chg: [blog] old draft about cyber security exercises merged

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---
layout: post
title: "Cyber Security Exercises and Reality"
date: 2017-11-30 18:52:21
categories: infosec
---
# Cybersecurity Exercises and The Reality
Alexandre Dulaunoy <a@foo.be>
*version 0.1 - 2017-11-30*
When you are facing a potential threat, the most difficult aspect is to understand what you are fighting against.
Evaluating a threat in information security is a complex aspect especially when you have no simple ways
to scale the threat and know if you have the organisational and technical capabilities to respond to such threat.
In the past years, many cyber security exercises appear at local, national or international levels with the aim
to improve the capabilities at organisational or/and technical levels. There are many different organisations
involved in such exercise and there are many models depending of their respective focus. After being involved
in many of those (including designing or/and playing), I compiled my thoughts and especially the shortcomings
in such approach. The idea behind this series of notes is to improve such exercise or experiment other approaches.
# Synthetic information/evidences
- Synthetic information or evidences
- The aim is often limited to solve one or more challenges
# Reducing operational security aspects to simple games
A critical issue in my eyes with cyber security exercises is the over simplification of cyber security threats at a level
which make these understandable for the political or non-operational managerial level. There are some significant
risks to reduce complexity of the reality. When operational security teams face real and concrete incidents, their
work can be seen as like solving a challenge. In incident response, it's quite common to face complex topics,
with different contexts and ultimately being incapable to reach a complete solution of the analysis from partial evidences,
multi-compromised infrastructures.
- Resources and allocation
- Outcomes and how results are integrated in operational security
# References