Serge E. Hallyn 8ec2328f11 file capabilities: don't prevent signaling setuid root programs ... An unprivileged process must be able to kill a setuid root program started by the same user. This is legacy behavior needed for instance for xinit to kill X when the window manager exits. When an unprivileged user runs a setuid root program in !SECURE_NOROOT mode, fP, fI, and fE are set full on, so pP' and pE' are full on. Then cap_task_kill() prevents the user from signaling the setuid root task. This is a change in behavior compared to when !CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES. This patch introduces a special check into cap_task_kill() just to check whether a non-root user is signaling a setuid root program started by the same user. If so, then signal is allowed. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>		2007-11-29 09:24:53 -08:00
..
keys	KEYS: Make request_key() and co fundamentally asynchronous	2007-10-17 08:42:57 -07:00
selinux	SELinux: add more validity checks on policy load	2007-11-08 08:56:23 +11:00
capability.c	Implement file posix capabilities	2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00
commoncap.c	file capabilities: don't prevent signaling setuid root programs	2007-11-29 09:24:53 -08:00
dummy.c	V3 file capabilities: alter behavior of cap_setpcap	2007-10-18 14:37:24 -07:00
inode.c	security/ cleanups	2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00
Kconfig	Implement file posix capabilities	2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00
Makefile	[PATCH] LSM: remove BSD secure level security module	2006-09-29 09:18:10 -07:00
root_plug.c	security: Convert LSM into a static interface	2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00
security.c	security/ cleanups	2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00