that he could not refuse him his troops without manifest injury. +Thus Julius by his impetuous move achieved what no other pontiff with +the utmost human prudence would have succeeded in doing, because, if +he had waited till all arrangements had been made and everything +settled before leaving Rome, as any other pontiff would have done, it +would never have taken place. For the king of France would have found +a thousand excuses, and the others would have inspired him with a +thousand fears. I will omit his other actions, which were all of this +kind and which all succeeded well, and the shortness of his life did +not suffer him to experience the contrary, for had times succeeded +in which it was necessary to act with caution, his ruin would have +resulted, for he would never have deviated from these methods to which +his nature disposed him. I conclude then that fortune varying and men +remaining fixed in their ways, they are successful so long as these +ways conform to each other, but when they are opposed to each other +then they are unsuccessful. I certainly think that it is better to be +impetuous than cautious, for fortune is a woman, and it is necessary, +if you wish to master her, to conquer her by force; and it can be seen +that she lets herself be overcome by these rather than by those who +proceed coldly. And therefore, like a woman, she is a friend to the +young, because they are less cautious, fiercer, and master her with +greater audacity. + + + + +CHAPTER XXVI + + +EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS + + +Having now considered all the things we have spoken of, and thought +within myself whether at present the time was not propitious in Italy +for a new prince, and if there was not a state of things which offered +an opportunity to a prudent and capable man to introduce a new system +that would do honour to himself and good to the mass of the people, it +seems to me that so many things concur to favour a new ruler that I do +not know of any time more fitting for such an enterprise. And if, as +I said, it was necessary in order that the power of Moses should be +displayed that the people of Israel should be slaves in Egypt, and to +give scope for the greatness and courage of Cyrus that the Persians +should be oppressed by the Medes, and to illustrate the pre-eminence of +Theseus that the Athenians should be dispersed, so at the present time, +in order that the might of an Italian genius might be recognised, it +was necessary that Italy should be reduced to her present condition, +and that she should be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed +than the Persians, and more scattered than the Athenians; without a +head, without order, beaten, despoiled, lacerated, and overrun, and +that she should have suffered ruin of every kind. And although before +now a spirit has been shown by some which gave hope that he might be +appointed by God for her redemption, yet at the highest summit of his +career he was thrown aside by fortune, so that now, almost lifeless, +she awaits one who may heal her wounds and put a stop to the rapine and +pillaging of Lombardy, to the rapacity and extortion in the kingdom +and in Tuscany, and cure her of those sores which have long been +festering. Behold how she prays God to send some one to redeem her from +this barbarous cruelty and insolence. Behold her ready and willing to +follow any standard if only there be some one to raise it. There is +nothing now she can hope for but that your illustrious house may place +itself at the head of this redemption, being by its power and fortune +so exalted, and being favoured by God and the Church, whose leadership +it now occupies. Nor will this be very difficult to you, if you call to +mind the actions and lives of the men I have named. And although those +men were rare and marvellous, they were none the less men, and had each +of them less occasion than the present, for their enterprise was not +juster than this, nor easier, nor was God more their friend than He is +yours. Here is a just cause; for that war is just which is necessary; +and those arms are merciful where no hope exists save in them. Here +is the greatest willingness, nor can there be great difficulty where +there is great willingness, provided that the measures are adopted of +those whom I have set before you as examples. Besides this, unexampled +wonders have been seen here performed by God, the sea has been opened, +a cloud has shown you the road, the rock has given forth water, manna +has rained, and everything has contributed to your greatness, the +remainder must be done by you. God will not do everything, in order +not to deprive us of freewill and the portion of the glory that falls +to our lot It is no marvel that none of the before-mentioned Italians +have done that which it is to be hoped your illustrious house may do; +and if in so many revolutions in Italy and so many warlike operations, +it always seems as if the military capacity were extinct, this is +because the ancient methods were not good, and no one has arisen +who knew how to discover new ones. Nothing does so much honour to a +newly-risen man than the new laws and measures which he introduces. +These things, when they are well based and have greatness in them, +render him revered and admired, and there is not lacking scope in Italy +for the introduction of every kind. Here there is great virtue in the +members, if it were not wanting in the heads. Look how in duels and in +councils of a few the Italians are superior in strength, dexterity, +and intelligence. But when it comes to armies they make a poor show; +which proceeds entirely from the weakness of the leaders, for those +that know are not obedient, and every one thinks that he knows, there +being hitherto nobody who has raised himself so high both by valour and +fortune as to make the others yield. Hence it comes about that in all +this time, in all the wars waged during the last twenty years, whenever +there has been an army entirely Italian it has always been a failure, +as witness first Taro, then Alexandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, +and Mestri. If your illustrious house, therefore, wishes to follow +those great men who redeemed their countries, it is before all things +necessary, as the true foundation of every undertaking, to provide +yourself with your own forces, for you cannot have more faithful, or +truer and better soldiers. And although each one of them may be good, +they will together become better when they see themselves commanded +by their prince, and honoured and supported by him. It is therefore +necessary to prepare such forces in order to be able with Italian +prowess to defend the country from foreigners. And although both the +Swiss and Spanish infantry are deemed terrible, none the less they +each have their defects, so that a third order might not only oppose +them, but be confident of overcoming them. For the Spaniards cannot +sustain the attack of cavalry, and the Swiss have to fear infantry +which meets them with resolution equal to their own. From which it has +resulted, as will be seen by experience, that the Spaniards cannot +sustain the attack of French cavalry, and the Swiss are overthrown +by Spanish infantry. And although a complete example of the latter +has not been seen, yet an instance was furnished in the battle of +Ravenna, where the Spanish infantry attacked the German battalions, +which observe the same order as the Swiss. The Spaniards, through their +bodily agility and aided by their bucklers, had entered between and +under their pikes and were in a position to attack them safely without +the Germans being able to defend themselves; and if the cavalry had not +charged them they would have utterly destroyed them. Knowing therefore +the defects of both these kinds of infantry, a third kind can be +created which can resist cavalry and need not fear infantry, and this +will be done not by the creation of armies but by a change of system. +And these are the things which, when newly introduced, give reputation +and grandeur to a new prince. This opportunity must not, therefore, +be allowed to pass, for letting Italy at length see her liberator. I +cannot express the love with which he would be received in all those +provinces which have suffered under these foreign invasions, with what +thirst for vengeance, with what steadfast faith, with what love, with +what grateful tears. What doors would be closed against him? What +people would refuse him obedience? What envy could oppose him? What +Italian would rebel against him? This barbarous domination stinks in +the nostrils of every one. May your illustrious house therefore assume +this task with that courage and those hopes which are inspired by a +just cause, so that under its banner our fatherland may be raised up, +and under its auspices be verified that saying of Petrarch: + + + Valour against fell wrath + Will take up arms; and be the combat quickly sped I + For, sure, the ancient worth, + That in Italians stirs the heart, is not yet dead. + + +THE END + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Prince, by Nicoló Machiavelli + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PRINCE *** + +***** This file should be named 57037-0.txt or 57037-0.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/5/7/0/3/57037/ + +Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at Free Literature +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will +be renamed. + +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United +States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. 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