CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the XFS filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: xfs@oss.sgi.com
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This commit is contained in:
David Howells 2008-11-14 10:39:04 +11:00 committed by James Morris
parent a5f773a659
commit 82ab8deda7
3 changed files with 5 additions and 5 deletions

View file

@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
* Credentials
*/
typedef struct cred {
/* EMPTY */
/* EMPTY */
} cred_t;
extern struct cred *sys_cred;

View file

@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ xfs_ioctl_setattr(
* to the file owner ID, except in cases where the
* CAP_FSETID capability is applicable.
*/
if (current->fsuid != ip->i_d.di_uid && !capable(CAP_FOWNER)) {
if (current_fsuid() != ip->i_d.di_uid && !capable(CAP_FOWNER)) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EPERM);
goto error_return;
}

View file

@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ xfs_acl_allow_set(
return ENOTDIR;
if (vp->i_sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)
return EROFS;
if (XFS_I(vp)->i_d.di_uid != current->fsuid && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
if (XFS_I(vp)->i_d.di_uid != current_fsuid() && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
return EPERM;
return 0;
}
@ -413,13 +413,13 @@ xfs_acl_access(
switch (fap->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
seen_userobj = 1;
if (fuid != current->fsuid)
if (fuid != current_fsuid())
continue;
matched.ae_tag = ACL_USER_OBJ;
matched.ae_perm = allows;
break;
case ACL_USER:
if (fap->acl_entry[i].ae_id != current->fsuid)
if (fap->acl_entry[i].ae_id != current_fsuid())
continue;
matched.ae_tag = ACL_USER;
matched.ae_perm = allows;