aha/ipc/shm.c

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/*
* linux/ipc/shm.c
* Copyright (C) 1992, 1993 Krishna Balasubramanian
* Many improvements/fixes by Bruno Haible.
* Replaced `struct shm_desc' by `struct vm_area_struct', July 1994.
* Fixed the shm swap deallocation (shm_unuse()), August 1998 Andrea Arcangeli.
*
* /proc/sysvipc/shm support (c) 1999 Dragos Acostachioaie <dragos@iname.com>
* BIGMEM support, Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@suse.de>
* SMP thread shm, Jean-Luc Boyard <jean-luc.boyard@siemens.fr>
* HIGHMEM support, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
* Make shmmax, shmall, shmmni sysctl'able, Christoph Rohland <cr@sap.com>
* Shared /dev/zero support, Kanoj Sarcar <kanoj@sgi.com>
* Move the mm functionality over to mm/shmem.c, Christoph Rohland <cr@sap.com>
*
[PATCH] Rework of IPC auditing 1) The audit_ipc_perms() function has been split into two different functions: - audit_ipc_obj() - audit_ipc_set_perm() There's a key shift here... The audit_ipc_obj() collects the uid, gid, mode, and SElinux context label of the current ipc object. This audit_ipc_obj() hook is now found in several places. Most notably, it is hooked in ipcperms(), which is called in various places around the ipc code permforming a MAC check. Additionally there are several places where *checkid() is used to validate that an operation is being performed on a valid object while not necessarily having a nearby ipcperms() call. In these locations, audit_ipc_obj() is called to ensure that the information is captured by the audit system. The audit_set_new_perm() function is called any time the permissions on the ipc object changes. In this case, the NEW permissions are recorded (and note that an audit_ipc_obj() call exists just a few lines before each instance). 2) Support for an AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM audit message type. This allows for separate auxiliary audit records for normal operations on an IPC object and permissions changes. Note that the same struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl is used and populated, however there are separate audit_log_format statements based on the type of the message. Finally, the AUDIT_IPC block of code in audit_free_aux() was extended to handle aux messages of this new type. No more mem leaks I hope ;-) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2006-04-02 21:07:33 +00:00
* support for audit of ipc object properties and permission changes
* Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
*
* namespaces support
* OpenVZ, SWsoft Inc.
* Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org>
*/
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
#include <linux/shm.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include "util.h"
static struct file_operations shm_file_operations;
static struct vm_operations_struct shm_vm_ops;
static struct ipc_ids init_shm_ids;
#define shm_ids(ns) (*((ns)->ids[IPC_SHM_IDS]))
#define shm_lock(ns, id) \
((struct shmid_kernel*)ipc_lock(&shm_ids(ns),id))
#define shm_unlock(shp) \
ipc_unlock(&(shp)->shm_perm)
#define shm_get(ns, id) \
((struct shmid_kernel*)ipc_get(&shm_ids(ns),id))
#define shm_buildid(ns, id, seq) \
ipc_buildid(&shm_ids(ns), id, seq)
static int newseg (struct ipc_namespace *ns, key_t key,
int shmflg, size_t size);
static void shm_open (struct vm_area_struct *shmd);
static void shm_close (struct vm_area_struct *shmd);
static void shm_destroy (struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct shmid_kernel *shp);
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
static int sysvipc_shm_proc_show(struct seq_file *s, void *it);
#endif
static void __ipc_init __shm_init_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct ipc_ids *ids)
{
ns->ids[IPC_SHM_IDS] = ids;
ns->shm_ctlmax = SHMMAX;
ns->shm_ctlall = SHMALL;
ns->shm_ctlmni = SHMMNI;
ns->shm_tot = 0;
ipc_init_ids(ids, 1);
}
static void do_shm_rmid(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct shmid_kernel *shp)
{
if (shp->shm_nattch){
shp->shm_perm.mode |= SHM_DEST;
/* Do not find it any more */
shp->shm_perm.key = IPC_PRIVATE;
shm_unlock(shp);
} else
shm_destroy(ns, shp);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IPC_NS
int shm_init_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns)
{
struct ipc_ids *ids;
ids = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_ids), GFP_KERNEL);
if (ids == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
__shm_init_ns(ns, ids);
return 0;
}
void shm_exit_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns)
{
int i;
struct shmid_kernel *shp;
mutex_lock(&shm_ids(ns).mutex);
for (i = 0; i <= shm_ids(ns).max_id; i++) {
shp = shm_lock(ns, i);
if (shp == NULL)
continue;
do_shm_rmid(ns, shp);
}
mutex_unlock(&shm_ids(ns).mutex);
kfree(ns->ids[IPC_SHM_IDS]);
ns->ids[IPC_SHM_IDS] = NULL;
}
#endif
void __init shm_init (void)
{
__shm_init_ns(&init_ipc_ns, &init_shm_ids);
ipc_init_proc_interface("sysvipc/shm",
" key shmid perms size cpid lpid nattch uid gid cuid cgid atime dtime ctime\n",
IPC_SHM_IDS, sysvipc_shm_proc_show);
}
static inline int shm_checkid(struct ipc_namespace *ns,
struct shmid_kernel *s, int id)
{
if (ipc_checkid(&shm_ids(ns), &s->shm_perm, id))
return -EIDRM;
return 0;
}
static inline struct shmid_kernel *shm_rmid(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int id)
{
return (struct shmid_kernel *)ipc_rmid(&shm_ids(ns), id);
}
static inline int shm_addid(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct shmid_kernel *shp)
{
return ipc_addid(&shm_ids(ns), &shp->shm_perm, ns->shm_ctlmni);
}
static inline void shm_inc(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int id)
{
struct shmid_kernel *shp;
shp = shm_lock(ns, id);
BUG_ON(!shp);
shp->shm_atim = get_seconds();
shp->shm_lprid = current->tgid;
shp->shm_nattch++;
shm_unlock(shp);
}
#define shm_file_ns(file) (*((struct ipc_namespace **)&(file)->private_data))
/* This is called by fork, once for every shm attach. */
static void shm_open(struct vm_area_struct *shmd)
{
shm_inc(shm_file_ns(shmd->vm_file),
shmd->vm_file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_ino);
}
/*
* shm_destroy - free the struct shmid_kernel
*
* @shp: struct to free
*
* It has to be called with shp and shm_ids.mutex locked,
* but returns with shp unlocked and freed.
*/
static void shm_destroy(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct shmid_kernel *shp)
{
ns->shm_tot -= (shp->shm_segsz + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
shm_rmid(ns, shp->id);
shm_unlock(shp);
if (!is_file_hugepages(shp->shm_file))
shmem_lock(shp->shm_file, 0, shp->mlock_user);
else
user_shm_unlock(shp->shm_file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_size,
shp->mlock_user);
fput (shp->shm_file);
security_shm_free(shp);
ipc_rcu_putref(shp);
}
/*
* remove the attach descriptor shmd.
* free memory for segment if it is marked destroyed.
* The descriptor has already been removed from the current->mm->mmap list
* and will later be kfree()d.
*/
static void shm_close (struct vm_area_struct *shmd)
{
struct file * file = shmd->vm_file;
int id = file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
struct shmid_kernel *shp;
struct ipc_namespace *ns;
ns = shm_file_ns(file);
mutex_lock(&shm_ids(ns).mutex);
/* remove from the list of attaches of the shm segment */
shp = shm_lock(ns, id);
BUG_ON(!shp);
shp->shm_lprid = current->tgid;
shp->shm_dtim = get_seconds();
shp->shm_nattch--;
if(shp->shm_nattch == 0 &&
shp->shm_perm.mode & SHM_DEST)
shm_destroy(ns, shp);
else
shm_unlock(shp);
mutex_unlock(&shm_ids(ns).mutex);
}
static int shm_mmap(struct file * file, struct vm_area_struct * vma)
{
int ret;
ret = shmem_mmap(file, vma);
if (ret == 0) {
vma->vm_ops = &shm_vm_ops;
[PATCH] shmat: stop mprotect from giving write permission to a readonly attachment (CVE-2006-1524) I found that all of 2.4 and 2.6 have been letting mprotect give write permission to a readonly attachment of shared memory, whether or not IPC would give the caller that permission. SUS says "The behaviour of this function [mprotect] is unspecified if the mapping was not established by a call to mmap", but I don't think we can interpret that as allowing it to subvert IPC permissions. I haven't tried 2.2, but the 2.2.26 source looks like it gets it right; and the patch below reproduces that behaviour - mprotect cannot be used to add write permission to a shared memory segment attached readonly. This patch is simple, and I'm sure it's what we should have done in 2.4.0: if you want to go on to switch write permission on and off with mprotect, just don't attach the segment readonly in the first place. However, we could have accumulated apps which attach readonly (even though they would be permitted to attach read/write), and which subsequently use mprotect to switch write permission on and off: it's not unreasonable. I was going to add a second ipcperms check in do_shmat, to check for writable when readonly, and if not writable find_vma and clear VM_MAYWRITE. But security_ipc_permission might do auditing, and it seems wrong to report an attempt for write permission when there has been none. Or we could flag the vma as SHM, note the shmid or shp in vm_private_data, and then get mprotect to check. But the patch below is a lot simpler: I'd rather stick with it, if we can convince ourselves somehow that it'll be safe. Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2006-04-12 21:34:27 +00:00
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
shm_inc(shm_file_ns(file), file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_ino);
}
return ret;
}
static int shm_release(struct inode *ino, struct file *file)
{
struct ipc_namespace *ns;
ns = shm_file_ns(file);
put_ipc_ns(ns);
shm_file_ns(file) = NULL;
return 0;
}
static struct file_operations shm_file_operations = {
.mmap = shm_mmap,
.release = shm_release,
#ifndef CONFIG_MMU
.get_unmapped_area = shmem_get_unmapped_area,
#endif
};
static struct vm_operations_struct shm_vm_ops = {
.open = shm_open, /* callback for a new vm-area open */
.close = shm_close, /* callback for when the vm-area is released */
.nopage = shmem_nopage,
#if defined(CONFIG_NUMA) && defined(CONFIG_SHMEM)
.set_policy = shmem_set_policy,
.get_policy = shmem_get_policy,
#endif
};
static int newseg (struct ipc_namespace *ns, key_t key, int shmflg, size_t size)
{
int error;
struct shmid_kernel *shp;
int numpages = (size + PAGE_SIZE -1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
struct file * file;
char name[13];
int id;
if (size < SHMMIN || size > ns->shm_ctlmax)
return -EINVAL;
if (ns->shm_tot + numpages >= ns->shm_ctlall)
return -ENOSPC;
shp = ipc_rcu_alloc(sizeof(*shp));
if (!shp)
return -ENOMEM;
shp->shm_perm.key = key;
shp->shm_perm.mode = (shmflg & S_IRWXUGO);
shp->mlock_user = NULL;
shp->shm_perm.security = NULL;
error = security_shm_alloc(shp);
if (error) {
ipc_rcu_putref(shp);
return error;
}
if (shmflg & SHM_HUGETLB) {
/* hugetlb_zero_setup takes care of mlock user accounting */
file = hugetlb_zero_setup(size);
shp->mlock_user = current->user;
} else {
int acctflag = VM_ACCOUNT;
/*
* Do not allow no accounting for OVERCOMMIT_NEVER, even
* if it's asked for.
*/
if ((shmflg & SHM_NORESERVE) &&
sysctl_overcommit_memory != OVERCOMMIT_NEVER)
acctflag = 0;
sprintf (name, "SYSV%08x", key);
file = shmem_file_setup(name, size, acctflag);
}
error = PTR_ERR(file);
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto no_file;
error = -ENOSPC;
id = shm_addid(ns, shp);
if(id == -1)
goto no_id;
shp->shm_cprid = current->tgid;
shp->shm_lprid = 0;
shp->shm_atim = shp->shm_dtim = 0;
shp->shm_ctim = get_seconds();
shp->shm_segsz = size;
shp->shm_nattch = 0;
shp->id = shm_buildid(ns, id, shp->shm_perm.seq);
shp->shm_file = file;
file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_ino = shp->id;
shm_file_ns(file) = get_ipc_ns(ns);
/* Hugetlb ops would have already been assigned. */
if (!(shmflg & SHM_HUGETLB))
file->f_op = &shm_file_operations;
ns->shm_tot += numpages;
shm_unlock(shp);
return shp->id;
no_id:
fput(file);
no_file:
security_shm_free(shp);
ipc_rcu_putref(shp);
return error;
}
asmlinkage long sys_shmget (key_t key, size_t size, int shmflg)
{
struct shmid_kernel *shp;
int err, id = 0;
struct ipc_namespace *ns;
ns = current->nsproxy->ipc_ns;
mutex_lock(&shm_ids(ns).mutex);
if (key == IPC_PRIVATE) {
err = newseg(ns, key, shmflg, size);
} else if ((id = ipc_findkey(&shm_ids(ns), key)) == -1) {
if (!(shmflg & IPC_CREAT))
err = -ENOENT;
else
err = newseg(ns, key, shmflg, size);
} else if ((shmflg & IPC_CREAT) && (shmflg & IPC_EXCL)) {
err = -EEXIST;
} else {
shp = shm_lock(ns, id);
BUG_ON(shp==NULL);
if (shp->shm_segsz < size)
err = -EINVAL;
else if (ipcperms(&shp->shm_perm, shmflg))
err = -EACCES;
else {
int shmid = shm_buildid(ns, id, shp->shm_perm.seq);
err = security_shm_associate(shp, shmflg);
if (!err)
err = shmid;
}
shm_unlock(shp);
}
mutex_unlock(&shm_ids(ns).mutex);
return err;
}
static inline unsigned long copy_shmid_to_user(void __user *buf, struct shmid64_ds *in, int version)
{
switch(version) {
case IPC_64:
return copy_to_user(buf, in, sizeof(*in));
case IPC_OLD:
{
struct shmid_ds out;
ipc64_perm_to_ipc_perm(&in->shm_perm, &out.shm_perm);
out.shm_segsz = in->shm_segsz;
out.shm_atime = in->shm_atime;
out.shm_dtime = in->shm_dtime;
out.shm_ctime = in->shm_ctime;
out.shm_cpid = in->shm_cpid;
out.shm_lpid = in->shm_lpid;
out.shm_nattch = in->shm_nattch;
return copy_to_user(buf, &out, sizeof(out));
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
struct shm_setbuf {
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
mode_t mode;
};
static inline unsigned long copy_shmid_from_user(struct shm_setbuf *out, void __user *buf, int version)
{
switch(version) {
case IPC_64:
{
struct shmid64_ds tbuf;
if (copy_from_user(&tbuf, buf, sizeof(tbuf)))
return -EFAULT;
out->uid = tbuf.shm_perm.uid;
out->gid = tbuf.shm_perm.gid;
out->mode = tbuf.shm_perm.mode;
return 0;
}
case IPC_OLD:
{
struct shmid_ds tbuf_old;
if (copy_from_user(&tbuf_old, buf, sizeof(tbuf_old)))
return -EFAULT;
out->uid = tbuf_old.shm_perm.uid;
out->gid = tbuf_old.shm_perm.gid;
out->mode = tbuf_old.shm_perm.mode;
return 0;
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
static inline unsigned long copy_shminfo_to_user(void __user *buf, struct shminfo64 *in, int version)
{
switch(version) {
case IPC_64:
return copy_to_user(buf, in, sizeof(*in));
case IPC_OLD:
{
struct shminfo out;
if(in->shmmax > INT_MAX)
out.shmmax = INT_MAX;
else
out.shmmax = (int)in->shmmax;
out.shmmin = in->shmmin;
out.shmmni = in->shmmni;
out.shmseg = in->shmseg;
out.shmall = in->shmall;
return copy_to_user(buf, &out, sizeof(out));
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
static void shm_get_stat(struct ipc_namespace *ns, unsigned long *rss,
unsigned long *swp)
{
int i;
*rss = 0;
*swp = 0;
for (i = 0; i <= shm_ids(ns).max_id; i++) {
struct shmid_kernel *shp;
struct inode *inode;
shp = shm_get(ns, i);
if(!shp)
continue;
inode = shp->shm_file->f_dentry->d_inode;
if (is_file_hugepages(shp->shm_file)) {
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
*rss += (HPAGE_SIZE/PAGE_SIZE)*mapping->nrpages;
} else {
struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode);
spin_lock(&info->lock);
*rss += inode->i_mapping->nrpages;
*swp += info->swapped;
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
}
}
}
asmlinkage long sys_shmctl (int shmid, int cmd, struct shmid_ds __user *buf)
{
struct shm_setbuf setbuf;
struct shmid_kernel *shp;
int err, version;
struct ipc_namespace *ns;
if (cmd < 0 || shmid < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
version = ipc_parse_version(&cmd);
ns = current->nsproxy->ipc_ns;
switch (cmd) { /* replace with proc interface ? */
case IPC_INFO:
{
struct shminfo64 shminfo;
err = security_shm_shmctl(NULL, cmd);
if (err)
return err;
memset(&shminfo,0,sizeof(shminfo));
shminfo.shmmni = shminfo.shmseg = ns->shm_ctlmni;
shminfo.shmmax = ns->shm_ctlmax;
shminfo.shmall = ns->shm_ctlall;
shminfo.shmmin = SHMMIN;
if(copy_shminfo_to_user (buf, &shminfo, version))
return -EFAULT;
/* reading a integer is always atomic */
err= shm_ids(ns).max_id;
if(err<0)
err = 0;
goto out;
}
case SHM_INFO:
{
struct shm_info shm_info;
err = security_shm_shmctl(NULL, cmd);
if (err)
return err;
memset(&shm_info,0,sizeof(shm_info));
mutex_lock(&shm_ids(ns).mutex);
shm_info.used_ids = shm_ids(ns).in_use;
shm_get_stat (ns, &shm_info.shm_rss, &shm_info.shm_swp);
shm_info.shm_tot = ns->shm_tot;
shm_info.swap_attempts = 0;
shm_info.swap_successes = 0;
err = shm_ids(ns).max_id;
mutex_unlock(&shm_ids(ns).mutex);
if(copy_to_user (buf, &shm_info, sizeof(shm_info))) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
err = err < 0 ? 0 : err;
goto out;
}
case SHM_STAT:
case IPC_STAT:
{
struct shmid64_ds tbuf;
int result;
memset(&tbuf, 0, sizeof(tbuf));
shp = shm_lock(ns, shmid);
if(shp==NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
} else if(cmd==SHM_STAT) {
err = -EINVAL;
if (shmid > shm_ids(ns).max_id)
goto out_unlock;
result = shm_buildid(ns, shmid, shp->shm_perm.seq);
} else {
err = shm_checkid(ns, shp,shmid);
if(err)
goto out_unlock;
result = 0;
}
err=-EACCES;
if (ipcperms (&shp->shm_perm, S_IRUGO))
goto out_unlock;
err = security_shm_shmctl(shp, cmd);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
kernel_to_ipc64_perm(&shp->shm_perm, &tbuf.shm_perm);
tbuf.shm_segsz = shp->shm_segsz;
tbuf.shm_atime = shp->shm_atim;
tbuf.shm_dtime = shp->shm_dtim;
tbuf.shm_ctime = shp->shm_ctim;
tbuf.shm_cpid = shp->shm_cprid;
tbuf.shm_lpid = shp->shm_lprid;
if (!is_file_hugepages(shp->shm_file))
tbuf.shm_nattch = shp->shm_nattch;
else
tbuf.shm_nattch = file_count(shp->shm_file) - 1;
shm_unlock(shp);
if(copy_shmid_to_user (buf, &tbuf, version))
err = -EFAULT;
else
err = result;
goto out;
}
case SHM_LOCK:
case SHM_UNLOCK:
{
shp = shm_lock(ns, shmid);
if(shp==NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
err = shm_checkid(ns, shp,shmid);
if(err)
goto out_unlock;
[PATCH] Rework of IPC auditing 1) The audit_ipc_perms() function has been split into two different functions: - audit_ipc_obj() - audit_ipc_set_perm() There's a key shift here... The audit_ipc_obj() collects the uid, gid, mode, and SElinux context label of the current ipc object. This audit_ipc_obj() hook is now found in several places. Most notably, it is hooked in ipcperms(), which is called in various places around the ipc code permforming a MAC check. Additionally there are several places where *checkid() is used to validate that an operation is being performed on a valid object while not necessarily having a nearby ipcperms() call. In these locations, audit_ipc_obj() is called to ensure that the information is captured by the audit system. The audit_set_new_perm() function is called any time the permissions on the ipc object changes. In this case, the NEW permissions are recorded (and note that an audit_ipc_obj() call exists just a few lines before each instance). 2) Support for an AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM audit message type. This allows for separate auxiliary audit records for normal operations on an IPC object and permissions changes. Note that the same struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl is used and populated, however there are separate audit_log_format statements based on the type of the message. Finally, the AUDIT_IPC block of code in audit_free_aux() was extended to handle aux messages of this new type. No more mem leaks I hope ;-) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2006-04-02 21:07:33 +00:00
err = audit_ipc_obj(&(shp->shm_perm));
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
if (!capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
err = -EPERM;
if (current->euid != shp->shm_perm.uid &&
current->euid != shp->shm_perm.cuid)
goto out_unlock;
if (cmd == SHM_LOCK &&
!current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur)
goto out_unlock;
}
err = security_shm_shmctl(shp, cmd);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
if(cmd==SHM_LOCK) {
struct user_struct * user = current->user;
if (!is_file_hugepages(shp->shm_file)) {
err = shmem_lock(shp->shm_file, 1, user);
if (!err) {
shp->shm_perm.mode |= SHM_LOCKED;
shp->mlock_user = user;
}
}
} else if (!is_file_hugepages(shp->shm_file)) {
shmem_lock(shp->shm_file, 0, shp->mlock_user);
shp->shm_perm.mode &= ~SHM_LOCKED;
shp->mlock_user = NULL;
}
shm_unlock(shp);
goto out;
}
case IPC_RMID:
{
/*
* We cannot simply remove the file. The SVID states
* that the block remains until the last person
* detaches from it, then is deleted. A shmat() on
* an RMID segment is legal in older Linux and if
* we change it apps break...
*
* Instead we set a destroyed flag, and then blow
* the name away when the usage hits zero.
*/
mutex_lock(&shm_ids(ns).mutex);
shp = shm_lock(ns, shmid);
err = -EINVAL;
if (shp == NULL)
goto out_up;
err = shm_checkid(ns, shp, shmid);
if(err)
goto out_unlock_up;
[PATCH] Rework of IPC auditing 1) The audit_ipc_perms() function has been split into two different functions: - audit_ipc_obj() - audit_ipc_set_perm() There's a key shift here... The audit_ipc_obj() collects the uid, gid, mode, and SElinux context label of the current ipc object. This audit_ipc_obj() hook is now found in several places. Most notably, it is hooked in ipcperms(), which is called in various places around the ipc code permforming a MAC check. Additionally there are several places where *checkid() is used to validate that an operation is being performed on a valid object while not necessarily having a nearby ipcperms() call. In these locations, audit_ipc_obj() is called to ensure that the information is captured by the audit system. The audit_set_new_perm() function is called any time the permissions on the ipc object changes. In this case, the NEW permissions are recorded (and note that an audit_ipc_obj() call exists just a few lines before each instance). 2) Support for an AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM audit message type. This allows for separate auxiliary audit records for normal operations on an IPC object and permissions changes. Note that the same struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl is used and populated, however there are separate audit_log_format statements based on the type of the message. Finally, the AUDIT_IPC block of code in audit_free_aux() was extended to handle aux messages of this new type. No more mem leaks I hope ;-) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2006-04-02 21:07:33 +00:00
err = audit_ipc_obj(&(shp->shm_perm));
if (err)
goto out_unlock_up;
if (current->euid != shp->shm_perm.uid &&
current->euid != shp->shm_perm.cuid &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
err=-EPERM;
goto out_unlock_up;
}
err = security_shm_shmctl(shp, cmd);
if (err)
goto out_unlock_up;
do_shm_rmid(ns, shp);
mutex_unlock(&shm_ids(ns).mutex);
goto out;
}
case IPC_SET:
{
if (copy_shmid_from_user (&setbuf, buf, version)) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
mutex_lock(&shm_ids(ns).mutex);
shp = shm_lock(ns, shmid);
err=-EINVAL;
if(shp==NULL)
goto out_up;
err = shm_checkid(ns, shp,shmid);
if(err)
goto out_unlock_up;
[PATCH] Rework of IPC auditing 1) The audit_ipc_perms() function has been split into two different functions: - audit_ipc_obj() - audit_ipc_set_perm() There's a key shift here... The audit_ipc_obj() collects the uid, gid, mode, and SElinux context label of the current ipc object. This audit_ipc_obj() hook is now found in several places. Most notably, it is hooked in ipcperms(), which is called in various places around the ipc code permforming a MAC check. Additionally there are several places where *checkid() is used to validate that an operation is being performed on a valid object while not necessarily having a nearby ipcperms() call. In these locations, audit_ipc_obj() is called to ensure that the information is captured by the audit system. The audit_set_new_perm() function is called any time the permissions on the ipc object changes. In this case, the NEW permissions are recorded (and note that an audit_ipc_obj() call exists just a few lines before each instance). 2) Support for an AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM audit message type. This allows for separate auxiliary audit records for normal operations on an IPC object and permissions changes. Note that the same struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl is used and populated, however there are separate audit_log_format statements based on the type of the message. Finally, the AUDIT_IPC block of code in audit_free_aux() was extended to handle aux messages of this new type. No more mem leaks I hope ;-) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2006-04-02 21:07:33 +00:00
err = audit_ipc_obj(&(shp->shm_perm));
if (err)
goto out_unlock_up;
[PATCH] update of IPC audit record cleanup The following patch addresses most of the issues with the IPC_SET_PERM records as described in: https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2006-May/msg00010.html and addresses the comments I received on the record field names. To summarize, I made the following changes: 1. Changed sys_msgctl() and semctl_down() so that an IPC_SET_PERM record is emitted in the failure case as well as the success case. This matches the behavior in sys_shmctl(). I could simplify the code in sys_msgctl() and semctl_down() slightly but it would mean that in some error cases we could get an IPC_SET_PERM record without an IPC record and that seemed odd. 2. No change to the IPC record type, given no feedback on the backward compatibility question. 3. Removed the qbytes field from the IPC record. It wasn't being set and when audit_ipc_obj() is called from ipcperms(), the information isn't available. If we want the information in the IPC record, more extensive changes will be necessary. Since it only applies to message queues and it isn't really permission related, it doesn't seem worth it. 4. Removed the obj field from the IPC_SET_PERM record. This means that the kern_ipc_perm argument is no longer needed. 5. Removed the spaces and renamed the IPC_SET_PERM field names. Replaced iuid and igid fields with ouid and ogid in the IPC record. I tested this with the lspp.22 kernel on an x86_64 box. I believe it applies cleanly on the latest kernel. -- ljk Signed-off-by: Linda Knippers <linda.knippers@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2006-05-17 02:03:48 +00:00
err = audit_ipc_set_perm(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode);
[PATCH] Rework of IPC auditing 1) The audit_ipc_perms() function has been split into two different functions: - audit_ipc_obj() - audit_ipc_set_perm() There's a key shift here... The audit_ipc_obj() collects the uid, gid, mode, and SElinux context label of the current ipc object. This audit_ipc_obj() hook is now found in several places. Most notably, it is hooked in ipcperms(), which is called in various places around the ipc code permforming a MAC check. Additionally there are several places where *checkid() is used to validate that an operation is being performed on a valid object while not necessarily having a nearby ipcperms() call. In these locations, audit_ipc_obj() is called to ensure that the information is captured by the audit system. The audit_set_new_perm() function is called any time the permissions on the ipc object changes. In this case, the NEW permissions are recorded (and note that an audit_ipc_obj() call exists just a few lines before each instance). 2) Support for an AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM audit message type. This allows for separate auxiliary audit records for normal operations on an IPC object and permissions changes. Note that the same struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl is used and populated, however there are separate audit_log_format statements based on the type of the message. Finally, the AUDIT_IPC block of code in audit_free_aux() was extended to handle aux messages of this new type. No more mem leaks I hope ;-) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2006-04-02 21:07:33 +00:00
if (err)
goto out_unlock_up;
err=-EPERM;
if (current->euid != shp->shm_perm.uid &&
current->euid != shp->shm_perm.cuid &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
goto out_unlock_up;
}
err = security_shm_shmctl(shp, cmd);
if (err)
goto out_unlock_up;
shp->shm_perm.uid = setbuf.uid;
shp->shm_perm.gid = setbuf.gid;
shp->shm_perm.mode = (shp->shm_perm.mode & ~S_IRWXUGO)
| (setbuf.mode & S_IRWXUGO);
shp->shm_ctim = get_seconds();
break;
}
default:
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
err = 0;
out_unlock_up:
shm_unlock(shp);
out_up:
mutex_unlock(&shm_ids(ns).mutex);
goto out;
out_unlock:
shm_unlock(shp);
out:
return err;
}
/*
* Fix shmaddr, allocate descriptor, map shm, add attach descriptor to lists.
*
* NOTE! Despite the name, this is NOT a direct system call entrypoint. The
* "raddr" thing points to kernel space, and there has to be a wrapper around
* this.
*/
long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg, ulong *raddr)
{
struct shmid_kernel *shp;
unsigned long addr;
unsigned long size;
struct file * file;
int err;
unsigned long flags;
unsigned long prot;
int acc_mode;
void *user_addr;
struct ipc_namespace *ns;
if (shmid < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
} else if ((addr = (ulong)shmaddr)) {
if (addr & (SHMLBA-1)) {
if (shmflg & SHM_RND)
addr &= ~(SHMLBA-1); /* round down */
else
#ifndef __ARCH_FORCE_SHMLBA
if (addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
#endif
return -EINVAL;
}
flags = MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED;
} else {
if ((shmflg & SHM_REMAP))
return -EINVAL;
flags = MAP_SHARED;
}
if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY) {
prot = PROT_READ;
acc_mode = S_IRUGO;
} else {
prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
acc_mode = S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO;
}
if (shmflg & SHM_EXEC) {
prot |= PROT_EXEC;
acc_mode |= S_IXUGO;
}
/*
* We cannot rely on the fs check since SYSV IPC does have an
* additional creator id...
*/
ns = current->nsproxy->ipc_ns;
shp = shm_lock(ns, shmid);
if(shp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
err = shm_checkid(ns, shp,shmid);
if (err) {
shm_unlock(shp);
goto out;
}
if (ipcperms(&shp->shm_perm, acc_mode)) {
shm_unlock(shp);
err = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
err = security_shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
if (err) {
shm_unlock(shp);
return err;
}
file = shp->shm_file;
size = i_size_read(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
shp->shm_nattch++;
shm_unlock(shp);
down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
if (addr && !(shmflg & SHM_REMAP)) {
user_addr = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (find_vma_intersection(current->mm, addr, addr + size))
goto invalid;
/*
* If shm segment goes below stack, make sure there is some
* space left for the stack to grow (at least 4 pages).
*/
if (addr < current->mm->start_stack &&
addr > current->mm->start_stack - size - PAGE_SIZE * 5)
goto invalid;
}
user_addr = (void*) do_mmap (file, addr, size, prot, flags, 0);
invalid:
up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
mutex_lock(&shm_ids(ns).mutex);
shp = shm_lock(ns, shmid);
BUG_ON(!shp);
shp->shm_nattch--;
if(shp->shm_nattch == 0 &&
shp->shm_perm.mode & SHM_DEST)
shm_destroy(ns, shp);
else
shm_unlock(shp);
mutex_unlock(&shm_ids(ns).mutex);
*raddr = (unsigned long) user_addr;
err = 0;
if (IS_ERR(user_addr))
err = PTR_ERR(user_addr);
out:
return err;
}
asmlinkage long sys_shmat(int shmid, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
{
unsigned long ret;
long err;
err = do_shmat(shmid, shmaddr, shmflg, &ret);
if (err)
return err;
force_successful_syscall_return();
return (long)ret;
}
/*
* detach and kill segment if marked destroyed.
* The work is done in shm_close.
*/
asmlinkage long sys_shmdt(char __user *shmaddr)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma, *next;
unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)shmaddr;
loff_t size = 0;
int retval = -EINVAL;
if (addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
return retval;
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
/*
* This function tries to be smart and unmap shm segments that
* were modified by partial mlock or munmap calls:
* - It first determines the size of the shm segment that should be
* unmapped: It searches for a vma that is backed by shm and that
* started at address shmaddr. It records it's size and then unmaps
* it.
* - Then it unmaps all shm vmas that started at shmaddr and that
* are within the initially determined size.
* Errors from do_munmap are ignored: the function only fails if
* it's called with invalid parameters or if it's called to unmap
* a part of a vma. Both calls in this function are for full vmas,
* the parameters are directly copied from the vma itself and always
* valid - therefore do_munmap cannot fail. (famous last words?)
*/
/*
* If it had been mremap()'d, the starting address would not
* match the usual checks anyway. So assume all vma's are
* above the starting address given.
*/
vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
while (vma) {
next = vma->vm_next;
/*
* Check if the starting address would match, i.e. it's
* a fragment created by mprotect() and/or munmap(), or it
* otherwise it starts at this address with no hassles.
*/
if ((vma->vm_ops == &shm_vm_ops || is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) &&
(vma->vm_start - addr)/PAGE_SIZE == vma->vm_pgoff) {
size = vma->vm_file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_size;
do_munmap(mm, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start);
/*
* We discovered the size of the shm segment, so
* break out of here and fall through to the next
* loop that uses the size information to stop
* searching for matching vma's.
*/
retval = 0;
vma = next;
break;
}
vma = next;
}
/*
* We need look no further than the maximum address a fragment
* could possibly have landed at. Also cast things to loff_t to
* prevent overflows and make comparisions vs. equal-width types.
*/
size = PAGE_ALIGN(size);
while (vma && (loff_t)(vma->vm_end - addr) <= size) {
next = vma->vm_next;
/* finding a matching vma now does not alter retval */
if ((vma->vm_ops == &shm_vm_ops || is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) &&
(vma->vm_start - addr)/PAGE_SIZE == vma->vm_pgoff)
do_munmap(mm, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start);
vma = next;
}
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
return retval;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
static int sysvipc_shm_proc_show(struct seq_file *s, void *it)
{
struct shmid_kernel *shp = it;
char *format;
#define SMALL_STRING "%10d %10d %4o %10u %5u %5u %5d %5u %5u %5u %5u %10lu %10lu %10lu\n"
#define BIG_STRING "%10d %10d %4o %21u %5u %5u %5d %5u %5u %5u %5u %10lu %10lu %10lu\n"
if (sizeof(size_t) <= sizeof(int))
format = SMALL_STRING;
else
format = BIG_STRING;
return seq_printf(s, format,
shp->shm_perm.key,
shp->id,
shp->shm_perm.mode,
shp->shm_segsz,
shp->shm_cprid,
shp->shm_lprid,
is_file_hugepages(shp->shm_file) ? (file_count(shp->shm_file) - 1) : shp->shm_nattch,
shp->shm_perm.uid,
shp->shm_perm.gid,
shp->shm_perm.cuid,
shp->shm_perm.cgid,
shp->shm_atim,
shp->shm_dtim,
shp->shm_ctim);
}
#endif